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ABSTR-\CT 
This dissertation focuses on determining benefits or value of environmental 
improvements in agricultural production, specifically, with an application to the pork 
industry. Values or benefits from reduced odor, reduced manure run-off. and reduced 
manure spills were elicited from consumers from Iowa. Kansas. \'ermont. Oregon, and North 
Carolina. For the study, two pound packages of pork chops with selected combinations of 
air. ground water, and surface water environmental attributes were used to obtain consumer 
willingness-to-pay for environmental improvements. These benefits or willingness-to-pay 
for improved environmental practices have been obtained through research using a multiple 
trial sccond-price sealed-bid auction. 
.A. focus of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between willingness-to-
pay for embedded environmental attributes and socioeconomic characteristics. The 
dependent variables analyzed had a mix of continuous and discrete points within the 
distribution because of self-selectivity. Given this, a two-stage econometric procedure 
employing a polychotomous choice function, specifically an ordered probit. was used to 
investigate this relationship. Predictive ability of the model was limited and sensitive to the 
\ ariables included. 
Two measures of willingness-to-pay for improved envirormiental attributes were 
de\ eloped and examined. It was found that under both these measures, approximately two-
thirds of the participants indicated they would be willing to pay a premium for pork products 
u itli embedded environmental attributes. The average premium paid by premium payers 
under botii measures ranged from SI.62 to S2.23 for the package with all three embedded 
enMronmenlal attributes. Statistical methods were used to examine whether there w ere 
differences in premiums with differing levels of embedded environmental attributes. 
Examining the premiums across the different locations in this study shows that there were no 
significant differences in the premium level by location. Demographic and attitudinal data of 
the participants in this study are presented. Statistical tests are employed to see whether they 
are significantly different across premium payers and non-premium payers. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Ens'ironmental issues related to livestock production have received increased attention 
in recent years. These environmental issues have included odors, and surface and ground 
water quality. Asi industry at the forefront of this attention has been the pork production 
indusir\-. One of the major issues the industry is facing is odor from production. This has 
been due to recent scientific research which has shown the effects that odor from production 
can have on nearby residents. Schiffman et al. cite studies that provide evidence of the health 
risks that can occur in highly odorous environments including swine housing facilities 
{I99S ). These health risks can cause localized health concems especially in large producing 
states like Iowa and North Carolina. 
Manure spills and odor from production have increased the concems surrounding 
livestock production and the environment. Large concentrations of hog operations have 
rccei\ ed a heightened focus on their effect to the environment. The three most vocalized 
conccms have been odor, contamination of ground water by both slow seepage and run-off of 
hog w aste, and major catastrophic events such as lagoon spills (Hone\Tnan 1995, 1996; 
Perkins 1996; Beeman 1996a. 1996b; Letson and Gollehon 1996). This recent attention has 
brought much scrutiny to the pig industry and effort by the industry is focusing on these 
concems. 
While odor has been a more local issue, the industry has attracted wide spread public 
scrutiny staning in the mid 1990's. In June of 1995. North Carolina suffered a large spill that 
resulted in approximately 25 million gallons of hog waste flowing into a nearby river (U.S. 
New s and World Report 1996). About one month later, the Des Moines Register reported a 
major spill in Iowa amounting to 1.5 million gallons of hog manure flowing into a local river 
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(19<-75). Both of these spills had a profound effect on the local environment. Additional 
manure spills have occurred since that time further expanding the concern. 
Due to this heightened focus, much work is currently ongoing with respect to 
technologies and/or production practices that assist in reducing potential for manure spills or 
leaks and resulting pollution of surface and ground water and odor reduction. However. 
there is little research on what the value of improved environmental quality is for consumers. 
For the past few years, the pork industry in the United Stales has been undergoing a 
major structural change. In the past, this industry has been reliant on the "community" 
farmer located in the region known as the Com Belt with an average hog inventor>- between 
500 to 999 head. In 1988, firms marketing less than 1000 hogs a year accounted for thirty-
two percent of the market, whereas firms marketing 50,000 or more accounted for only seven 
percent (Lawrence et al. 1999a). More recently the pork industr>- has seen a rapid expansion 
of large production operations with inventories that well exceed 1000 head and adopt state of 
the art production facilities to mass produce pigs (Meyer 1995). By 1997. the producers who 
market less than a 1000 head of hogs only marketed five percent of the total United States 
production. In this same year, those producers that marketed 50.000 or more hogs produced 
thirts-seven percent of the market hogs (Lawrence et al. 1999a). This expansion has allowed 
these larger farms to gain production cost efficiencies and caused increasing competitive 
pressures for the traditional pork producer. There has been a dramatic shift from the small-
scale operations to large-scale pork production. 
With the increased competitive pressure, the Iowa pork industry, too, has witnessed the 
movement to large-scale operations. This adoption of large-scale operations has had two 
J 
major effects in Iowa. First, small-scale producers have been rapidly exiling the industry. 
Second, in the adjustment process. Iowa has regained much of its competitive advantage. 
States like Iowa and North Carolina have a large vested interest in the pork industr\. as 
it is an important part of the economic base of the state. Swine production represents a major 
industry providing much economic activity in Iowa. .Approximately 94.000 jobs are directly 
related to pork production (Otto and Lawrence 1993, 1994). In a tNpical year swine gross 
reccipis are 52.6 to S3 billion and represent 30 percent of all agricultural marketing 
(Lawrence et al. 1994). The industry supports a multi-billion dollar input supply industry 
consuming about twenty-two percent of Iowa's com production. Industry stakeholders 
represent a key economic component of Iowa's economy. For a typical small rural 
community in Iowa with a ten square mile trade area, swine production represents 
approxmiately 58 million in economic activity. 
•Along with production efficiencies, the industry's ability to effectively handle 
cn\ ironmenial issues within a sustainable framework will be key to its competiti\ e position. 
These cffecls have caused many debates recently in Iowa's legislature on how much 
regulation is needed in Iowa's pork industry. Additionally, many people from lou a are 
beginning to \oice concerns about environmental and health issues that acconipan\ large-
scale hog produclicn facilities. These issues cover ground and water quality, as w ell as air 
qualiiv relating to odor and transmission of disease organisms. For the legislature lo choose 
opiimal legislation (i.e. taxes on polluters, subsidies for environmental sustaining 
technologies, etc.), i'. must have knowledge on how its constituents value environmental 
issues. 
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Dissertation Content 
While en\ ironmental issues exist about livestock production, little is known about 
how society views the value or benefit of reduced livestock odors, reduced levels and or 
probability of run-off from livestock production systems or manure spills. This dissertation 
focuses on dcterminmg perceived benefits or value of environmental impro\ements in 
livestock production, specifically, with an application to the pork industry. There are two 
\ alues/benefits that can be solicited from an experimental setting that are used in this 
dissertation. One value is related to the consumer's willingness-to-pay for environmental 
attributes when the basis for environmental improvement is known. The other value is 
related to the consumers willingness-to-pay for environmental attributes where the 
consumer's environmental expectation related to the product is unknown ex ante. 
The first value that is important to calculate is the consumer's willingness-to-pay for 
embedded environmental attributes given an ex ante expectation of w hat levels of 
environmental attributes are incorporated in the product. This expectation is deri\ ed u hen 
consumers do not have complete information related to the product attributes. This value 
will be known as the consumer's willingness-to-pay given unknown ex ante expectations as 
to the lc\ el of embedded environmental attributes within the product, or more simply referred 
to as consumer's willingness-to-pay given unknown ex ante expectations. Throughout this 
dissertation this value will also be known as definition one for willingness-to-pay. Unlike 
consumer's willingness-to-pay with a loiown basis, this value is calculated across different 
information sets where the ex ante expectation as to the level of embedded environmental 
attributes is unknown. This value represents the initial benefit the consumer receives due to 
the release of environmental information. 
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The second value that is important to measure is the consumer's willingness-to-pay 
when the basis for environmental improvement is known. This value is derived from taking 
the difference in the value of a product with embedded environmental attributes with a 
product that is considered the basis of the environmental improvement. This will be known 
as the consumer's willingness-to-pay r'br pork products with embedded environmental 
attributes with a known basis, or more simply consumer's willingness-to-pay with a known 
basis. Throughout this dissertation this value will also be known as definition two for 
willingness-to-pay. This value is calculated within a specific information set where the 
consumer can compare an environmental package with a non-environmental package. This 
value will anse when markets have been allowed to adjust and consumers have full 
knowledge of the products they consume. Knowing this value can assist policy makers in 
determining the importance of environmental attributes to consumers. 
There are four main objectives of this dissertation. The first objective is- to 
theoretically model the behavior of a consumer in a second-price sealed-bid auction when 
there are embedded environmental attributes in the item being auctioned. A pan of this 
objective is to be able to interpret what bids represent from a second-price auction when 
there are embedded environmental attributes. From a second-price auction where the 
products have no embedded environmental attributes, the bids given in the auction can be 
interpreted as the consumer's true valuation for that product. This is a unique feature of the 
second-price auction A related sub-objective is to show how the two willingness-to-pay 
measures discussed above can be extracted from a multiple round, multiple object, second-
price auction when different information sets exist about the attributes of the products. 
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The second objective of this dissertation is to outline an experimental setting in which 
the willingness-to-pay measures mentioned above can be collected, while the third objective 
is to identify how much consumers are willing to pay for pork products with embedded 
en\ ironmental attributes when looking at both of the above definitions separately— 
consumer's willingness-to-pay with a known basis and consumer's willingness-to-pay given 
unknown ex ante expectations. An extension of this third objective will be to investigate 
w heiher these \ alues are different across different locations of the United States. .A.nother 
extension is to investigate if these values differ for selected combinations of environmental 
attributes. 
The fourth main objective is to investigate the relationship socioeconomic factors, 
specifically the core variables used in the willingness-to-pay literature, have on willingness-
to-pay for embedded environmental attributes using both definitions for willingness-to-pay. 
Within this fourth objective, there are three secondary objectives. The first is to predict the 
directional cffcct environmental information has on the participants using socioeconomic 
\ ariables. This directional effect would be positive, negative, or no effect. This information 
can assist in marketing decisions by helping marketers to more efficiently target consumers 
thai will pay for products with embedded environmental attributes. Once directional mipaci 
has been predicted the magnitude of the shift will be evaluated for positiv e premium pa>crs 
under both definitions of willingness-to-pay. Finally, a comparison of the two models for 
both definitions will be given. 
Values or benefits from a reduction of odors from production facilities, and/or a 
decrease in the impact to surface and ground water have been elicited from consumers from 
the states of Iowa, Kansas, Vermont, Oregon, and North Carolina. Participants included pork 
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producers, their neighbors, rural community residents and urban residents. Sites selected for 
the study ranged from those with a large pork production base to sites located a long distance 
from pork production facilities. 
Valuations are elicited from what is referred to as the experimental contingent 
valuation method (XCVM). This approach uses sur\ eys to collect participant information 
along with experimental economics to elicit participant values for attributes such as improved 
environmental production practices (contingent value). For this study. XCVM is used to 
study both definitions of consumer's willingness-to-pay for environmental sustainability 
and or improvement of air, surface water, and ground water quality as it is associated with 
pork production. 
Sustainability within agriculture requires that at least two broad conditions be met: 
one is that of environmental sustainability, and the second is economic sustainability. An 
o\ erriding issue in both areas is that of social acceptability or overall impacts on society. 
These societal issues feed into both the envirormiental and economic areas and will, at least 
in part, be reflected in the participants' willingness-to-pay for products from systems with 
differing environmental impact attributes. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In chapter two. a discussion of related literature 
is presented. The four main topics are the use of contingent valuation and hedonic pricing 
studies to obtain willingness-to-pay, the use of experimental economics to elicit willingness-
to-pay. ecolabeling, and the problem of free-riding in experimental settings with public 
goods. Chapter three presents a model of consumer behavior in an experimental setting with 
products that have embedded environmental attributes. From this chapter, an interpretation is 
gi\ en to bids that are solicited in a second-price auction when the products being sold have 
s 
embedded environmental attributes. Also within this chapter is a derivation of the two 
willingness-to-pay measures that will be examined throughout the rest of the dissertation. 
Chapter four presents the experimental process and protocol that was used for this study. It 
explains how the experiment was developed and what instruments were used for collecting 
data. Chapter five presents results and provides discussion of the data collected from the 
experimental process. Summary statistics are also provided here along with some standard 
statistical tests of pertinent hypotheses. Chapter six presents the results of the pre and post 
surveys completed. It provides similarities and differences in the socioeconomic 
characteristics of participants who were willing to pay a premium for embedded 
environmental attributes versus those who were not. Chapter seven investigates the 
relationship between willingness-to-pay and demographic and attitudinal data using a two-
stage econometric model which incorporates a polychotomous choice function. It 
demonstrates how data can be modeled when the dependent variable has both continuous and 
discrete points. Chapter eight presents a summary- of the findings, provides final conclusions 
that can be drawn from this research, and discusses future research ideas. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITER.\TLRE REMEW 
There are four major areas in the Uterature pertaining directly to this dissertation. The 
tlrst deals with sur\'ey methods to determine vvillingness-to-pay for environmental protection 
and. or sustainability of the environment. These primarily use, but are not limited to. 
contingent valuation methods (CVM) and hedonic price models to elicit values and- or prices 
for en\ ironmental amenities. The second area pertains to the use of XCVM. i.e.. the use of 
experiments, in place of CVM in eliciting consumers' willingness-to-pay for product 
attributes. The third major area is that of ecolabeling and nutritional labeling. Due to the 
public nature of the topic this dissertation investigates, the fourth major area in the literature 
is related to the problem of free-riding and public goods being valued in an experimental 
setting. 
\'aluation Studies for Groundwater and Livestock Odor Valuation 
Portney describes CVM studies as the use of surveys to obtain willingness-to-pay for 
h\poiheiical projects or programs (1994). These elicited values are contingent upon the 
constructed or simulated market presented in the survey. He defines three major elements 
that are incorporated in virtually every CVM study. The first element is a description of the 
scenario of the policy or program that the respondent will value or vote upon. The sccond 
element is a mechanism used to elicit values or choices from the respondent. The third 
element is a questionnaire that elicits dem.ographic and/or attitudinal data that will be used 
for econometric and statistical purposes. For a discussion and critical evaluation of CVM. 
see Portney (1994). Whitehead and Van Houtven (1997), Hanneman (1994). and Diamond 
and Hausman (1994). 
Much work has been completed on willingness-to-pay for ground water protection. A 
primar\- approach has been the use of CVM surv eys to gain information on willingness-to-
pa\ for ground water protection (Boyle et al. 1994; Powell et al. 1994; Edwards 1998; Sun et 
al. 1992; Caudill and Hoehn 1996; Poe and Bishop 1992; Jordan and Elnagheeb 1993; 
Laughland et al. 1993). These studies have found an average household willingness-to-pay 
for ground water protection ranging between SI to S155 per month (V\Tiitehead and \'an 
Houtvcn 1997). This wide range of results is due to the various design methods used to 
collect the data. For instance, there was not a clear definition across studies of ground water 
contamination, or a consistent payment method used for collecting this willingness-to-pay. 
e.g.. taxes, bond referendum, etc. 
Boyle et al. performed a meta-analysis of current CVM studies that measure the 
benefits of ground water protection (1994). This meta-analysis approach was conducted by 
using unique point estimates fi"om a group of studies as observations. In their study they 
found a wide range for annual willingness-to-pay. They cite three major points of interest 
that relate directly to this work. First, they suggested that there is a need for improvements in 
future ground water valuation studies that would more clearly identify systematic differences 
in ground water \ alues. Secondly, they expressed the need for more studies to expand the 
knowledge base of depth of information and specific characteristics of ground water. Third. 
the\ found that educating households about ground water issues could influence the level of 
willingness-to-pay. 
Boyle et al. found that a major limitation to their meta-analysis was the lack of a 
consistent definition for groundwater contamination (1994). Even with this limitation, which 
constrained the variables they could use, they found that the core variables demonstrated 
1 1  
remarkable consistency. These variables were: 1) change in the probability of contamination. 
2) nitrates mentioned as a source of contaminant, 3) substitute sources of portable water 
mentioned. 4) cost of substitute mentioned. 5) average household income. 6) policy was to 
contain contamination. 7) a dichotomous variable indicating whether the study was primarily 
focused on use values, and 8) change in supply of water. 
Powell et al. studied the impact CVM has on policy (1994). They point out that one of 
the drawbacks of their study was that the information was collected through a mail surv ey. 
Lacking from their method was a way of checking the intensity of respondent evaluation of 
CVM information provided before filling out the questionnaire. They concluded that local 
level decision making on ground water policy could be aided by CVM information. 
However, they point out that while mail surs'eys are very useful in collecting information, 
interpretation of results needs to be done with caution. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
obser\ e how the respondents filled out the survey. There is no way of knowing the time and 
care respondents took in filling out the surv ey. 
Recently there has been a rise in interest for organic agriculture. The importance of 
organic agriculture stems from the perceived attributes embedded within organic products. 
Klonsky and Tourte identify an existing perception that organic agriculture provides 
soluiions to problems related to environmental quality, food safety, the viability of rural 
communities, and market concentration (1998). Hence, organic farming has the perception 
of a market that provides incentives for farmers to follow good environmental production 
practices, providing a safe food product, having a positive community impact, and having 
favorable market concentration, i.e., an acceptable mixture of small and large farms. 
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Due 10 this rise in interest of organic agriculture, issues such as willingness-to-pay for 
organic produce (Misra et al. 1991; Weaver et al. 1992) and marketing organic products 
(Thompson and Kidwell 1998; Thompson 1998; Lohr 1998; Krissoff 1998; Duram 1998) 
have received increased attention. While premiums are being paid for organic agriculture 
(Dobbs 1998). it is difficult to know which attributes within organic products are 
commanding these premiums. There have been many studies that have investigated one of 
the pcrceived attributes, the issue of food safety (Misra et al. 1991. W^eaver et al. 1992, 
Roosen et al. 1998; Fox et al., 1994; Fox et al., 1995), but little has been done in the area of 
embedded environmental attributes. 
•A study by Misra et al. focuses on willingness-to-pay for pesticide-free fresh produce 
(1991). Like most of the ground water papers, their CV'M study was also conducted through 
mail sur\ey methods. They found that a majority of Georgia consumers surveyed indicated 
tiiat produce certified to be pesticide free was a very important to a somewhat important 
consideration in food purchases. However, consumers in general were not willing to pay 
more for cenified pesticide free fresh produce. 
Weaver et al. evaluate the willingness-to-pay for pesticide-free tomatoes (1992). The> 
used a different methodology than Misra et al. (I99I). Instead of doing mail sur\cys. thc\ 
conducted face to face sur\'eys in three retail grocer\' locations in Pennsylvania. Weaver cl 
al. found thai consumers were not only concerned about how pesticides affected them, but 
ihcy also showed altruistic concerns about the effects pesticides had on farm workers, ground 
water, and the environment. They further note that consumer's willingness-to-pay for 
pesticide free tomatoes was positive and significant. 
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Rather than using the survey methods of Misra et al. (I99I) and Weaver et al. (1992) to 
obtam \vi!Hngness-to-pay and or attitudes for pesticide free produce, Thompson and Kidw ell 
(199S) did an m-store study to obtain information on consumers" choice between organic 
products and conventional products. They explained the usefulness of their study comes 
from actually observing consumers" choices. They were able to map attitudes into actual 
purchasing behavior. Most organic food studies ha\'e focused on attributes such as pesticidcs 
that may be in the food product. The study by Thompson and Kidwell focused on measuring 
how cosmetic defects affect the decision of purchasing organic. 
There is one area of study where willingness-to-pay work is lacking. This area deals 
wiih odors from production systems. This has become an increasing problem in the hog 
industr%- with the growth of large production facilities. There are three papers that have 
inx estigated the effects of livestock odor on property values (Palmquist el al. 1995; .Abeles-
.•\llison and Connor 1990; Taff et al. 1996). Both Palmquist et al. and .Abeles-.Allison and 
Connor show that the proximity of hog operations has a statistically significant and negative 
impact on family housing property values. Taff el al. found a completely opposite result. 
They found property values rising as housing was located closer to large livestock faciliiies. 
They suggest that this counterintuitive result is due to livestock operation workers bidding up 
housmg prices to live closer to where they work. Palmquist el al. explained that ihcy had 
much difficulty with their study due to the lack of information in this area of odor valuation, 
.A.1I three of these papers used hedonic price techniques to obtain a value for the effcci 
li\ esiock odor has on property values. Freeman defines this technique as a "method for 
estimating the implicit prices of the characteristics that differentiate closely related products 
in a product class (1994, p. 125)." This technique gets at a value of a characteristic indirectly 
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b\- estimating implicit prices. Using this method, Palmquist et al. (1995). .Abeles-.A.llison and 
Connor {1990), and the Taff et al. (1996) studies were not able to investigate whether the 
food consumer would actually be willing to pay to alleviate the livestock odor problem. 
The\'just show the effect livestock odor has on nearby property values. Hence, there is a 
further need for a study that obtains values on what consumers" indicate they would pay for a 
reduction in livestock odors. 
E.vperimental Economics and the Measure of Wiilingness-to-Pay 
Much of the literature and studies that have been done on willingness-to-pay for 
surface and ground water impacts have utilized C\^M with mail surveys. WTiile mail surv eys 
represent a cost-effective method of obtaining willingness-to-pay information, they provide 
limited incentive for respondents to truthfully reveal their valuation of a good. WTiitehead 
and \'an Houtven discuss three limitations of the CVM approach (1997). The first limitation 
of CN'.VI is that it can be tainted by strategic bias. Strategic bias occurs when respondents 
o\ crstate or understate their true willingness-to-pay because they perceive that their answer 
u ill intluence policy. The second limitation arises because CVM studies can be very 
sensiti\ e to the various methods for eliciting values, e.g., using an open-ended question 
\ crsus a close-cnded question. The third limitation of the C\'.M comes from the hxpothetica! 
nauirc of the questions asked which may cast doubts on the reliability of the values 
generated. 
Experimental economics, on the other hand, provides more incentive for the 
participants to reveal their tnie value for a good. Fox et al. state "the non-hypothetical 
experimental method provides a more accurate and reliable estimate of economic value than 
traditional sur\'ey techniques (1995, p. 1048)." It uses real money, real goods, and real 
auctions (Fox el al. 1996). Hence, it provides more incentive for participants in the study to 
reveai their preferences truthfully compared to typical CX'M studies. 
There can be a large benefit to using experiments to discover willingness-to-pay. 
W ithin an experiment a researcher can control the parameters which go into the experiment 
and the participant decisions can be observed (Davis and Holt 1993). Experimental 
economics allows the researcher to provide information and observ e how it affects the 
outcome. The XCVM method is a very controlled environment, whereas CV'Vl using mail 
sur\ eys leaves many unanswered questions. 
When valuing willingness-to-pay it has been argued that the second-price sealed-bid 
auction is one of the most efficient methods of gaining a consumer's value of a good 
(Shogren et al. 1994a). The second-price sealed-bid auction is conducted as follows. A 
group of participants (consumers) are allowed to bid on a good(s). The highest bidder for the 
good is obligated to buy the good at the second highest bid price. The dominant strategy in 
this auction setting is for participants to reveal their true willingness-tc-pay (Hoffman et a!. 
1993. .Menkhaus et al. 1992). The robustness of this auction method is shown in Shogren ci 
al. (1994a). Their results "suggest that the revealed preferences for low-probability risk 
reductions are relatively robust to variations in the Vickrey auction. While this does not 
pro\ c that subjects revealed their true preferences, it does suggest that the bids were not 
particularly susceptible to refined changes in the set of market prices (1994a, p. 1094)." 
There have been multiple studies that have used experimental economics, specifically 
auctions, to obtain consumers' willingness-to-pay for attributes related to products. This 
method has been used to elicit values for food safety attributes in selected food products 
(Fox. 1993; Fox et al., 1995; Fox et al., 1996; Hayes et al. 1996; Roosen et al. 1998). quality 
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differences in food products (Melton et al. 1996a. 1996b). and packaging of food products 
(Hoffman et al. 1993; Menkhaus et al. 1992). Fo.\ et al. went one step further and used 
e.xpenmental techniques to calibrate contingent values from a CVM study (1998). 
Hoffman et al. (1993) and Menkhaus et al. (1992) have used experimental auctions to 
in\ esiigate whether people have a preference on how their meat products are packaged. 
Specifically, they test whether there is a difference in willingness-to-pay for packages of 
steaks placed in a traditional over-wrapped stjrofoam tray versus steaks that are vacuum-skin 
packaged. Packaging can be an important attribute related to a product because it can affect 
the visual appeal of the good. To obtain these values, they use a fifth-price, sealed bid 
auction. ' 
There are a few major tlndings in Hoffman et al. (1993) and Menkhaus et al. (1992) 
that are of interest. First, they found that with no information, the bids for the steaks in the 
stvTofoam packaging were not significantly different from the bid for the steaks in the 
\ acuum-skin packaging. Once information was released about the benefits of vacuum-skin 
packaging, the bids for the steaks in the vacuum-skin, as well as the styrofoam packaging, 
were significantly higher than in the no information case. Releasing information also caused 
the bids for the steaks in the vacuum skin packaging to be significantly greater than the bids 
for the steaks in the styrofoam packaging (Hoffman et al. 1993). When regressing the 
dependent variable (difference in bids for the two different packages of steaks) on the 
independent variables (demographic characteristics), they found that most of the 
demographic variables "'were not particularly important explanators (Menkhaus 1993. p. 
' .A fifth-pnce. sealed-bid auction is where the four highest bidders purchase the good they bid on at the fifth 
highest price. This auction has the same demand revealing properties as the second-price, sealed-bid auction. 
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51)." Only income, number of people in household, and employment were significant factors 
(Menkhaus el al. 1992). 
Rather than investigating attributes that are not embedded in the product. Melton ei 
al. studied the effects physical attributes have on consumers' willingness-to-pay for a pork 
product (1996a, 1996b). They used a second-price, ascending bid auction to investigate pork 
chop characteristics such as color, marbling, and size. This auction method works much like 
the second-price, sealed-bid auction. The only difference is that there are successive rounds 
where bids must stay the same or be increased. In their study, they presented these pork chop 
characteristics three ways—appearance by photograph, appearance by visual inspection, and 
appearance after a taste test of similar chops. 
There are three major results of the Melton et al. paper (1996b). The first result is 
that the level of physical attributes embodied in pork chops does matter. Secondly, 
appearance and taste are not equally good sources of information for evaluating pork chop 
characieristics. Third, consumers are not consistent in their preferences for fresh pork chops. 
The method used to convey information does matter. Melton et al. conclude that consumers 
arc able to "distinguish and value subtle differences in the attributes of a fresh food product, 
such as pork chops (1996b. p. 923)." In the Mellon et al. paper, standard regression analysis 
is used lo in\ osiigate the relationship between bid prices for pork chops and demographic 
characteristics and physical attributes (1996a). .After the taste test for the pork chops. lhc> 
found ihat women, households with children, and multi-income households tend to bid less 
for the pork chops. Furthermore, age, education, and household size reduce prices bid for 
chops, while household income was positively related to chop bid prices. 
18 
Ecolabeling 
Researchers in the third area, ecolabeling, examined firms which engage in 
en\ ironmenially friendly practices and then inform the public through advertising and. or 
product labeling. Bagnoli and Watts cite many examples of ecolabeling; including the recent 
shift to selling dolphin-safe tuna (1996). .Another example pertains to the use of recycled 
materials in packaging or in the product itself, e.g.. recycled paper. \ third class of examples 
is the production and sale of cruelty-free products. Each of these examples carries one 
particular common denominator; these attributes have no physical effect on the product's 
characteristics. This in turn has led to the production of a public good by the market without 
in\olving government intervention, such as regulations or taxation. This public good 
pro\ ided by the market relates to the environment. 
There are five primary papers that pertain to ecolabeling. Two of the papers, one by 
Bagnoli and Watts (1996) and one by Kirchhoff (1996). deal with a more theoretical view of 
ecolabeling. The third paper by van Ravenswaay develops the current situation with 
ccolabeling and some possible problems and policy issues related to products with 
environmental attributes (1996). The fourth paper by Nimon and Beghin (1997) and the fifth 
paper by Teisl et al. (1999) evaluate consumers' willingness-to-pay premiums for products 
u ith embedded environmental attributes. 
Bagnoli and Watts provide a basic overview of ecolabeling (1996). They also set up 
a theoretical model that shows how effective ecolabeling can be in using the market to 
pro\ ide a public good such as environmental protection and sustainability. Their model 
incorporates a Bertrand and a Coumot economic setting. In the Coumot setting, the firm 
sclects the amount of good it wants to sell and allows the market to dictate the price; while. 
in the Bertrand setting, the firm sets the price and lets the market dictate the quantity sold. 
Furthermore, they test this theoretical model in both the Coumot and Bertrand settings using 
an experimental economic environment. Bagnoli and Watts found from their experiments 
that firms would have an incentive to produce some of the public good, i.e., the 
environmental good, but not necessarily the most efficient level (1996). 
The second theoretical paper is by Kirchhoff (1996). She presents a model in which a 
monopoly over-complies with legal en\ ironmental standards under asymmetric intormation. 
She cites findings by Salop and Scheffman (1983) which have shown that "a firm might 
rationally want stricter regulations if compljing with them is relatively costlier for its 
competitors (1996, p. 3)." Kirchhoff further cites a poll by Greenberg/'Lake which has found 
that: "In the United States, 83 percent of consumers in a 1993 poll stated that they were 
willing to pay more for environmentally sound products (1996, p. 3)." Hence she is making 
the argument that firms will sell goods with environmental attributes to gain the premium 
that people would pay for those attributes. Furthermore, she believes that a fimi would seek 
out a third-party labeling system to assist in the validity of the environmental attributes. This 
third party would provide credibility to the product sold. 
Having cited some evidence that this is actually going on in the United States. 
Kirchhoff lays out a theoretical model to e.xplain why this might be true (1996). She states 
that "voluntary over-compliance is shown to be more likely when quality premia are 
relatively high, cost differences are relatively low, and the probability of cheating being 
discovered is sufficiently high" (1996, p. 19). Hence her major conclusion is that if there 
v\ ere a large enough premium to be gained in producing a good with environmental 
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atiributes. then the firm would have an incentive to produce and market that good with those 
attributes. 
This theoretical view of Bagnoli and Watts (1996 ) and Kirchhoff (1996) has been 
substantiated in the real world by van Ravenswaay (1996). She states that "over the last 
decade, a growing number of consumers have been demanding more environmentally 
fncndly products, and manufacturers have been meeting that demand by voluntarily 
including a growing number of environmental claims on their product label (1996. p. 1)." 
She further cites that more than 20 countries have developed ecolabeling programs. These 
countries have come together to form an international organization to facilitate 
harmonization of product claims across different participating programs all over the world. 
In her paper, van Ravenswaay also looks at two major controversies that arise with 
ecolabcling and discusses the policy implications that arise from it (1996). The first 
controx ersy she discusses pertains to the potential for consumer deception. She discusses 
poienlial difficulties in substantiating environmental claims of being "environmentally 
friendly." Hence she cites the key issue in this controversy is what types of environmental 
labels are and are not deceptive. 
The second controversy van Ravenswaay introduces is whether environmental labels 
should also ser\ e environmental objectives (1996). Thus, the label should not only be 
truthful, but it should reduce the environmental impact of consumption. This implies that 
even though the claims on the label may be true, the claims can not come from increasing 
some other environmental impact that more than offset the original impact. For example, if a 
firm claims to reduce the impact of production on w'ater pollution, it cannot at the same time 
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increase its impact in another environmental area such as odor that more than offsets the 
original impact. Hence, the claim must have a positive net return to environmental impacts. 
.More firms are adopting ecolabeling to gain an advantage over their competitors 
while meeting the changing demands of consumers. This, in turn, will lead more firms to 
adopt ecolabeling methods with this approach as a method of removing or improving 
competitiveness. The market can provide a public good, that of environmental sustainability. 
u ith little or no government intervention. This has been verified in an area closely related to 
ecolabeling. This area is nutritional and food safety product labeling. Caswell and 
-Mojduszka study how information labeling of nutritional and food safety attributes can effect 
the market demand of a product (1996). They cite evidence that information labeling does 
have a positive influence on demand. Since information labeling can affect consumer 
demand, the focus of their paper is on the economic rationales for labeling policies and issues 
related to how the success or failure of these policies should be judged. 
Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) cite some of the same problems of information 
labeling of food safety and nutritional attributes that van Ravenswaay (1996) has espoused 
with ecolabeling. In many aspects they are the same. A major difference between 
ecolabeling and information labeling of food safety and nutritional attributes is that the 
fomier deals with nonuse values and the latter pertains to use value. Nonuse values are 
values that are independent of people's present use. WTiereas. use values are values that are 
directly related to present consumption (Freeman 1994). 
Nimon and Beghin investigate whether consumers pay a premium for environmental 
attributes embedded in clothing (1997). The specific attributes they looked at were organic 
cotton and environmental-fiiendly dyes. Using a hedonic price function, they found that 
consumers paid a premium for organic cotton. On the other hand, they found no evidence 
that consumers paid a premium for environmentally friendly dyes. Hence their paper suggest 
that certain environmental attributes may receive a premium while others do not. 
Along the same line as Nimon and Beghin (1997), TeisI et al. investigated the effect 
ecolabeling has on tuna with the attribute that it was caught with nets that are safe to dolphins 
(1999). Their goal was to measure the effectiveness of dolphin-safe labeling of canned tuna. 
Thc> used a product e.xpenditure approach to show that dolphin-safe labeling, i.e., 
ecolabeling. affected consumer behavior. This labeling caused tuna to gain market share 
o\ er substitute products. While they were able to show that ecolabeling tuna as dolphin-safe 
liad an effect on market share, they were not able to deduce what the value of that ecolabel 
u as. Hence, they were not able to get at willingness-to-pay for dolphin-safe tuna. 
The Public Good Nature of Environmental Attributes 
.Any product that has embedded environmental attributes is going to ha\ e a public 
good nature lo it. Public goods tend to have two major properties related to them. The first 
propertN relates lo the nonrivalry aspect of a public good. A good is said to be nonrival if the 
good can be consumed by an individual without detracting from another person's 
consumption of thai good. The second property that relates to public goods is the idea of 
noncxcludabiiity. A nonexcludable good is a good that can not be costlessly withheld (rorrt 
others once it is provided. (Comes and Sandler 1996) A product that has embedded 
en\ ironmental attributes, such as the one being studied in this dissertation, tends to have a 
public good nature to it because, once produced, its benefits cannot be e.xcluded from others 
and is nonrival. 
There is a vast Hterature on the nature of public goods. One major area of this 
literature that pertains directly to this dissertation is the free-riding literature. This literature 
stems from an inherent problem that arises due to the two major attributes of public goods— 
nonrivalry and nonexcludability. Free-riding as it relates to provision of public goods is 
hen people underrepresent their true benefits from the public good to avoid having to pay 
for the total benefits they receive from that provision. Hence free-riding tends to lead to the 
underprovision of public goods. In its extreme, free-riding would lead to no provision of the 
public good. 
.Much research has been done in the area of free-riding as it relates to the provision of 
a public good in an experimental setting. One of the first papers to look at this issue was 
done by Marwell and .\mes (1979). They designed an experiment to test whether people 
truly free-ride when giving to the provision of a public good. In their research they found 
approximately fifty-seven percent of the available resources went to the provision of the 
public good. Strong free-riding tendencies of the participants would have predicted thai this 
number would have been closer to zero. Hence, Marwell and Ames were able to show that 
while there was an underprovision of the public good in their experiment, there were still a 
substantial amount of resources given by the participants towards a public good ( 
Marwell and .A.mes investigated provision of the public good in a one-shot setting 
(19~9). They received criticism of their work because they did not investigate what would 
happen to provision to the public good over time. Isaac et al. (1985) built upon Marwell and 
Ames' work (1979) by adding repetition to the experimental process. Isaac et al. had the 
participants in their study give to the public good many times within one experiment. They 
found that in the first round their results were much the same as Marwell and Ames. But, 
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they further found with repetition that there was a tendency of the participants to give less to 
the public good in later rounds. Hence, they found that with repetition there was a signitlcani 
underprovision of the public good within the experimental setting. 
The two studies above show that with less e.xperienced participants there is a 
tendency for them to give to the public good. But with repetition, it was also found that 
provision of the public good declines. Neither of these studies systematically looked at the 
free-riding principle. The first group of researchers to take a systematic investigation of what 
causes free riding was Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984). In Isaac et al., they systematically 
investigated how repetition, group size, and pay-off to providing the public good affects 
participants contribution levels to the public good (1984). They found three major results. 
First, having a higher pay-off to the provision of the public good leads to higher contribution 
levels. Obviously, if the return from the provision of the public good is high, participants 
u ill tend to give more to the public good. Second, they found that experience does matter. 
In liicir study, the more experienced participants tended to give less to the pro\ ision of the 
public good. Third, they found that group size had a positive correlation with contribution to 
the public good, i.e., as group size increased, the contribution to the public good increased. 
WTiile many researchers have investigated within an experimental setting the 
p r o \  ision of public goods, there has been no definitive research which shows why people 
give the amount they do. In public good experiments, some participants give to the public 
good while others do not. The free-riding problem can be prevalent, i.e., underprovision of 
the public good, but not to the extent that theory would suggest (Davis and Holt). It should 
be noted that all of the studies looked at public goods in a ver>' abstract manner, i.e., the 
public good was a pot of money. No research has been done in an experimental setting 
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testing how people would give to an actual public good. e.g.. a park bench, environment, etc.. 
that is not related to the participants within the respective studies. One part of this 
dissenation investigates this issue. 
CHAPTER THREE: INTERPRETING PRICES FROM A VICKRE^ 
AUCTION WHEN THE OBJECT HAS ENVIRONMENTAL 
ATTRIBUTES 
This chapter examines consumer behavior in a second-price sealed-bid auction with 
products having different environmental quality attributes. A unique feature of this model is 
that it describes consumer behavior with different information sets. From this model, a 
demonstration will be given on how to derive consumers willingness-to-pay for embedded 
en\ ironmental attributes through the consumer's behavioral choice using a second-price 
sealed-bid auction. It will be showTi that if free-riding e.xists. then prices from the second-
price auction cannot be interpreted as the consumer's true valuation of the product being sold. 
Furthermore this chapter will show how prices for products with embedded environmental 
attributes from a second-price sealed-bid auction can be interpreted. 
In this chapter it will also be shown that in an auction setting with different 
information sets, willingness-to-pay can be derived in at least two ways. One way relates to 
comparing a t\pical good to one that has an environmental improvement over the typical 
good m the same round. This willingness-to-pay measure assures that the expectation of the 
cn\ ironmental attributes for the consumer is known, but it does not directly account for any 
\ isua! nonen^ ironmental quality differences between the two products being considered. 
.\noiher wa\' to look at consumer's willingness-to-pay is to obser\ e it for similar products 
\\ ith different information sets. This allows for the visual attributes of the product to remain 
constant, but there is no ex ante information on the consumer's prior expectation of 
embedded environmental attributes. It should be noted that, ex post, these expectations 
could be inferred. 
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Auctions 
McAfee and McMillan define an auction as a "market institution with an explicit set 
of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market 
participants." (1987, p. 701) Over the centuries, auctions have been used to establish value 
for many different kinds of commodities. Some of these commodities include plundered 
booi> from the people who were conquered by the Roman Empire, federal land, artwork, 
limber rights, stamps, and wine. The four most common auctions are the English auction, the 
Dutch auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the second-price sealed-bid auction. 
(.Vlilgrom and Weber, 1982)' 
In a typical English auction, an auctioneer starts the bidding sequence at a low pricc 
and steadily increases the price for the item until only one willing bidder remains. In this 
auction, everyone involved in the auction knows the number of active bidders and the current 
bid price at any point in time in the auction. While the English auction starts at a low price 
and increases, the Dutch auction starts at a high price that decreases. The price in this 
auction decreases until some bidder stops the auction at an acceptable price and claims the 
item for the price at which the auction stopped. The Dutch auction is used to sell flowers in 
Holland. In the first-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder submits a bid to the auctioneer 
which is unknown to the other bidders." In this auction, the highest bidder claims ihc obicci 
being auctioned at the price she bid. In the second-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder also 
submits a bid to the auctioneer which is unknown to other bidders. The difference between a 
• l-or an in-depth discussion on each of these auction mechanism see; Milgrom and Weber; 19S2, .Vlc.A.fee and 
Mc.Millan. 19S7; and .Milgrom, 19S9; V'ickrey, 1961. 
" .-\ seaied-bid auction is an auction where each bidder submits a bid to the auctioneer which is unknown to the 
other bidders. Only the auctioneer knows who submined a particular bid. 
first-price and a second-price auction is that in a second-price auction the highest bidder 
claims the object being auctioned at the second highest bid. 
hi 1961. William Vickrey laid the foundations for the study of auctions (1961). He 
in\ estigaled the four auctions mentioned above under what is now considered the benchmark 
model for studying auctions. In his paper he investigated these four auctions under six basic 
assumptions. One basic assumption Vickrey used for stud\'ing auctions was that the bidders 
in the auction are risk neutral. Another assumption N'ickrey made was that the bidders were 
svTnmetric. Bidders are said to be symmetric when they draw their valuations from the same 
probability distribution. Symmetry also requires that bidders who draw the same valuation 
gi\ e identical bids. A third assumption made by Vickrey is that there is no collusion among 
the bidders. The fourth assumption is that paxTnent is a function of the bids alone. This 
implies that there are no reservation values of the auctioneer or initial payments to the 
auctioneer to enter the auction.^ No initial payment implies that anyone can participate in the 
auction without paying a fee to the auctioneer. An implicit fifth assumption Vickrey made 
u as that bidders have e.xpected utility maximizing beha\ ior.'* The sixth assumption in 
X ickrcy's investigation is that the independent-private-values assumption applies. Under this 
assumption, each bidder is assumed to know her exact valuation of the good she is bidding 
on. u hile not knowing anyone else's valuation. .A.lso. the bidder perceives the value of an> 
other bidder as a random draw from some probability distribution where the value of other 
bidder's is statistically independent from her own. 
resen. e price is the minimum price set by the auctioneer at which she will sell the item being auctioned. It" 
the highest bidder's bid is below the reserve price, the item being auctioned will not be sold. 
" This specific assumption was not given in Victj^ey's 1961 paper explicitly. Kami and Safra (1986, 1989) 
demonstrated that Vickrey needed to assume that the bidders are expected utility maximizing agents to make 
some of his arguments. 
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Under these six assumptions, which will be referred to as the benchmark model of 
assumptions. Vickxey was able to demonstrate some remarkable findings through 
argumentation. One of these findings is that the Dutch auction and the first-price auction are 
straiegically equivalent. Strategic equivalence implies that the sets of strategies and their 
mapping to outcomes are identical for both auctions. Another finding of Vickrey was that 
the English auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction both have a dominant strategy 
equilibrium of revealing one's true valuation." A dominant strategy is a strategy such that no 
other strategy is better than it is. A third finding by Vickrey is that the English auction and 
the second-price sealed-bid auction are Pareto optimal in the sense that the bidder with the 
highest valuation wins the object. The most remarkable finding in Vickrey's paper relates to 
expected revenue of the auctions. He conjectured that the four typical auctions described 
abo\ e with the same benchmark assumptions would generate on average the same revenue to 
the seller.'* This would imply that from the point of view of the seller, it would not matter 
which auction mechanism was utilized to sell an object.' 
Of the four auctions mentioned above, two stand out as better mechanisms for 
gathering consumer's willingness-to-pay for embedded environmental attributes. These t\\ o 
auctions are the second-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction. The reason these 
iwo auctions stand out is because under the benchmark assumptions, they both have as 
~ Kami and Safra showed that to obtain this result it is necessary to assume that bidders follow expected utility 
niaximizini: behavior (1989). To prove that true value revelation is a dominant strategy in a second-price 
sealed-bid auction it is a neccssary and sufficient condition for the bidders to have e.xpected utility maximizing 
behavior. Kami and Safra (1986) also showed that the existence of a dominant strategy of truth revelation does 
not imply utility maximizing behavior for the second-price auction. 
' This IS knoN^Ti as the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. For a discussion of why this is true, see .Vlc.Afee and 
McMillan (1987). 
It should be noted that while the four auctions under the benchmark assumptions have the same expected 
re\ enue. this does not imply that they have the same variance. 
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dominant strategies truthful revelation of the bidders" preferences. Theoretically, in the 
Dutch auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction, it is in the interest of the bidders to bid a 
\ aluc below their true valuation. The amount each bidder shaves her bid from her true 
\ aluation will depend upon the probability distribution of the other bidders' valuations and 
the number of competing bidders (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). 
T r u t h f u l  Revelation Propert>- of the Second-Price Sealed-Bid .Auction 
Before consumer behavior can be understood in a second-price sealed-bid auction 
where the product has embedded environmental attributes, a major characteristic of the 
auction must be discussed. A major characteristic of the single-unit second-price sealed-bid 
auction is that it requires the top bidder to purchase the object being bid upon at the second 
highest bid price. This feature of the auction ensures that each participant will bid his/her 
true willingness to pay for the product being auctioned, i.e.. each participant's true valuation 
(Vickrey 1961). The reason this holds true is because in a game theoretic setting it is the 
bidder's weakly dominant strategy to bid his/lier true value."^ This true valuation can be 
dcfmed as the maximum income that the bidder would be willing to give up to obtain the 
product. The bidder's utility in this situation is equal to the bidder's utility when she has her 
full amount of income and no product. 
To see why the second-price sealed-bid auction gi\ es the true willingness-to-pay for 
an object, the following standard argument from the literature is presented (Vickrey 1961: 
Mc.A.fee and .McMillan 1987. Kami and Safra 1989). Suppose there are N bidders where 
bidder i, i = 1. 2, ... . N, gives a bid of b, for an object and has a true valuation of v, for that 
^ -A weakly dominant strategy is a strategy such that no other strategy is strictly better than it is. In this case, 
some strategies may be equally good, but not necessarily for all cases. 
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object. It is also assumed that the benchmark model set of assumption explained above holds 
true for each bidder—the bidders are risk neutral expected utility maximizers. there is no 
collusion among the bidders, the independent-private-values assumption holds, the bidders 
are s\Tnmetric, and the bidders pa>Tnent is a function of their bids alone. Let VV be the 
maximum bid of all other bidders excluding bidder i. Without loss of generality, assume that 
if bidder i does not purchase the object her utility level is 0. Also assume that if she does 
purchase the good her utility is equal to her true valuation minus the second highest bid. 
Hence, if her true valuation is greater than the second highest bid she obtains a positive 
utility from purchasing the good. 
There are two general scenarios that must be investigated. The first scenario is when 
bidder i bids higher than her true valuation, i.e.. b, > v,. In this first scenario, suppose that W 
> b,. This would imply that bidder i receives 0 utility whether she bids her true valuation or 
not because she is not the highest bidder. Now suppose that W < v, < bi. In this case bidder 
i obtains utility level v, - W, which she would have obtained by bidding her true valuation \ 
Suppose that the ma.ximum bid from all other participants is greater than the true valuation of 
bidder i but less than the bid given by bidder i. i.e., v, < W < b,. This would imply that the 
utility of bidder i is equal to v, - VV, which is obviously a negative number. In this situation, 
it w ould ha\ e been better for bidder i to bid her true valuation v, and obtain a utility lc\cl ot' 
U. Hencc. it has been shown that bidder i would have done no worse by bidding her true 
valuation and in some cases would have been better off 
The second scenario that needs to be investigated is when bidder i bids less than her 
true valuation, i.e.. b, < v,. In this situation, when bidder i bids greater than or equal to the 
maximum of the other bidders, i.e., b, > W, she receives a utility level of v, - W. which is a 
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positive level. Bidder i, in this case, would have received the same utility le\ el if she bid her 
true valuation. If the true valuation of bidder i is less than or equal to the maximum bid of all 
the other individuals, i.e., W > v„ then she received 0 utility. In this case, she could receive 
the same utility level by bidding her true valuation because she will never be the highest 
bidder. Finally, if the bid of bidder i is strictly less than the ma.\imum bid of the other 
individuals, which is strictly less than the true valuation of bidder i, i.e., v, > \V > b„ then 
bidder i foregoes a positive utility level by under bidding. In this case it would have been in 
the best interest of bidder i to bid her true valuation. Hence, it has been shown under this 
second scenario that bidder i would have done no worse by bidding her true valuation and in 
some cases would have been better off. 
Two major implications of the Vickrey auction can be drawn from the above 
discussion. The first implication is that the second-price sealed-bid auction has the property 
of optimizing individuals revealing their true preferences in a noncooperative game theoretic 
setting. The second implication is that this auction mechanism divorces the bidders from 
strategic interaction, i.e., the bidders do not base their bids on what they believe the other 
bidders are doing. This can be seen from the fact that probabilities were not utilized in the 
argument above.These implications will be important when looking at willingness-lo-pay 
for environmental attributes and consumer behavior. 
'• Implicitly, the bidder increases her probabilitv- of being the highest bidder by increasing her bid. but this does 
not increase her gains (utility) compared to bidding her true valuation. The assumption that relates to 
probability structures in the benchmark model of assumptions is used to prove revenue equivalence among the 
four auctions. TTiis assumption is not necessary when establishing the dominant strategy of the second-price 
auction. 
Second-Price Auction Research 
Since Vickrey's seminal paper, there has been much research done in the area of 
auctions. N4uch of this research has focused on the seller's side of the auction and usually 
consists of optimal auction theorems or comparing different auctions in the areas of revenue 
generation and equi\ alence (Matthews. 1987). The literature on optimal auction theorems 
attempts to characterize auctions which optimize seller's revenue given a particular set of 
assumptions. In the literature related to revenue generation, auctions are ranked by the 
amount of money each generates to the seller using a particular set of assumptions. The 
re% enue equiv alence literature investigates what assumptions are required for a set of 
auctions to generate equivalent e.xpected revenue. 
In the benchmark model, the most fundamental assumption that is studied in the 
second-price auction literature is related to the differences among the bidders" valuations of 
the item. There are two extreme assumptions that can be made about the bidders' valuations 
( Mc.A^fee and .VIcVIillan 1987). The first extreme is known as the independent-private-values 
assumption. Under this assumption, each bidder is assumed to know exactly her true v alue 
of ilie item being auctioned. She does not know any other bidder's value of the item; rather, 
she perceives any other bidder's value as a random draw from some probabilit\ distribution. 
This \ alue is independent of any other bidder's value. The common-value assumption is the 
converse of the independent-private-values assumption. Under the common-value 
assumption, the object being auctioned has a single objective value which is unknown to the 
bidders. This implies that every bidder has the same valuation of the product being 
auctioned, but they do not know with certainty what that valuation is. Hence, each bidder 
draws her valuation from the same distribution as the other bidders given this single objective 
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value. An example of this type of item being auctioned would be a tract of oil King beneath 
the ground. 
Wlien valuing embedded environmental attributes, it is more appropriate to use the 
independent-private-values assumption. This assumption allows the bidders to value 
en\ ironmental attributes differently, i.e.. the utility derived from environmental attributes can 
be different for different bidders. The common-value assumption requires that the bidders 
have the same value for environmental attributes. 
V\'ithin the theoretical literature related to second-price sealed-bid auctions using the 
independent-private-values assumption there are three major areas that are studied which 
relax the assumptions of Vickrey's seminal paper. The first set of papers examines collusion 
in a second-price auction. Second-price auctions when more than one item is sold are 
examined in the second set of papers. The third set of papers examines bidder's risk 
behavior, conjectures, and behavior without expected utility. 
There are three major papers that study collusion in a second-price auction with the 
indepcndent-private-values assumption. One paper examines why the second-price auction 
has a tendency of facilitating collusion among bidders compared to other auction methods 
(von Ungem-Stemberg 1988). The two other papers that study collusion examine 
mechanisms for maintaining collusion in a second-price auction (Graham and Marshall 
.Maiiath and Zemsky 1991). 
von Ungem-Stemberg studies why a second-price auction is a better facilitator of 
collusive behavior than the other auctions, i.e., first-price, Dutch, and English auctions, by 
modeling the collusive behavior in a second-price auction as a cartel (1988). This cartel 
designates who the high bidder will be for any particular auction. The bidders that are not 
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designated the high bidder must submit a predetermined bid set by the cartel. He argues that 
since the highest bidder only has to pay the second highest bid in a second-price auction, 
collusion can be maintained in this type of auction by having the designated high bidder 
submit a bid exorbitantly higher than the highest valuation of the other members of the 
collusive group. Wlien bidders exist outside the cartel, von Ungem-Stemberg argues that the 
designated highest bidder from the cartel will still submit a bid higher than his valuation if he 
believes it will encourage cartel discipline. He funher argues that collusion in the second-
price auction is even more pronounced when the bidders repeatedly interact with each other 
in other second-price auctions. 
Graham and Marshall study collusion and the auctioneer's best response to collusion 
in the second-price auction with ex ante homogeneous bidders (1987). In their model, they 
have an outside agent which coordinates the collusion of a subset of bidders. This agent 
operates an incentive compatible mechanism prior to the actual auction, known as a 
prcauction knockout, to implement efficient collusion among any subset of bidders. 
Collusive behavior in Graham and Marshall's model is maintained by the outside agent 
offering side pavTnents to the collusive bidders. Except for the designated high bidder from 
the preauction knockout, the rest of the members of the collusive group submit a bid less than 
their true valuation in the second-price auction. From their model, Graham and Marshall 
show that coalitions among a subset of bidders in the actual auction is possible and that gains 
to the coalition are increasing in the size of the coalition. They also showed that the optimal 
response of the auctioneer is to develop a reserve price that is a function of the coalition's 
size. 
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Mailath and Zemsky (1991) take the work of Graham and Marshall (19S7 ) one siep 
further by studying collusion with ex ante heterogeneous bidders. Mailath and Zemsky were 
able to show that a mechanism exists to obtain an ex post budget balancing efficient 
collusion in a second-price auction.In Graham and Marshall's work, their mechanism was 
ex ante budget balancing, not necessarily ex post budget balancing. To obtain efficient 
collusion. Mailath and Zemsky show that each bidder's net payoff from participating in the 
coalition is a constant, which is independent of her valuation." They also show thai the 
collusi\ e surplus can always be allocated in such a way that every subset of bidders will 
alw ays wish to participate in the coalition. 
In the independent-private-values setting, there are two major papers that examine 
issues related to selling multiple objects in a second-price auction. The first paper examines 
the auctioneer's choice of whether to sell multiple objects in multiple single unit auctions or 
to group the items into one single unit auction (Chakraborty 1999).'" The second paper 
studies the properties of selling multiple objects in multiple sequential auctions when the 
bidders have diminishing marginal valuations of the items being sold (Katzman 1999). 
In the context of a second-price auction, Chakraborty investigates under what 
conditions an auctioneer would want to sell multiple objects in multiple auctions versus 
selling the multiple objects in one bundle in a single auction (1999). In his model, he 
assumes thai the bidders employ the same strategies whether they face a single auciion or 
multiple auctions and that the values of the multiple objects are additive. Without proof, he 
Budget balancing is said to exist when the summation of the side payments are less than or equal to zero. 
'' The net payoff of the bidder is defined as the difference between the expected payoff when colluding and the 
payoff when not colluding. 
Noie that in a single unit auction only an item or a group of items arc sold as one unit. 
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stales thai "it is the dominant strategy for each bidder to bid his true valuation for the objects 
w hen the objects are sold simultaneously or sequentially through Vickrey auctions (1999. p. 
725)." In essence, he has assumed away any wealth effects that might occur in the multiple 
auction setting due to a buyer having obtained an item in a previous auction.' " By assuming 
away wealth effects, he is implicitly assuming that there is no complementarity or 
substitutability between the products being auctioned. The major result that Chakraborty 
found was the e.xistence of a unique critical number of bidders for each set of objects being 
auctioned such that the seller prefers to bundle the objects when there are fewer bidders than 
the critical value. When there are more bidders than the critical number of bidders, the seller 
prefers to sell the objects in separate auctions. Furthermore, he was able to show that this 
property still holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated for a given bidder. 
In the complicated world of multi-unit demands. Katzman studies behavior in a 
second-price auction with diminishing marginal valuations (1999). To make the problem 
tractable he uses the most simplistic model he can. He assumes that there are two bidders 
and a sequence of two auctions. Within this setting, Katzman studies the behavior of bidders 
w hen there is complete and incomplete information sets. Katzman examines four situations 
that could occur with complete information. He shows that in a few situations bidders rc\cal 
their true valuation of the item being auctioned, but in most situations they do not. Price 
sequences tend to be constant or decreasing in the complete information setting and there is 
the possibility for inefficient allocations.'"' Bidding behavior is quite different in the 
incomplete information setting. In the first sequence of bidding, both bidders shave their 
'' Wealth effects are when participants change their bids because they won an earlier trial (Fox et al. 19951. See 
Davis and Holt (1993) for a discussion of wealth effects in e.xperimental markets. 
Inefficiency in this context implies that the bidder with the highest valuation does not obtain the item. 
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high \ aluations when bidding. In the final auciion. bidders bid their true valuations. Thus, in 
the incomplete world, there are efficient allocations of the item being auctioned. 
There are five main papers that are related to bidders' conjectures and risk attitudes in 
the second-price auction with the independent-private-values assumption. .A. paper by 
Rotiikopf et al. studies the question why V^ickrey auctions are rarely used in the real world 
setting (1990). Two papers exsmiine the implications from the buyers and seller's point of 
\ iew when bidders are risk averse (Matthews 1987; Smith and Levin 1996). N'eilson 
examines second-price auctions when the bidders are not e.xpected utility maximizers (1994). 
while Lo e.xamines uncertainty averse bidders (1998). 
With revenue equivalence of the four auctions and the truthful revelation property of 
the \'ickrey auction using the benchmark model. Rothkopf et al. ask the question of why the 
\ ickrey auction is seldom used in practice (1990). To answer this question, they examine 
se\ en possible reasons, five of which have been examined by other authors, why the Vickrey 
auciion is rarely used. From the standpoint of Rothkopf et al. there are five inadequate 
reasons for the rarity of the second-price auction studied in the literature. These reasons are; 
1) man\ auctions sell multiple objects for sale, 2) bidder risk aversion. 3) bidder as\Tnmciry, 
4) non-independent values, i.e., the common-value assumption, and 5) inertia.'"^ Two reasons 
thai were not examined in the literature prior to Rothkopf el al. are strictly related to the 
bidders. These authors argue that one of the major reasons why second-price auctions arc 
rare is because the bidders fear bid takers might cheat them. A second reason, u hich the 
authors argue is an even more plausible reason, is that bidders have a resistance to truih-
'• Inertia is the argument that the second-price auction is not used because bidders have become accustomed to 
other auction methods. 
re\ ealing strategies. In this first case, the authors argue that in a Vickrey auction, it would be 
lucrative for the auctioneer to place a phony bid higher than the actual second highest bid to 
capture the surplus that is given to the highest bidder due to the nature of the auction.'" In an 
English auction where everyone at ever\' point in time sees the bids in the auction, this phony 
bid is not as big of a problem. In the second case, the authors argue that bidders are 
conditioned not to give their true valuations because of later interactions with other bidders. 
Bidders may fear that revealing their true valuation in a particular auction may harm them in 
future auctions. 
WTien e.xamining the second-price auction within the conte.xt of the independent-
pnvate-values assumption, the predominant emphasis of the literature has been placed on the 
seller's point of view. To counter this bias. Matthews investigates second-price auctions 
from the point of view of the buyer (1987). Specifically, he studies which auctions the 
buyers would prefer when each bidder is risk averse. He examines three different auctions— 
the first price auction, the second-price auction, and the first price auction when the number 
of bidders is revealed—where bidders exhibit decreasing (DARA), constant (C.A.R.A.). or 
increasing (IAR.A.) absolute risk aversion.' One of the major findings of Matthews is that 
u iih no reserve price, it is the dominant strategy to reveal one's true valuation under all three 
risk av ersion slates. Matthews is able to also show that when CAR.A holds, the bidders arc 
'' The surplus that goes to the bidder is the difTerence between the highest bid and the second highest bid. In a 
\ ickrey auction, this surplus goes fiilly to the bidder. 
' Matthews assumes that in the standard first-price and second-price auctions that the bidders do not know hou 
manj- bidders there are m the auction. In the second-price auction it does not matter how many bidders there 
are from the point of view of the optimal strategy to use when bidding (1996). But. it will matter to the bidders 
in the tlrst-price auction because they shave there bid from their true value based on the number of bidders in 
the auction. 
indifferent between all three auctions. Under DAR.\. Matthews shows that the bidders prefer 
the second-price auction to the first price auction, while under lARA. it is the exact opposite. 
Smith and Levin (1996) take Matthews (1987) research one step further. Rather than 
having a fixed number of bidders. Smith and Levin study the first-price and second-price 
auction u hen entry is endogenous under the three t>pes of risk aversion. They are able to 
show that under lARA and CARA, that the results of Matthews remain robust with 
endogenous entr\'. However, under DARA, the ranking of the auctions can change with 
endogenous entry. Smith and Levin show that the reason the ranking can change with 
endogenous entry is because the first price auction "mechanism discourages entrv' to an 
extent that offsets its inherent tendency to stimulate more aggressive bidding (1996. p. 550)." 
Even with endogenous entry, it is still a dominant strategy for the bidders to reveal their irue 
valuation in the second-price auction. 
One of the assumptions made in the benchmark model is that the bidders in the 
auciion must be expected utility maximizing agents. This necessar>' and sufficient condition 
\\ as shown by Kami and Safra (1989). They showed that when this assumption is missing, 
i.e.. when the bidder's preferences are represented by a non-expected utility functional, it is 
the dominant strategy of bidders to bid their certainty equivalence of the item. Building on 
Kami and Safra's work. Neilson investigates what happens to the results of the second pricc 
auciion when expected utility fails (1994). Specifically, he examines what happens when the 
number of bidders change in the auction, what happens to the optimal reserve price set by the 
auctioneer, and what happens to revenue equivalence between the English and second-price 
auction. Neilson is able to show that when the number of bidders or the reserve price 
changes, the bids by the participants will change. He also shows that when e.xpected utility 
fails, the English auction and the second-price auction do not give the same expected 
re\ cnue. 
-Ajiother author who relaxes the expected utility assumption is Lo (199S). The focus 
of his paper is to study what happens to the first-price and second-price auction when bidders 
are uncertainty averse. Uncertainty aversion is a state when each bidder is unsure of the 
probability measures of the other bidders. While one of the main focuses of Lo's paper is to 
classify the equilibrium bidding strategies of the first price auction, he does state that the 
equilibrium bidding strategy for the second-price auction is still the dominant strategy of 
re\ ealing one's true valuation. Under uncertainty aversion, Lo is able to show under certain 
conditions that the first-price auction Pareto dominates the second price auction. 
When studying the literature related to the second-price sealed-bid auction using the 
independent-private-values assumption, three general results emerge. In all three papers 
pertaining to collusion in a second-price auction, it is clear that the bidders who participate in 
collusion and are not selected to be the winning bidder by the group have no incentive to 
rc\ eal their true valuations. Hence, the first general result is that the property of truthful 
revelation of preferences breaks down when collusion exists. The second result is that the 
second-pnce auction from the point of view of the seller, when comparing it to other 
auctions, can be ver>- sensitive to the assumptions made within the model. Excluding 
collusive behavior, the third result is that the dominant strategy of bidding one's true value is 
robust to change in the assumptions of bidders' behavior. 
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Interpreting the Bids from a Second-Price Auction when the Item Has Embedded 
Environmental Attributes 
In the literature above, it was seen that the dominant strategy in a second-price 
sealed-bid auction is to bid one's true value for the item being auctioned. This result is ver\-
robust unless the bidder is not an expected utility maximizer or if collusion exists among the 
bidders. One of the implicit assumptions that was made to prove the dominant strategy in the 
second-price auction is that the item being auctioned is a purely private good with no public 
good attributes. When examining items with embedded environmental attributes, this 
implicit assumption does not hold. These items have a public good aspect to them. From 
chapter two. it is known that when public good attributes exist, there is a possibility of free-
riding by consumers. This motivates the question as to how to interpret the bids from a 
second-price auction when some of the goods have embedded environmental attributes. To 
understand how to interpret bids in an auction when the item has embedded environmental 
attributes, an understanding of a bidder's valuation is necessarv'. 
It shall be assumed that there are I bidders in a second-price sealed-bid auction 
bidding on one item which has embedded environmental attributes. Bidder i's. i = 1. 2 
1. true valuation of the product being auctioned is v,. Bidder i's true valuation v, is assumed 
lo be ihc sum of three disjoint values, i.e., v, = v,; v,; - v,;. v,i is defined to be the 
maximum amount of money bidder i is willing to give up to obtain the physical attributes 
embodied in the product being auctioned. In the case of a pork chop, this value is derived 
from such physical attributes as tenderness, color, type of cut, marbling, etc. The second 
\ alue, \ ;2, is defined as the true value the bidder receives from being the one that contributes 
to the public good, i.e., it is the maximum amount of money the bidder is willing to give up 
to provide lo the public good no matter what other bidders do. This value could be derived 
from altruism or warm-glow altruism.'® Altruism is where people give to a public good and 
receive utility from the consequences of their giving. Warm-glow altruism is where people 
receive satisfaction from the process of giving to the public good with no regard to the 
conscquences of giving (Kotchen et al. 2000). For this value to e.\ist. the bidder must be the 
one who obtains the item from the auction, v,;. can be viewed as the \ alue one receives from 
the public good being provided by some other person. It is the maximum amount of money 
the bidder is willing to give to the public good, which does not overlap with v,2. assuming 
that no other person is contributing to the public good. If other bidders are contributing to 
the public good, this value is going to be conditional on the other bidder's contribution. This 
value exists for each bidder no matter who provided the public good. Hence, this is a value 
where free-riding can occur. The distinction made between v,2 and v,;. is that v,; is only 
realized if the bidder is the highest bidder, whereas, v,; is realized no matter who is the 
liighest bidder. 
To interpret the bids from a second-price auction when the item has embedded 
en\ ironmenial attributes, the same t>pe of reasoning used to prove the pure private good case 
can be used. i.e.. Vickrey's argument can be adapted to this situation. First of all. it shall be 
assumed thai the assumptions of the benchmark model hold.' '^ In the pure private good ease, 
it was assumed without loss of generality that the utility of the bidder was 0 if she did not 
purchase the object. This is no longer the case with an item that has embedded 
en\ironmental attributes. Even if bidder i does not purchase the good, she still obtains v,^. 
.Altruism and warm-glow altruism ha%'e been studied by Andreoni (1988, 1990). 
Noie that die assumption of bidders' being risk neutral can be weakened to risk averse. 
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This is because no matter who provides the public good, bidder i receives utility from the 
public good characteristic of the product being auctioned. Hence, as long as bidder i believes 
that someone will purchase the good with embedded environmental attributes, it will never 
be in the interest of the bidder i to incorporate v,3 into her bid function.This implies that in 
a second-price auction it is not a dominant strategy for the bidder to reveal her true valuation 
of the item. To show this rigorously, a stronger statement will be proven. Under the 
assumptions of the benchmark model, when the item has embedded environmental attributes 
and the bidder has some free-riding tendencies, it shall be proven that the dominant strategy 
for each bidder is for her to bid a value equal to v,i2 = v,i v,2. 
Define \V as the maximum bid given by all bidders excluding bidder i. If bidder i is 
the highest bidder, then W is the second highest bid. Bidder i is assumed to have a true 
v aluation of the product of v,. where v, = v,i v,; v,:.. Define V, as the difference between 
bidder i's true valuation, v,. and VV. There are two scenarios, one with four cases and the 
other with three, that need to be examined to show that bidding v,i2 is the dominant strategy. 
The first scenario is when bidder i bids higher than v,i2, i.e., b, > v,i2- In this first 
scenario, suppose that W > b,. This would imply that bidder i receives a utility lev el of \ 
whether she bids v,i2 or not because she is not the highest bidder. Suppose that the maximum 
bid from all other participants is greater than the true valuation of bidder i but less than the 
bid given by bidder i, i.e., v, < W < b,. This would imply that the utility of bidder i is equal to 
V, = V, - W. which is obsMously a negative number. In this situation, it would have been 
better for bidder i to bid v,i2 and obtain a utility level of v.i. Under this situation, if the 
In auction setting, this belief is not unrealistic. Since the item being auctioned has already been produced, the 
environmental characteristics have already been provided. This being the case, bidder i can view v,3 as an initial 
endowment of utility which she does not have to pay for. 
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bidder bid her true valuation v., she would have obtained a positive utility of v,;. Now 
suppose that v,i; < W < Vj < bi. In this case bidder i obtains utility level V, = v, - W. Since 
W is less than bidder i's true valuation v,, then V, > 0. While V, is nonnegative in this case, 
this does not imply that bidding one's true valuation is a dominant strategy. Since W is 
greater than v,i -r v,2, then the bidder would have done better off by bidding v,i:. By bidding 
\ bidder i would have received utility level v,;,. In this case, V, = v, -  W < v,;,. The final 
case in scenario one assumes that W < v,i2 < v, < b,. While bidding b, in this case gives the 
bidder a utility level greater than v,3, the bidder could have done just as well by bidding v,i:. 
Hence, it has already been shown that it is not the bidder's dominant strategy to bid her true 
\ aluaiion. It has also been shown for scenario one that bidder i can do no better than bidding 
v.i:-
The second scenario that needs to be investigated is when bidder i bids less than v, ,;. 
i.e.. b.. < V,:;. In this situation, there are only three cases that need to be examined. In case 
one. assume that W > v,i2 > b,. Under this first case, bidder i could have received the same 
uiiiity \if she bid v.ij. Suppose that for case two, v,i2 > W > b,. By bidding belovs- v.i;. 
bidder i obtains utility v,3. Bidder i could have been better off had she bid v,i;. because \' 
would ha\c been equal to v, -  W > v, -  v,i2 > v,;,. In this case, bidder i foregoes a greater 
uiiliiy level by under bidding. Finally for case three, suppose that v,i2 ^ b; > W. In this ease, 
ii would make no difference whether bidder i bid b, or v,i2- Under each bid she would obtam 
the utility V, = v, -W. Hence, it has been shown under this second scenario that bidder i 
would have done no worse by bidding v,i2 and in some cases would have been better off 
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Coupling the results in scenario two with scenario one's results, it has been shown 
tliat bidding \-,i: = v,i -r v,2 is a dominant strategy for bidder i. The intuition behind this result 
is the following. Since v,3 represents the value of the public good, which the bidder gets even 
if she is not the highest bidder, it is not in her best interest to incorporate it into her bidding 
strategy. v,i; represents the value to the bidder only if she obtains the item being auctioned. 
Hence, if the bidder wants to maximize her probability of obtaining the largest surplus from 
the auction procedure, she should bid v,i2. It should be noted that if a person is a perfect free-
rider and the product being auctioned has embedded environmental attributes, then tlie bid 
received in this auction would be equal to the bid received in a second-price auction when the 
item has no embedded environmental attributes. 
It has been shown that in a second-price sealed-bid auction, only the private value 
v,i-. which is less than Vj when free-riding exists, is submitted as the bid. WTien 
en\ ironmentaI attributes exist or any other t\pe of spillover effect, the second-price auction 
does not get at a bidder's true valuation. 
Theoretical Base for Modeling Consumer Behavior with Differing Information Sets 
It has just been shown how to interpret bids for a product with embedded 
environmental attributes from a second-price sealed-bid auction. The next step in 
understanding value in a multiple-round second-price auction with different information sets, 
is to understand the theoretical base of consumer behavior \vhen different information sets 
exist. Teisl et al. provide this theoretical framework for handling consumer behavior when 
there are different information sets (1999). 
In the paper by Teisl et al., they studied what effects dolphin-safe labeling had on the 
tuna industry (1999). To study this issue, they adopt a model proposed by Foster and Just 
A1 
(19S9) thai takes into account when consumers have different information sets about the 
product. Their model starts with an indirect utility function that incorporates environmental 
assessments for a given set of products, a v ector of other quality characteristics for those 
products, prices, and income. Specifically, they represent their indirect utility function as; 
(3.1) = V(.\^ q, Y, p) 
where = environmental assessments for m products given information set S. 
q = vector of other quality characteristics, 
Y = income, 
p = a vector of prices for the m products. 
They assume that this indirect utility function increases with quality characteristics and 
income, and decreases with prices. 
To translate environmental information into an environmental assessment A^. TeisI et 
al. assume that the assessment function can be modeled as a household production process. 
This process lakes into account the individual's environmental knowledge, cognitive abilities, 
lime, and ihe environmental information presented at the time of purchase. They model this 
process as the following: 
(3.2) = f(Sj, G, tj; 0). 
In this process, is the individual's subjective environmental assessment of purchasing 
s s good j given information set S. Note that A j is an element in \ . Sj is the environmental 
mformaiion displayed about product j at the time of purchase. The consumer's prior stock of 
en\'ironmental information is represented by G. This would include any news accounts, 
advertising, word-of-mouth, or any other source of information previously obtained about the 
product. The time spent analyzing the environmental information about product j is denoted 
by t,. Finally. 0 represents the objective levels of environmental impact from consumption of 
the products. 
This model lays the foundations for thinking about how consumer's value is derived 
in a second-price sealed-bid auction with rounds having different information sets. 
Specifically, it incorporates different information sets into the standard consumer 
optimization problem. This model elaborates on what a bidder's true value v, is dependent 
upon. i.e.. v, is dependent on income, prices, quality characteristics, information. 
Deriving the Exogenous Factors of the Bid Function in a Multiple Round Vickrey 
.Auction with Different Information 
The standard utility maximization problem assumes that prices are fixed and 
consumers choose the quantity they want to consume. While this is the usual setting in 
which consumers make decisions, it is not necessarily indicative of how consumers make 
decisions in a multiple round second-price sealed-bid auction. In this auction setting, the 
consumers have a fixed quantity to consume and are allowed to submit bids. In this ease, 
participants will set bids for the objects they are bidding upon at their true valuation for that 
product when there are no embedded environmental attributes and v,i2. which was e.xplained 
abo\ e. when environmental attributes exist. This is the unique behavioral characteristic 
associated with the second-price auction and must be taken into consideration of the model. 
.Another characteristic of this model is that different information sets can be used in the 
different rounds of bidding. This section sketches the exogenous factors that affect the bid 
function in a multiple round second-price auction with different information sets. 
The utility function of a consumer can be modeled as having three different 
components. The first component relates to the products that will be consumed and how they 
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show up in the uliHty function. The second component within the utiUty function is an 
assessment function that maps cenain attributes of the products into utility. The third 
component that is related to the utility function is the socioeconomic characteristics that 
make up the consumer. Hence the consumer's utility function for an information set 1 is 
represented as: 
(3.3) U = U(y. .xi.x;; A', S) 
\\ here y = a vector of goods not in the auction, 
xi = a nonenvironmental product in the auction. 
x: = an environmental product in the auction. 
a' = environmental assessments for xl and x2 given information set S. 
S = vector of socioeconomic characteristics of the consumer. 
It is assumed that the consumer's utility function is increasing at a decreasing rate for y. xi. 
X:, and any element of A*. 
For this model, assume that the consumer's utility is dependent on the characteristics 
of purchased goods. Further assume that these goods can be broken up into three groups. 
The first group is the normal basket of goods that the consumer purchases outside of the 
auction setting. This basket of goods will be denoted by y and have an associated vector of 
fixed prices Pj. The second group of goods is the set of products in the auction that have no 
particular environmental attributes, while the third group of goods is the set of products in ilic 
auction that have embedded envirorunental attributes. The only differences between these 
last tw o groups are that they differ in the level of embedded environmental attributes and 
possibly perceived visual quality attributes. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the 
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last two groups of goods only consist of one product each."' The non-environmental product, 
i.e.. the t\pical product, will be denoted by Xi and the product with embedded environmental 
atiribute(s) will be denoted by xi. In this setting, the choice variables for the consumer are 
the normal basket of goods y. the bid for the t\'pical product p-,. and the bid for the product 
with embedded environmental attribute(s) pi-
Following Teisl et al. (1999), it is assumed that within the consumers utility function 
there is an assessment function .4' which evaluates the products based on a set of 
characteristics given an information set I. This assessment function contains the assessment 
of each product, i.e., a' = [a/, .\2'. An'] where An' is the assessment of product n based 
on infonnation set I. This assessment function maps certain attributes such as quality 
characteristics into utility. Within this information set I. there is information pertaining to 
the attributes embodied within the products and previous market prices. In the case of an 
auction for products with embedded environmental attributes, one information set may 
contain no environmental information regarding the products. This could be known as a 
naY\ c information set. In another information set, there could be environmental information 
released. 
The set of characteristics in the assessment function can be divided into two subsets. 
The first subset is related to the physical attributes related to the products and will be denoted 
b\ Q. These characteristics revolve mainly around visual quality—color, texture, marbling, 
etc. Within this Q, the evaluation of each product can be divided by product, i.e., Q = [Q,. 
"• For the second group, there is usually only one product in that set which is used as a basis for comparison. 
For the thu-d group of products, there will be independence between the products that have different 
environmental attributes. This independence will come from the fact that in this auction at most one product 
uill be sold after all the rounds of bidding are completed. Hence, by adding products to this group there will be 
no alTect on the budget constraint of the consumer. 
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Q: Qn] where Qn is the quality evaluation of product n based on visual inspection. It is 
assumed that the utility function is increasing in Q, i.e.. a consumer has an ordered 
preference for different visual attributes. Across information sets, these visual attributes are 
constant for each product. The visual quality of a product does not change across 
information sets. Due to the constant visual quality, no adjustments will need to be made 
when comparing products across information sets. Within a particular information set. these 
\ isual qualities can be very different across products or at least perceived as such. This 
would imply that any comparison of products within an information set must account for 
possible perceived visual quality differences. 
The other subset of characteristics is related to environmental attributes and will be 
denoted by E(I). Within E(I), the evaluation of each product can be segregated by product, 
i.e.. E(I) = [Ei(r). £2(1), ..., En(I)] where £„(!) is the quality evaluation of product n based on 
perceived or e.xpected environmental attributes given information set I. It is assumed that the 
utility function is increasing in both the level of environmental attributes and the number of 
en\ ironmental attributes. A consumer's utility will increase if they perceive that the number 
of environmental attributes has increased or if the level of a panicular environmental 
atiribute is perceived to increase. These characteristics are related to the perceived or 
expecied environmental attributes embodied in each product. Whether these characteristics 
are perceived versus expected will depend upon which information set the consumer has. In 
a naive round with no environmental information, this set of characteristics would be related 
to the consumer's expectation of the environmental attributes embodied in each product. In a 
bid round where environmental information exists for each product, then the set of 
characteristics are perceived. 
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One component that is not directly represented in the standard utility function or the 
model of Teisl ei al. (1999) is the socioeconomic characteristics of the consumer. These 
characteristics are usually implied within the utility function by assuming that all consumers 
are the same. Since all the consumers are considered identical, there is no need to have the 
socioeconomic characteristics explicitly given. However, these characteristics are seldom 
equal. There are gender differences, age differences, educational differences, attitudinal 
differences, etc. Each of these characteristics can have an affect on how the consumer values 
products. Hence, they can cause the utility function of one person to be different to the 
utility function of another person. In this model. S will denote the socioeconomic 
characteristics. 
For each purchase decision, the consumer will maximize her utility function given a 
fixed amount of income M under the given rules of the second-price sealed-bid auction. 
.Adapting the model of Teisl et al. (1999) to this situation, the consumer's indirect utility 
funciion can be represented as: 
(3.4) \-'= V(A'. M. pv, S) 
w here A ' = f(Q, E(I)). 
From this indirect utility funciion, a person's true valuation v, can be derived through 
cxamuiing what happens to a person's utility when a new allocation of attributes or a new 
information set is provided. A person's true valuation can be defined as the maximum 
amount of income she would be willing to pay to obtain a change. In this case, it would be 
the amount of money the consumer would be willing to give up to obtain the environmental 
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aliribuies or the information pertaining to the environmental attributes. This is also known as 
compensating variation."" 
Since a person's true valuation of a particular change is dependent on the indirect 
utility function, this would imply that a person's true valuation is dependent on the same 
exogenous factors. In this case, a person's true valuation depends on the assessment 
function, the information set, income, socioeconomic factors, and the prices of other goods. 
Taking this a step further, since it has been shown that a person's bid in an auction setting is 
dependent on a person's true valuation, this would imply that the exogenous factors of a 
person's true valuation would also be influencing factors in a person's bid function. With 
this information, wiliingness-to-pay in a multiple round second-price auction with different 
information sets can now be defined. 
Defining W'illingness-to-Pay 
.As mentioned above, this dissertation looks at two willingness-to-pay measures. To 
see u here these different measures come from, an examination of the bids given in each 
round of the second-price auction is necessary. Within this auction, the participants will bu> 
no more than one of the goods being auctioned, i.e., a final characteristic of this mode! is that 
only one product will be sold after the auction is over. The product sold is randoniK' selected 
tVom a round that is also randomly selected. This allows an auction that investigates the 
\aluc of man\ goods to maintain the properties of the Vickrey auction explained abo\ e. 
Another way of defining a person's true valuation is by using equivalent variation. Equivalent variation is the 
amount of money would be willing to accept to forgo a change. There are two basic reasons compensating 
variation can be a better choice for examining a person's true valuation. First of all. a typical second-price 
auction for a good is a natural way for gathering compensating variation. Secondly, compensating variation is 
bounded by a person's income, whereas equivalent variation is unbounded. 
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Without loss of generality, it is assumed that there are two products being bid upon. 
The first product is a product that has no embedded environmental attributes, while the 
second product is a product that has the same physical attributes as the first product but has 
embedded environmental attributes. In the naive bidding round where there is no specific 
cn\ ironmental information about the two products, the bidders only have expectations about 
the embedded environmental attributes. In a bidding round with environmental information, 
the bidders know the embedded environmental attributes. The bids for the first and second 
product are defined respectively as bi(py. M, S, A') and b^CPy, M, S. A'). These bids are a 
function of the person's true valuation for each product. Since it is assumed that each bid is 
derived from the second-price auction, it has been shown earlier that that b,(py. M. S. A*) will 
be equal to v,i; if the bidders are strategically optimizing their payoff" \\Tien the bidder 
expects or knows that the product has no environmental attributes, her bid for that product 
w ill equal her true valuation. In a second-price auction setting, it can be expected that bi(Py. 
M. S. .A.') and b2(py, M. S, \') will be different across different information rounds if 
panicipants value envirorunental attributes. Each of these bids is independent of each other 
smcc the bidder will only purchase, at most, one of the products. 
To make this analysis more clear, assume that there are two information rounds in the 
second price auction. In the first round, it is assumed that there is no specific infomiation I' 
related to the environmental attributes. This is usually known as a naive bidding round 
u here consumers usually bid on visual attributes. For the next round, information I" is 
released on the embedded environmental attributes of the product. This would imply that 
•' it should be noted that for the case of a product with no environmental attributes, v,,; = v,,. This is because 
v,j and v,3 are equal to zero when the product has no environmental attributes. 
under the first information set I', the set of bids are bi(pj. M. S. A') and b;(py, M. S. A' 
Under the second information set I", the set of bids are b>(py. M. S. A' ) and b:(pj. M. S. 
A' ). h should be obvious that the prices for the goods outside of the experiment Py. 
consumer income M. and the socioeconomic characteristics S of the consumer have not 
changed. Hence, the only thing that has changed is the information in the assessment 
function. This would imply that further investigation of the assessment function is necessary. 
.A.S mentioned above, the assessment function can be written as A' = f(Q. E(I)). Since 
there are only two products being examined, this function can be written as a' = flQi. Q;, 
E;(I). E;(I)). In this case, Qi and Q: denote the visual quality assessment ofthe t\pical 
package and the environmental package respectively. No matter which information set the 
consumer is in, these quality attributes do not differ across information sets for each product. 
Within a particular information set. these quality evaluations can be quite different. Ei(I) and 
E:( I) denote the perceived or expected environmental attributes in the typical package and 
the environmental package in information set I. In the naive information set I' where no 
information related to environmental attributes has been released, these environmental 
quality assessments are based on expectations. Within this information set, there is no u ay 
for ihe researcher to know the basis for the expectation. In the environmental information sci 
I", the consumer knows the level and number of environmental attributes embedded in each 
product. They also know that the product with environmental attributes is using the l\pical 
product as the basis, i.e., a comparison is made between the two products within this 
information set where the typical product is used as the basis of comparison. 
It should be noted that in this naive round, the panicipant has no environmental information. Hence, the 
subscripts on prices are only being used to keep track of each product through the different rounds. 
Up lo this point, the bids given in the auction represent all of the attributes 
incorporated in the products being auctioned, i.e., the bids represent both the visual quality 
attributes and the environmental attributes. The objective of this dissertation is to value the 
en\ ironmental attributes only. To do this, the visual quality attributes must be factored out. 
This implies that there are two major definitions for willingness-to-pay that can be developed 
from this auction setting with different information sets to obtain the value for environmental 
attributes. The first definition for willingness-to-pay that arises from this setting is related to 
comparing bids across information sets. In chapter one, this measure was called the 
consumer's willingness-to-pay with unknown ex ante expectations. This measure of 
w illingness-to-pay examines the bid differential for the product due to the release of 
information. In this case, willingness-to-pay for any embedded environmental attributes in 
product i due to the information provided (WTP,) can be defined as: 
(3.5) WTP: = b,(pv, M, S, A'") - b,(p.v. M, S, A'') 
= b,{py, M, S, f{Q,. Q2, £,(!"). £2(1"))) - b,(p,. M, S, f(Qi. Q;. EKD. £;(!'))) 
- b.(p,, M, S. f(Q„ E.d"), Ejd"))) - b,(py, M, S, f(Q., E.d'), E.d')))" 
= WTP,(Py, M, S, Q„ E,(r'), E,d"). E,(r). E,(!•)), 
for i.j = 1 or 2. This measure represents the consumer's willingness-to-pay environmental 
aiiributes for product i."^ Since Q, is the same across both information sets, an advantage of 
this measure is that no adjustment is needed for visual quality differences in the product. .A 
major problem with this measure is that the attributes of £,(!') are unknown to the rescarcher 
" The visual quality Q, for product j*i can be dropped becausc it is assumed to have no effect on the price of 
product 1. 
"' This is not the value of the new information set as a whole. This represents the value of the information 
related to product i. To obtain the value of the information set as a whole, WTP, would be summed over all 1. 
In this case WTP, ^ WTP; equals the consumer's willingness-to-pay for the new information set. 
because it is based on the expectation of the consumer. There is no way of knowing ex ante 
\s hat the consumer's expectations are for each product. 
The real benefit of this measure is that it gives an ex post view of the consumer's 
expectation. If this measure is positive, this would imply that the consumer's expectations on 
a particular product were lower than the actual environmental attributes embedded in the 
product. A measure of zero implies that the consumer's expectations from the naive round 
are met in the round with environmental information. Finally, if this measure is negative, 
then the consumer had a higher expectation of what attributes were embedded in the product 
than w hat actually was. Another way of viewing this measure is to think of it as the short-
term effect when environmental information is released into the market. It is the initial gain 
or loss before the market has time to react and the consumer can change her spending habits. 
This measure also gives a producer a more accurate picture of the initial gains to be made by 
selling a product that has environmental attributes. 
The second definition of willingness-to-pay looks at the premium a consumer will 
pa\ for a product with embedded environmental attributes as compared to a basis product 
within the same information set. In this case, this product is the typical product. In chapter 
one. this measure was known as the consumer's willingness-to-pay for environmental 
aitributcs w ith a known basis. Hence, this definition of willingness-to-pay can be 
represented as; 
(3.6) WTP = b:(py, M, S, A'") - b,(py, M, S, A'") 
= b2(p.v, M, S, fcQ:, EKI"), £2(1"))) - b,(p,., M, S, f(Q,, £,(!"), E.d"))) 
= WTP(p.v, M, S, Qu Q2, E.d"), E.d")). 
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Assuming Qi equals Q;. i.e.. each product has the same visual qualities, this measure 
represents the consumer's willingness-to-pay for a product with embedded environmental 
attributes over a typical product. As was mentioned earlier, this is a long-term measure 
\\ here the consumer has information related to environmental attributes and is allowed to 
adjust her market decisions. 
The real advantage to this definition is that the environmental attributes embedded 
within each product is known to the consumer where one of the products is being used as the 
basis of comparison. Ei(r') and £2(1") are known to the researcher as well as the consumer. 
The major disadvantage of this definition is that it must assume that the visual quality 
attribute across products is the same. This is usually not the case. If possible, this measure 
will need to be adjusted for the perceived visual quality differences. One way to adjust for 
the visual quality difference is to take the difference of the two products in the nai ve round 
and use it to adjust the willingness-to-pay appropriately. This of course assumes that the 
expectation of embedded environmental attributes for each product in the nai ve round are 
equal. Hence, the second willingness-to-pay measure adjusted for visual quality differences 
can be represented as: 
(3 ") WTP = \VTP(pv. M, S. Qi. Q2, Eid"), Ezd")) - (b:(r) - bid')) 
where b.ll') = bi(py, M, S, .A.') for i = 1, 2. 
If bid') is greater than b:(r), this would imply that the participant viewed the first product 
having a better visual appeal than the second product. In this case, there would be a positive 
adjustment to willingness-to-pay compared to equation 3.6. WTien visual attributes are 
perceived by the participant of the auction to be the same for both products equation 3.7 is 
equal to equation 3.6. 
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In this chapter two main results have been shown. The first result shows how to 
interpret bids from a second-price auction when the item being sold has embedded 
environmental attributes. Specifically, it is the dominant strategy of each bidder to bid the 
part of her true valuation that cannot be provided by another bidder. The second result in this 
chapter is that in a multiple round second-price auction with different information sets, there 
are tw o approaches to define willingness-to-pay. The first approach relates willingness-to-
pay for embedded environmental attributes across the different information sets for the same 
product. The second approach to derive willingness-to-pay for embedded environmental 
attributes is by comparing a certain product with a base product within the same information 
set. Depending on which method is used, there are advantages and disadvantages to each. 
Equation 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 all can be used to represent v,i2 explained above. Each 
equation measures a person's private valuation. v,i2, from a different point of view. For each 
of these willingness-to-pay measures, the policy maker must keep in mind that v.:; represents 
onl> a portion of the consumers true valuation when embedded environmental attributes exist 
in the product, i.e.. it is a lower bound of a person's true valuation for the embedded 
env ironmental attributes. There is no way of knowing from this experiment what the 
person's true valuation is when embedded environmental attributes exist because ihc le\ cl ot" 
free-riding is unknown to the researcher. Equation 3.5 looks at v,i2 for embedded 
environmental attributes before the consumer can adjust to all the information released about 
the multiple products. It does not allow the participants to adjust the base product of 
comparison for the new information provided. This is why it is a short-run view of v.i:. By 
examining equation 3.5 for each product, the researcher can infer the environmental 
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expectations each participant had when no information of en\'ironmental information is 
present. 
Equations 3.6 and 3.7 are essentially measuring the same thing. The only difference 
between them is that equation 3.7 relaxes the assumption that the visual qualities between the 
products being auctioned are the same. Thus, equation 3.7 attempts to adjust for visual 
quality differences. Both equations 3.6 and 3.7 represent a long-run view of v,i:. These 
equations allow the consumer to adjust the bid for the product being used as a basis, as well 
as. allowing her to adjust the bid for the product that has environmental attributes. Equation 
3.5 does not account for the released information affecting any other products. Since 
equations 3.6 and 3.7 represent a long-run view of a person's private valuation v,i:, it is a 
more pertinent measure for policy makers to examine. It is also a more accurate measure of 
the utility a person receives from the existence of the environmental attributes. 
61 
CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTED 
Introduction 
Development of the study design for data collection can be divided into two major 
components. The first component focused on initial information gathering that helped shape 
the questions asked in the sur\'eys and assisted in experimental design. The second pan w as 
conducting the experiments and surveys for data collection. 
During the first stage of study design, information on different pork production 
methods and what effects they have on the environment was anah-zed. This was an 
interdisciplinary focus including persormel from the Departments of Animal Science and 
.•\gricultural Engineering at Iowa State University. The National Pork Producers Council and 
The Iowa Pork Producers Association were also contacted to provide information on pork 
production and manure management systems. 
Environmental attributes, such as level and potential for air and water degradation 
from different systems were determined. From this information it was concluded that i\\o 
cn\ ironmental impact levels would be used in the study; a low reduction and a high 
reduction. These represent a reduction over the typical levels. Potential odor reduction 
lc\ els u cre chosen to be either at a thirty to forty-percent or an eighty to ninety-percent 
rcduciion over the tN-pical level. Ground and surface water impact were chosen to be at either 
fifteen to twenty-five percent or forty to fifty-percent reduction levels over the typical. 
Experimental Locations 
The second part, conducting the experiments, was completed in six different locations 
of the United States: Ames, Iowa; Iowa Falls, Iowa; Manhattan, Kansas; Raleigh, North 
Carolina; Burlington, Vermont; and Corvallis, Oregon. These experiments were conducted 
dunng the months of June and July over a two-year period in 1997 and 1998. Site selection 
\\ as not from a random draw. Each site was selected for a particular purpose. 
The first area in which the experiment was conducted was Iowa. Two sites for the 
Iowa experiments represented a rural site (Iowa Falls) where there is a high concentration of 
hog production and a site with a lower livestock concentration (Ames). At each site in Iowa, 
three sets of surv eys/experiments were conducted. Another three experiments were 
conducted in Kansas for comparisons to the Iowa results. This allowed for a test to evaluate 
whether results differ for an agricultural area which has a livestock population density less 
than that faced in Iowa. North Carolina was selected to provide a comparison of two major 
hog producing states, one dominated by large pork production operations (North Carolina) 
and one with a broader mix of types of pork production operations (Iowa). Two sets of 
experiments were conducted in Raleigh. North Carolina because following the first 
experiment it was determined that a random procedure had not been followed in selecting 
experiment pariicipants. Thus, a second set of experiments was conducted at this location. 
The personnel who recruited participants for the first Raleigh experiment had difficult} 
obtaming a sufficient number of participants for the study. Hence they partially filled the 
experiment with graduate students who were near at hand. Thus, the selection was not a 
comparable random procedure. Using students is a well-known practice when doing 
experiments and there does not seem to be any definitive evidence that use of students bias 
the results. There have been some studies that have shown that behavior is not different 
between students and adults. 
The last six experiments, three at each location, were conducted in Burlington, 
\'ermont and Cor\'allis, Oregon. These locations allowed for comparison of pork consumers 
at locations which are not reliant on pork production as an economic base with states that 
ha\ e a much larger \ ested interest in economic activity from hog production. Another aspect 
to these locations is that some contend that there is a higher environmental awareness in 
these locations. 
While these sites were selected to meet specific conditions the researchers had ties 
with individuals in the area. These ties allowed for better quality control when it came to 
sample selection and running the experiment. It also helped in facilitating the data collection 
process. Since sites were not selected randomly, care must be taken in interpreting the 
results. All of the sites selected, except Iowa Falls, had a major university located within the 
city. It should be noted that while Raleigh, North Carolina is not typically considered a 
uni\ ersity tow n, it has many of the same properties because it is located in an area known as 
tiie research triangle where much research is undertaken. Thus, these will tend to have a 
population that, on average, has a higher income as well as being better educated. Sites 
associated with universities tend to be more culturally diverse than that found in a t\pical 
community. These factors can have a biasing effect on the data and results compared to a 
pure random sample draw of the population or a comparison to a large metropolitan area. 
Hence, if environmental attributes are a normal good, it is expected that participants in the 
study area will lend to pay a higher price than a typical consumer for a good with embedded 
environmental attributes. This fact must be taken into consideration when interpreting the 
results. Given this, the directional change is an important result. 
Participant Selection 
A random sample of individuals from the area being studied was used to obtain 
participants for the study. This sample was obtained by a random computer generated sample 
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drawn from telephone numbers found in the respective local telephone director>'. For each 
locaiion. a set of 700 names was drawn.' Following the procedures established by Fox 
(1994). an initial letter was sent out informing each person in the set that they would be 
receiving a call in the next two to three weeks asking them to participate in a consumer 
experiment. This letter was sent out four to five weeks before the experiment was to be 
conducted. .A. copy of the letter is provided in Appendix A. 
The letter sent to the households was used to familiarize the potential participants 
with the general aspects of the study. It stated that the nature of the study was to collect 
information about knowledge and concerns related to pork production. Beyond this, there 
were three additional pieces of information that was provided to the household about the 
nature of the study. First, they were told that the study would take less than two hours and 
would be on an upcoming Saturday. Second, the potential participants were assured that 
there was no risk to them and they would be paid forty dollars for their participation. Third, 
ihc location of the study was revealed to them. Accompanying the letter was a map that 
assisted the participants in finding the location of the experiment. There were two pieces of 
infomialion left out of the letter, the actual date and time. The reasoning behind leaving this 
information out was to minimize the chance that someone would not show up without ha\ ing 
siuncd-Lip. On average, approximately twenty percent of these letters came back as rctuni to 
sender for \ arious reasons. The majority of these were sent back because the potential 
panicipant had moved. 
' For the first Iowa experiment, only 350 names were drawn for the sample. Using this small sample, it was 
very- difficult to sign-up the desired number of participants. Hence, for the remaining e.xpenments. the random 
sample was increased to 700 to assure that there was no problems obtaining the desired number of panicipants. 
Phone calls to the potential participants drawn from the sample started approximately 
three u eeks before the experiment was conducted. Phone calls to sign up panicipants for the 
study were usually made between the hours of 5 p.m. to 9 p.m. WTien called, each potential 
participant was screened to make sure he/she was the primary food shopper in his/lier 
household. The potential participant was then asked whether he/she received the letter sent 
to his her household about the experiment. If they did not. the caller would explain the 
contents of the letter and then asked him/her if they wanted to participate. If he/she had 
recei\ed the letter, the caller would ask if he/she wanted to participate. The caller provided 
no further information to the potential participant about the study to minimize study bias." 
.•\t the time initial calls were made, approximately seventy-five percent of the 
potential participants were not at home. In this case, messages were not left and the caller 
\\ eni to the next person on the list. This was done for two reasons. First, it allows for better 
control of the number of participant's signed up for each experiment. Secondly, it assures 
ihat a bias does not result based on the potential participants who self-selected themseh es lo 
ha\. e an answering machine. Of the people reached, approximately sixty percent turned 
down the offer to participate. .A. majority of the people who turned down participating did so 
because of a prior engagement. 
Data Collection 
Each experiment lasted about two hours at each site. The first experiment was 
conducted at 9:00 a.m., the second at 13 ;30 a.m., and the third at 2:00 p.m. WTien the 
participants arrived for their experiment session, they were instructed to wait outside the 
" Most of the callers who solicited participants for the study had no information about the experiment. This was 
to ensure that they would not release any information that would cause a self-selectivity bias. 
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experimental room until all participants arrived. Once ail participants had arrived, they were 
escorted to a room where the e.vperiment was to be conducted. Participants were instructed 
to sit where there was paper and pencil and were discouraged from talking to each other 
during the e.xperiment. The papers were spread out across the room so participants were 
sitting away from each other. Within the general instructions, the participants were notified 
that talking could result in a penalty of three dollars. These measures were used to discourage 
collusive behavior being formed within the auction. 
WTien the participants sat down, they found three items in front of them. The first 
item was a consent form notifying the participants of their rights during the experiment. 
Their primar\' right was that at any time during the experiment they could leave with no 
prejudice to them. It also mentioned that the results from the experiment are strictly 
confidential. The second item was general instructions for the experiment. See appendix B 
for these materials. Each one of these was read aloud. The third item was a piece of paper 
\Mih a randomly generated number. This randomly generated number was used as the 
participants' identity throughout the experiment and ensured their anonymity from the other 
participants. 
Once all instructions were read and the consent forms signed, the monitor went 
around to each participant and collected their consent forms. Next, as done in one of the 
experiments by Fox (1994), cach participant was paid forty dollars for participating in the 
experiment. This forty dollars was to compensate participants for their time spent in the 
experiment plus any other expenses that were incurred for participating in the experiment, 
e.g.. travel costs, etc. It also gave a broad range of participants an incentive to come to the 
experiment. 
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Data collection consisted of two main parts; surv eys and auction experiments. There 
ere two surv eys conducted during each experimental session. The first surv ey was 
conducted before the auction and collected personal information and information on 
participants' perception about industrv' issues. See appendix B for the pre auction survey, 
information collected included items such as participant's age, genden household income, 
and education. Other questions were related to issues of concern and importance. 
.•\ second survey was conducted immediately following the auction. See appendix B 
for the post auction sur\'ey. This survey dealt with participant knowledge about pork 
production and contained questions pertaining to perceptions and attitudes about potential 
methods of improving environmental attributes in products. These questions were related to 
issues such as livestock production facilities and methods of manure storage and land 
application. These issues were addressed in the post survey to assure that the pre survey did 
not influence participants' expectations or create biases prior or during the experiment. 
The .\uction (Experiment) 
There have been many studies that have demonstrated the usefulness of experimental 
auctions for this tvpe of marketing research, i.e., obtaining willingness-to-pay for some sort 
ofaiiribuie related to the product being studied (Hoffman et al. 1993; Menkhaus et al. 1992; 
Hayes ct al. 1996; .Melton et al. 1996a. 1996b). Hoffman et al. (1993) and Menkhaus ct al. 
(1992) investigated willingness-to-pay for beef that is sold in different packaging under 
different information sets. Hayes et al. did various experiments to obtain consumer's 
u illingness-to-pay for food safety attributes (1996). Mellon et al. studied consumer's 
willingness-to-pay for pork chops with different visual characteristics (1996a, 1996b). 
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The most commonly used auction method for eliciting willingness-to-pay for an 
auribute is a second-price sealed-bid auction. The second-price sealed-bid auctioned is 
conducted in the following manner. Participants are shown an item (or items) which will be 
put up for auction. Participants submit bids anonymously to the monitor for the item(s). 
Once the monitor has collected all the bids, he/she determines which participant is the 
highest bidder and what the second highest bid is. After this is completed, the highest 
bidder's identification number along with the second highest bid price is posted. If there is a 
lie for the highest bidder, then the winning bidder is randomly selected among the bidders 
whom lied. This bidder is required to pay his/her own bid price because the second highest 
bid is also ihe highest bid. 
Theoretically, a second-price sealed-bid auction for a purely private good with one 
round is demand revealing, i.e., people reveal their true valuation of a good when this method 
is used. This demand-revealing property of the second-price auction is because the dominant 
siraieg\ of the participant is to truthfully reveal his./her preferences. Hayes et al. explain thai 
"bidding less than one's true value only decreases the probability of winning at what 
oiherwise may have been a fair price. Bidding more than one's true value increases the 
probability of winning, but at a price that is higher than one's true value." (1996, p. 367) 
X'ickrcy was the first to discover this demand revealing property (1961). Hence the second-
price sealed-bid auction is also referred to as the V'ickrey auction. 
WTiile the second price auction is theoretically demand revealing in a single round, 
behaviorally people do not necessarily reveal their true valuations in a single round (Hoffman 
el al. 1993; Menkhaus et al. 1992). Even though this has been shown to be the case, it has 
also been found that in multiple round experimental second price auctions, participants have 
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a tendency to leam that their dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation for a good 
(Coppinger et al. 19S0; Cox et al. 1985. Shogren et al. 1994a). Hence, the auction method 
used for this study was a second-priced sealed-bid auction segmented into five bidding 
rounds. 
To familiarize the participants with the second price auction, a preliminary auction to 
seil a brand name candy bar was used. See appendix B for the instructions and the sheet used 
for bidding for this auction. This was a single round second-price sealed-bid auction and 
allowed the participants to become familiar with the second price auction. To assure that the 
participants understood the motivation of the second price auction, we used the following 
paragraph to explain the intuition of the auction: 
In this auction it is in your best interest to bid the amount you are truly willing 
to pay for the candy bar. If you bid more than your true willingness-to-pay. 
then you increase your chances of purchasing the candy bar but you may have 
to pay a price that is greater than your valuation of that candy bar. On the other 
hand, if you bid less than the amount that you are truly willing to pay. you may 
lose the chance to purchase the candy bar at a price that you would be willing to 
pay. 
To further assure that participants understood the auction method, they u ere gi\ en a 
tu o-question quiz concerning the auction. After answering the quiz, the monitor discussed 
the correct answers and asked participants for any further questions about the auction 
method. 
.A.fter this first auction was completed, a multiple trial second-price sealed-bid auction 
was conducted with the pork products. This involved five bidding rounds. See appendix B 
for the instructions and bid sheets used for this experiment. Similar to the candy bar 
experiment, the same type of motivating paragraph for the second price auction was used. 
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Before the experiment began, the participants were invited up to the front of the room to 
visually inspect the packages of pork chops. They were also ad\'ised that anytime during the 
experiment, they could look at the packages again. 
In the first three rounds of this auction, participants bid only on the physical 
aitribuies, such as color and marbling, of the product having no other information except for 
the previous round's bids. This allowed participants to obtain feedback on price information. 
Ii also allowed the researchers to determine if some packages of chops were perceived as 
\ isual!>- more appealing than other chops. For the founh round, the participants were 
informed of the specific environmental attributes associated with the respective products. 
This information shock allowed for determination of the effect of releasing environmental 
information had on participants' bids. In the fifth round, the implications of the 
cn\ ironmental attributes were further explained and the participants were allowed to bid a 
final time. See appendix B for the information provided in the fifth round. 
The products used to elicit bids were two-pound packages of uniformly cut, boneless. 
1' 4 inch pork loin chops. These pork loin chops were cut and packaged to look as unifomi as 
possible. The first three rounds of bidding allowed us to identify whether the packages 
provided were perceived as similar. In round four, participants were bidding on the 
cn\ ironmenial attribute information provided. Changes in bid responses would retleci ilic 
value of the respective environmental attribute. 
The Products 
The participants were allowed simultaneously to bid on ten different packages of pork 
chops each having different environmental attributes. The packages of pork chops were 
arranged in a row, and placed on ice in one of three white coolers. Each of the ten packages 
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was labeled as Package i, where i = 1..., 10. Following the third round of each experiment 
each participant was told that one package was a "typical package" with no specific 
cn\ ironmentai attributes. In this same round, the other nine packages were assigned vary ing 
le\ els of environmental attributes dealing with ground water, surface water, and odor. See 
appendi.x B for the description provided for each package of pork chops in round four for 
cach e.xpcriment. 
Odor reduction was at two levels: a thirty to forty-percent reduction, and an eighty to 
ninety-percent reduction over the "typical" product. Ground water and surface w ater impacts 
were also available at two levels: a fifteen to twenty-five percent reduction and a forty to 
fifty-percent reduction over the "t>'pical" product. Packages were provided with single 
attributes (only air, ground water, or surface water), double attributes, or all three attributes 
embedded. The double and triple attribute pork packages were all at the high reduction 
levels. The following description was given for the respective packages; 
Package I has no particular environmental attributes. It is the typical pork loin 
chops which can be bought at any local store. 
Package 2 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using 
t e c h n o l o g y  t h a t  r e d u c e s  o d o r  b y  3 0  t o  4 0 %  b e l o w  t h e  t y p i c a l  ( p a c k a g e  I ) .  
Package 3 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using 
t e c h n o l o g y  t h a t  r e d u c e s  o d o r  b y  8 0  t o  9 0 %  b e l o w  t h e  t y p i c a l  ( p a c k a g e  1 ) .  
Package 4 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using 
technology that reduces seepage of nutrients, etc.. from swine manure into the 
g r o u n d w a t e r  b y  1 5  t o  2 5 %  b e l o w  t h e  t y p i c a l  ( p a c k a g e  I } .  
Package 5 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using 
technology that reduces seepage of nutrients, etc., from swine manure into the 
g r o u n d w a t e r  b y  4 0  t o  5 0 %  b e l o w  t h e  t y p i c a l  ( p a c k a g e  I ) .  
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Package 6 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using 
technology- that reduces run-off of phosphorus, etc.. from manure into surface water 
b y  1 5  t o  2 5 %  b e l o w  t h e  t y p i c a l  ( p a c k a g e  1 ) .  
Package 7 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using 
technology that reduces run-off ofphosphorus, etc.. from manure into surface water 
by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 1). 
Package 8 has a combination of two environmental attributes in a pig production 
system: one using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, and the other using 
technology that reduces seepage into the groundwater by 40 to 50% below the 
t y p i c a l  ( p a c k a g e  I ) .  
Package 9 has a combination of Avo environmental attributes in a pig production 
system; one using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, and the other using 
technology that reduces run-off into surface water by 40 to 50% below the typical 
( p a c k a g e  I ) .  
Package 10 has a combination of three environmental attributes in a pig production 
system; one using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, the second using 
technology that reduces seepage into the groundwater by 40 to 50%, and the third 
using technology that reduces run-off into surface water by 40 to 50% below the 
t y p i c a l  ( p a c k a g e  I ) .  
Table 4.1 summarizes each of these attributes. For brevity, the descriptions used in this table 
\\ il! be ihc description used in the discussions throughout the dissenaiion. 
To control for bias bidding due to package labeling and location, package numbering 
u as su itched for some of the packages across each of the different time slots at the 
respective locations. This control for sequencing effects has been done before by .Mcnkhaus 
c; al. (! 992). What this does is it averages out the effect that participant's may anchor on a 
particular package because it has a certain number on the package or location in the display 
area. Hence, the package with no specific environmental attribute was labeled Package 1 at 
the 9:00 session. Package 5 at the 11:30 session and Package 10 at the 2:00 session. Sec 
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Table 4.1: Environmental Attributes for the Ten Packages of Pork Loin Chops Used in 
the Experiment 
Pork Chop Environmental Attributes Package Labeling for 
(Level of Improvement over the Typical) Morning Experiment 
No Specific Attributes (Typical Product) Package 1 
Odor 30-40% Package 2 
Odor SO-90% Package 3 
Ground water 15-25% Package 4 
Ground water 40-50% Package 5 
Surface Water 15-25% Package 6 
Surface Water 40-50% Package 7 
Odor S0-90%/Ground Water 40-50% Package 8 
Odor S0-90%/Surface Water 40-50% Package 9 
Odor 80-90° o/'Ground Water 40-50%/Surface Water 40-50% Package 10 
Table 4.2 for the corresponding package numbers and respective environmental 
atiribules during each time period. As done in Fox et al. (1995, 1996) and Roosen (199S). an 
aticmpl was made to control for wealth effects." Wealth effects are when participants change 
their bids because they won an earlier trial (Fox et al., 1995). The method used in each 
experiment to control for wealth effects was a random drawing of one bidding round and one 
product from that selected round to be the product sold at the end of the experiment. B> 
selecting only one product to be sold, this auction had the properties of a single unit auction 
rather than a multiple unit auction. Hence, the theoretical demand revealing properly still 
holds for the V'ickrey second-price sealed-bid auction. 
See Davis and Holt for a discussion of wealth effects in experimental markets (1993). 
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Table 4.2: A Mapping of Pork Attributes to Package Labeling for Each Session Time 
Session Time 
Pork Chop Environmental .Attributes 
(Level of Improvement) 
9:00 11:30 2:00 
No Specific Attributes (Typical) Package 1 Package 5 Package 10 
Odor 30-40% Package 2 Package 1 Package 1 
Odor SO-90% Package 3 Package 2 Package 2 
Ground water 15-25% Package 4 Package 3 Package 3 
Ground water 40-50% Package 5 Package 4 Package 4 
Surface Water 15-25% Package 6 Package 6 Package 5 
Surface Water 40-50% Package 7 Package 7 Package 6 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50% Package 8 Package 8 Package 7 
Odor S0-90%/Surface Water 40-50% Package 9 Package 9 Package 8 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-
50" 0 Surface Water 40-50% 
Package 10 Package 10 Package 9 
Pretest of the Experimental Procedure 
A focus group was utilized to test the experimental procedure and information 
pro\ ided to participants. This provided information and feedback on the experiment, the 
surv eys used, and the environmental impacts. This allowed pre-testing and refinements ol' 
the surx ey questions and procedures and information developed for the experimcnis. as \\cll 
as provided feedback on perception and thoughts of the focus group participants. After this, 
the surv eys and experimental approach were finalized. 
The focus group consisted of sixteen participants from many different backgrounds. 
Each participant was selected to gain a differing prospective on the experimental process. 
One of the participants was selected due to his knowledge of experimental economics. Some 
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were selected because they were from other countries. This allowed for feedback on the 
clarity of the English to people with foreign backgrounds, .\nother group had industry 
experience in pork production or the related marketing industry. Participant selection was 
based on bringing in a diverse group of people to give feedback on the experiment from their 
point of view. 
During this session, comments on study design were mainly solicited after the 
experiment was completed. This allowed the researchers to gauge the time length needed for 
the experiment. It was found from the focus group that the experimental process and the 
experiment needed no substantial changes. 
While the experimental process and basic information did not change, some aspects 
of the surv eys did change. There were three main changes instituted in the surv eys. The 
biggest change was the addition of an 'I don't know' response for many of the questions that 
pertained to pork production—including distance participant lives from a pork production 
faciiiiy as well as all the questions in the second surv ey that related to production methods. 
Tlie second adjustment was related to age. In the focus group session, participants were 
pro\ ided different categories of ages from which to choose. In the regular experiments, this 
t\pc of response was changed to asking the person how old they were as of the last birthdav. 
The fmal change made in the survey was adding a question that related to whether the 
panicipant wanted environmental training for pork producers. This question came from the 
participants who were from the pork industry'. 
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chapter fiv e: results and discussion of data 
In chapter three, a model was presented to explain how consumers make decisions in a 
multiple round second-price sealed-bid auction. It was shown that when embedded 
environmental attributes do not exist in the product, it is the best interest of the consumer in a 
second-price sealed-bid auction to reveal her true valuation for the product being auctioned. 
When embedded environmental attributes exist, it was shown that if the consumer has free-
riding tendencies she only reveals the part of her true valuation she cannot receive from 
another bidder providing the environmental attributes. In chapter three, it was also explained 
how to derive consumer's willingness-to-pay for embedded environmental attributes, i.e., the 
premium a consumer would pay for a product with environmental attributes over a typical 
good. 
Two ways of defining willingness-to-pay were discussed in chapter three. The first 
way dealt with looking at the amount the consumer would change his/her bid on the same 
product given two different information sets. This was equation 3.5 in chapter three. In one 
of ihe information sets, the consumer did not know the level of environmental attributes 
\\ iihin the products. The other information set contained the actual improvement in level of 
embedded environmental attributes within each product. Using this definition of a premium 
assumes that the products in the naive information set are viewed as tvpical products. This 
ma\ noi be the case. The other way of looking at the premium is to compare products within 
the same information set where the consumer knows the basis good, i.e., the good with no 
particular environmental attributes. Assuming there is no difference in visual quality, the 
difference between the price paid for the typical good and the price paid for the good with 
improved environmental attributes can be considered the consumer's willingness-to-pay for a 
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product with embedded environmental attributes. Since it is unlikely that the visual qualities 
will be exactly the same, the visual quality adjustments shown in equation 3.7 from chapter 
three is the better estimator of v,i2, i.e., the willingness-to-pay measure for embedded 
environmental attributes. 
Chapter four discussed the design of the experiment for collecting data on consumer's 
wiilingness-to-pay for embedded environmental attributes. The experiment used to collect the 
data was a multiple-round second-price sealed-bid auction that had different information sets 
in some of the rounds. These information sets pertained to the embedded level of 
environmental attributes. It was also noted in this chapter that the data was collected in six 
different locations—Ames, Iowa; Iowa Falls, Iowa; Burlington, Vermont; Corvallis. Oregon: 
.Manhattan, Kansas; and Raleigh, North Carolina. 
This chapter discusses and analyzes the results of the data collection process. 
Specifically, this chapter examines three different aspects of the data. The first aspect of the 
data examined is the average level of bids across each bid round. The next aspect of the data 
analysis is an investigation of the consumer's willingness-to-pay for embedded environmental 
attributes with unknown ex ante expectations, i.e., the premium a consumer would pay under 
tw o different information sets. The final aspect of the data analysis consists of examinmu 
consumer's willingness-to-pay with a known basis, i.e., the premium paid over the ispical 
product within the same information set. 
There are two major statistical tests used in this chapter for data analysis.' The first 
test examines the null hypothesis of |io = i-C-. the mean value in question is statistically 
' Unless otherwise specified, these two tests will be the only tests used in this chapter. 
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equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis in this case is that it is not equal to zero. To test this 
h\poihesis. a sample t-statistic is generated. This test statistic is the following: 
s / \hi 
where .v equals the sample mean, s is the sample deviation, and n is the number of sample 
data points (Freund 1992). If this sample t-statistic is greater than 2 and n is larger than 30. 
then the null hypothesis would be rejected at the five-percent level of significance. At the 
0.001 level of significance this same t-statistic would have to be greater than 2.756 with n 
larger than 30 to reject the null hypothesis. 
The second test that is commonly used in this chapter is a statistical test to see if the 
means of two samples are equal. The null hypothesis in this case is = ui, i.e.. the two 
means are equal. The alternative hypothesis to this is that the means are not equal. To test this 
hspothesis, a sample t-statistic is generated from the two sample means. In this case an 
assumption is being made that the variances are unknown but equal. This test statistic is the 
following: 
-V,  - .Y,  — S  I = . -
- -
\ "l "z 
where 
-1)5," + (/I, - 1)5," 
n^ + /;, - 2 
For this statistic, x,, for i =1 and 2, represents the sample mean from each mean in question. 
The number of sample data points is represented by ni, for i = 1 and 2. The sample standard 
dev iation for each sample is represented by s„ for i =1 and 2. As with the previous test, a test 
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statistic greater than 2 and n = (ni -f- n2 - 2) is greater than 30 represents a failure to accept the 
null hypothesis at the five-percent significance level. At the 0.001 level of significance a t-
statistic of 2.756 with n = (ni + n2 - 2) greater than 30 would allow the null hypothesis to be 
rejected. 
General Bid Data 
Of the 333 participants in the study, results from 329 were usable." Information 
provided in Table 5.1 shows the distribution of participants by study region. The e.xperiments 
were conducted during the summer 1997 through summer 1998 time periods. The number of 
participants ranged from sixty for the Corvallis, Oregon and Manhattan, Kansas locations to 
twenty-seven for Burlington, Vermont. In Iowa, the Ames location had forty-nine participants 
while the Iowa Falls location had fifty-eight participants. Two experiments were conducted in 
the Raleigh, North Carolina area because it was determined following the first experiment that 
a random procedure was not followed for participant selection. 
Table 5.1: Number of Participants by Area 
Experiment Area Number of Participants 
.A.!! areas 329 
.•\mes. lA 49 
.Manhattan. KS 60 
Rak'igh. NC (6/28/97) 31 
Burlington, \'T 27 
Iowa Falls, LA 58 
Corvallis, OR 60 
Raleigh, NC (6/27/9S) 44 
" Four participants were omitted because they did not finish the experiment and sur\ eys. One person had to 
leave durmg the study because she was ill. The other three did not complete the survey for unknown reasons. 
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Table 5.2 provides a summary of the average bids for each product during each round. 
It also provides the t-statistic related to the hypothesis test that the average bid from the 
current round is equal to the average bid in the previous round for the same product. For 
round one, the highest average bid for the group of pork chops was S3.47 for the package of 
pork chop which was later identified with the low-level odor reduction attribute (thirty to forty 
percent odor reduction). The lowest average bid in round one was S3.21 for the package 
aligned with low level ground water improvement (fifteen to twenty-five percent reduction in 
the impact to ground water). When testing the hypothesis that these two means are equal, a 
sample t-statistic of 1.60 is calculated. This implies that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
at the five-percent level of significance. Thus statistically, they are not significantly different. 
Examining the average bids in round two compared to round one. it appears that all the 
a\ erage bids by product increased. Testing the hypothesis that the average bids in round two 
are equal to the average bids for the same product in round one, it is discovered that at the 
fix c-perceni significance level that the bids in round two are not equal to the bids in round 
one. With a second-price sealed-bid auction, the expectation is that these average bids from 
round one to round two would be equal if participants were truly revealing their preferences. 
Two explanations can be offered for these bids not being equal. One is that the participanis 
were still in the process of discovering their preferences and responding to the market 
information. Another is that participants did not fully understand the intuition behind the 
second price auction. This type of bid increase has been seen in previous studies (Fox et al. 
1994; Fox et al. 1995. 
Table 5.2: Avt'raj»c' Bid for Mach I'rodiict l)y Mid Round (All Participants) 
Average Bids($) 
Pork Chop Environmental 
Attributes (Level of No Environmental Information Environmental Information 
Improvement over 'I'ypii-al) Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
No Particular Environmental 
Attributes (Typical) 
3.35 3,91 (3.32) 4.13(1.28) 3.61 (-2.96) 3.57 (-0.22) 
Odor 30-40% 3.47 4.01 (3.37) 4.26(1.57) 3.87 (-2.41) 3.90 (0.16) 
Odor 80-907f 3.22 3.81 (3.49) 4.05(1.45) 3.92 (-0,77) 3.91 (-0,04) 
Ground water 15-25% 3.21 3.72 (3.00) 3.91 (1.13) 3.85 (-0,33) 3.86 (0.03) 
Ground water 40-50% 3.25 3.84(3.6!) 4.03(1.18) 3,94 (-0,50) 4.(K) (0.36) 
Surface Water 15-25% 3.43 4.00(3.27) 4.15(0.87) 3,99 (-0,93) 4.05 (0.34) 
Surface Water 40-50% 3.26 3.82 (3.38) 4.06(1.43) 4,10(0.23) 4.12(0.14) 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 
40-50% 
3.43 4.10(3.94) 4.25 (0.88) 4.56(1,77) 4.68 (0.65) 
Odor SO-W^f/Surface Water 
40-50% 
3.45 4.08 (3.53) 4.17(0.52) 4.58 (2.22) 4.66 (0.37) 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50% 
3.46 4.06 (3.28) 4.19(0.67) 5.13(5.(K)) 5.17(0.23) 
Note: The number in parenthesis is tiie t-statistic for the test of whether the average bid in the current round is equal to the average 
bid in the previous round. 
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In round three, there were further increases in the aggregate bids of all the bids, but not 
by as much as from round one to round two. The question arises vs hether the bids from round 
three are statistically equal to the bids for round two. Another way of posing this is to ask 
\\ heiher the bids seem to converge. One way to define convergence is to test whether the 
av erage bid in a current round is not statistically different from the average bid in a previous 
round. If this tv-pe of convergence occurs, this could be evidence that the intuition of the 
second-price sealed-bid auction holds, i.e., participants truthfully reveal their preferences. If 
participants were truthfully revealing their preferences, little change in bids should be seen 
when no substantial new information has been released. Hence, from round two to round 
three, little change should be noticed between the two means. Table 5.2 shows that all the 
av erage bids for the products in round three are statistically equal at the five-percent 
significance level to the average respective bids in round two. Hence, at the aggregate level, it 
appears that bids are converging by the definition provided. 
While convergence in the bids seems to be evident after the third round is completed 
u hen aggregating all the participants together, it is more appropriate to evaluate each 
respective study location for convergence. Drawing inferences about bid convergence at the 
national level may be misleading because the set of pork chops are not exactly the same for all 
the locations. A set of fresh pork chops was bought for each location on the day of the study 
to assure quality. Hence, a particular package of chops could have different visual 
characteristics and perceived desirability across each location. These differences could cause 
v ariations between regions that could lead a particular package of chops to converge at the 
aggregate level even though it does not converges within each specific location. 
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Table 5.3 shows the percent of products by region that converged by round three. It 
also provides the number of the corresponding products that converged. UTien looking at 
each study site separately, convergence in the third round on the local level seems to support 
the aggregate data. At the five-percent level of significance, testing for difference in means 
from round two to round three for each package of pork chops shows that all test sites had a 
product convergence of eighty percent or greater. There were only two locations that did not 
ha\ e complete convergence—Manhattan, Kansas and Corvallis, Oregon. This result coupled 
u ith the aggregate data provide further support for the initial findings of Coppinger et al. 
(1980) and Cox et al. (1985) that participants eventually discover their preferences and the 
Vickrey auction with multiple trials does obtain true willingness-to-pay. 
Prior to the participants bidding in the fourth round, they were provided information 
on the environmental attributes embodied within the respective packages of pork. See chapter 
four andy'or appendix B for a detailed description of these attributes. Following release of the 
infomiation, each participant was allowed to bid on each package with the new information. 
\S'iih this release of information, there was a substantial change in some of the bids. The 
a\ erage bid levels are provided in Table 5.2 in the round four column. 
Table 5.3: Number of Products That Had Bids Converge by Round Three by .Area 
Experiment .\rea Percent of Products That Converged by Product 
Products Converging Number 
.•\11 areas 100 1.2.3.4.5.6,7.8,9.10 
AmcsAA 100 1.2,3,4,5.6,7,8,9.10 
Manhattan. KS 80 2.3,4,5.7,8,9,10 
Raleigh. NC (6/28/97) 100 1. 2. 3. 4, 5, 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 
Burlington, VT 100 1.2.3,4.5,6,7.8,9,10 
lowaPljlls. U 100 1,2,3,4.5.6.7,8.9.10 
Cor\allis. OR 90 2, 3, 4. 5, 6, 7. 8, 9, 10 
Raleigh, NC (6/27/98) 100 1,2,3,4, 5,6. 7. 8. 9. 10 
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Figure 5.1 shows the average bids in each round for the low-level environmental 
attribute products with the typical product as the basis. This figure shows that ail the 
packages with a low-level of envirorunental attributes increased between rounds one through 
three. In round four, all of these products decreased in value substantially, hi comparison to 
the previous rounds, the bid changes from round four to round five were small. 
Figure 5.2 shows the average bids in each round for the single high-level 
environmental attribute products again with the typical product with no particular 
environmental attributes as the basis. Similar to Figure 5.1, all the packages in this group 
increased substantially between rounds one and three. In round four, the packages with 
embedded environmental attributes related to odor and ground water decreased in value. \\ hile 
the package with the surface water increased. Again, in round five, there were few 
adjustments in the bids compared to round four. 
Figure 5.3 shows the average bids for the products with the highest levels of embedded 
environmental attributes—those packages with the double and triple high-level environmental 
aiiributes. .A.s in the previous two figures, there was a steady increase in bids betvs een rounds 
one and three. It is clear from this figure that all the multi-attribute products e.xperienced a 
substantial increase in bid levels from round three to round four. Again, in round five, there 
was \ ery little change compared to the previous round. 
To summarize Figure 5.1 through Figure 5.3. there was an increase in bids for the first 
three rounds. By the fourth round, releasing environmental information caused a positive and 
substantial increase in the bids for the high-level multi-attributes products, had mixed results 
on the bids of single high-level attribute packages, and negative effects to bids of single low-
level attribute packages. 
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In round five, another set of information was provided to the participants. This 
information can be found in Appendix B and was related to more detailed environmental and 
socieial health impacts of the embedded environmental attributes. Comparing round four to 
round fi\ e bids showed that there were only minor movements in the bids for each product. 
Examining the t-statistics in Table 5.2 shows that none of the average bids in round five are 
significantly different to their corresponding average bids in round four. This would imply 
that this new information did not have a large effect on participant bids. 
\N illingness-to-pay with Unknown Ex Ante Expectations 
In chapter three, two types of premium measures were developed from the theoretical 
model. One of the premiums was known as the consumer's willingness-to-pay for embedded 
en\ ironmental attributes with a known basis. This definition derived consumer's willingness-
to-pay by taking the difference of a base product with a product that has some level of 
embedded environmental improvements over the base product in the environmental 
information round, round four. This willingness-to-pay measure is equation 3.7 in chapter 
three. The other definition of a premium derived consumer's willingness-to-pay for 
embedded environmental attributes by comparing the effect the new information set had on 
the same product from round three to round four. This is equation 3.5 in chapter three. It 
w as explained in this case that the advantage of this definition is that it assures that the Msual  
characteristics of the product are identical. The draw back to this definition is that the 
consumer's ex ante expectations on the level of embedded environmental attributes is 
unknown to the researcher. This section will investigate this definition, i.e.. the definition 
based upon equation 3.5. 
89 
Table 5.4 presents an examination of the changes in average bids from round three, 
the no information round, to round four, the envirorunental information round. The 
difference between the average high and low bid in the no information third round is only 
SO.35. This would reflect the participant perception of the visual quality of the packages and 
did not represent a significant difference. For the entire group, the average bid increase for 
the most environmental two-pound package of pork loin chops was S0.94. while the bid for 
what was the typical package decreased by S0.52. The bids in the no information round are 
much tighter than the bids in the round in which the environmental information was released. 
For the three most environmental packages, the double (t-statistic of 4.81 for the product 
related to odor and ground water and a t-statistic of 5.91 related to the product with odor and 
surface water attributes) and triple attribute (t-statistic of 11.17) packages, the bid increases 
were significantly different from zero at the O.OOl significance level." For the typical (t-
statisiic of -6.90) and low-level odor reduction (t-statistic of -5.67) packages, there was a 
significant price decrease at the 0.001 significance level. .A.11 other bid changes were not 
significantly different at the 0.001 level. When relaxing the significance level to five-
pcrceni. the bid decreases for the packages with the high-level reduction in odor (t-statisiic ol 
-2.15) and the low-level reduction in impact to surface water (t-statistic of -2.53) were also 
signincanlly different from zero. 
Table 5.4 also shows when a pairvs'ise comparison was done, which bid changes are 
not significantly different from each other. When comparing the typical package with the 
low -level odor reduction impact package, the decreases in average bids for both are not 
significantly different at the five-percent level. This also holds true for the pairvsise 
" This result also holds true regionally for the most environmental package. 
Table 5.4: Participant Kid Levels by Knvinmmental Attribute Information (All Participants) 
Premium Bid 
Pork Chop Environmental Attributes 
(Level of Improvement over Typical) No Information 
Environmental 
Attribute Added 
Absolute 
Change* 
Percent 
Change 
No Particular Environmental Attributes 
(Typical) 
4.13 3.61 -0.52' -12.53 
Odor 30-40% 4.26 3.87 •0.39" -9.19 
Odor 80-90% 4.05 3.92 -0.13'' -3.23 
Ground water 15-25% 3.91 3.85 -0.06'"' -1.45 
Ground water 40-50% 4.03 3.94 -0.09'''-'' -2.12 
Surface Water 15-25%' 4.15 3.99 -0.16''"' -3.94 
Surfacc Water 40-50% 4.06 4.10 0.04''''' 0.97 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50% 4.25 4.56 0.31* 7.41 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50% 4.17 4.58 0.41' 9.88 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40- 4.19 5.13 0.94 22.42 
5()%/Surfacc Water 40-50% 
Corresponding letters indicate that at the five percent level of significance the null hypothesis of the two bid changes were equal 
could not be rejected. Also, note that the bold and italic changes represent a significant difference from zero at the 0.001 and 0.05 
level respectively. 
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comparison between the change in bids of the two double high-level attribute packages. 
Pairwise comparisons of the change in bids of the low-level and high-level single attribute 
products also shows that the change in value of many of these products is not significantly 
different from each other. 
Based on a simple assumption, an unexpected result can be seen in Table 5.4. 
•Assuming that environmental attributes are not perceived as negative attributes, and since all 
the pork packages are physically the same good from round three to round four, the 
e.xpectation for bidding was that the packages would either increase in value or stay the same. 
This was not the case. Six of the ten products decreased in \ alue, some by significant 
amounts as demonstrated above. It was not expected that the typical package, as well as 
some of the single-level attribute packages, would significantly decrease in value. 
This effect to the typical package might be explained by a framing bias that is 
commonly seen in CVM studies. A framing bias occurs when values are affected by the 
method from which market values are elicited (Cummings et al. 1986). In this case, since the 
i\pical good was used as the basis for environmental improvements in the other nine 
packages, participants in the study may be viewing this product as having lower overall 
quality—a lower level of environmental attributes. Wliile this can explain why the i\pical 
package decreased in value, it is not as clear why the single low and single high-lc\ ci 
cn\ ironmental packages also decreased in value. Some of the bids for these packages 
decreased significantly—the low and high level reduction in odor packages, as well as, the 
low-level surface water impact package. 
.As was modeled in chapter three, a more formal explanation for this effect could be that the 
participants' expectations of the product attributes were not being met. These participants 
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could be modeled as having incomplete information and having environmental quality 
showing up in their bid functions. Prior to the forth round, the bids were impacted by-
appearance and market price, i.e.. the bids of the second highest bidders. The participants 
had no specific information on environmental quality, but they may have had a prior or ex 
ante e.xpectation. Once the environmental information was released in round four, the 
participants updated their prior information and changed their bids accordingly. For the 
products that changed significantly in value, the participants' prior expectations of 
environmental quality were not being met. Hence they changed their bids accordingly. This 
could explain why the products with lower level environmental impacts experienced a 
decrease in the value of the package of pork chops. For those products that did not change 
significantly, the ex ante expectation of embedded environmental attributes is being met. 
Figure 5.4 represents averages of the five tiers of environmental information released 
in round four—typical, single low-level environmental, single high-level environmental, 
double high-level environmental, and triple high-level environmental. This figure illustrates 
the profound impact environmental information had on the bidding process. In rounds one 
through three, the average bids for each package remained relatively close to each other. In 
round three, the last naive round, the average bids for each tier of packages were not 
signitlcantly different from each other. Once the information pertaining to the embedded 
environmental attributes was released in round four, the bids took on a predictable pattern. 
In the no information round, the bids were randomly scattered among the packages. Once 
the information was released about the environmental attributes, the bids followed the pattern 
of the more environmental pork packages receiving the higher bids and the less 
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environmental packages receiving lower bids. Thus, values for the single attribute packages 
were higher than the typical package. Participants paid more for the dual attribute packages 
than the single attribute packages, w hile the triple attribute package commanded the highest 
premium. Hence, releasing environmental information had an impact on the bids. 
When testing the hypothesis of whether the changes in each product differ 
significantly as environmental attribute levels are increased or combined, it was found that at 
the five-percent level each tier of attributes was significantly different from the other tiers. 
Hence, the package with three high-level attributes was significantly different from the 
packages with two high-level attributes. It did not appear to matter what level of attribute 
\\ as embedded in the package; rather it was the number of attributes that were embedded. 
Table 5.5 shows the average absolute change in bids from round three to round four 
by package for each study area. In each area, the triple attribute package commanded the 
highest change in premium due to the information shock. The highest change of S1.11 
occurred in the second North Carolina experiment, while the lowest change of SO.79 w as 
from ihc Iowa Falls experiment. For the typical product, every area exhibited a decrease in 
\ alue. The greatest decrease of SO.77 was in the second North Carolina experiment, while 
the smallest decrease of SO. 19 was in Oregon. 
When testing to see whether there was a significant difference in mean bid changc 
across each area for each package, only four comparisons are significantly different at the 
five-percent significance level. The change in the typical attribute package is significantly 
different between Corvallis and the second experiment done in North Carolina (t-statistic of 
2.26). For the package with single high-level environmental attributes related to surface 
water, the increase of S0.36 in Ames is significantly different from the decrease of SO.08 in 
Tabic 5.5: Ahsoliilc Change in liids ($| From Koiiiui Three to Round Four hy I'roduct and Location 
Location 
Pork Chop Knvironmcnial Ames, Manhattan, Raleigh, Kurlington, Iowa Falls, Corvallis, Raleigh, 
Attributes (IA'VCI of lA KS NC(97) VT lA OR NC(98) 
Improvement over Typical) 
No Particular Environmental 
Attributes (Typical) 
-0,59 -0.43 -0.47 -0.68 -0.66 -0.19" -0.77' 
Odor 30-40% -0.41 -0.34 -0.35 -0.47 -0.45 -0.47 -0.25 
Odor 80-90% -0.02 -0.12 -0.10 -0.33 -0.28 -0,10 -0.02 
Ground water 15-25% 0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.30 -0.11 -0.01 
Ground water 40-50% 0.10 -0.03 -0.23 0.09 -0.31 0.06 -0.27 
Surface Water 15-25% -0.05 -0.33 -0.16 -0.18 -0.24 0.05 -0.25 
Surface Water 40-50% 0.36'' O . l l  -0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0,08'' 0.(K) 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 
40-50% 
0.59' 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.44'' 0.05''' 0.21 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 
40-50% 
0.45 0.50 0.27 0.47 0.37 0,29 0.53 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 
40-50%/Surrace Wjjicr 40-
1.03 0.89 0.80 0.95 0.79 1.00 l . l l  
50% 
Corresponding letters indicate that at the live percent level of significance the null hypothesis of the two changes being equal 
across location for each product could luit be rejected. 
Cor\ allis (t-statistic of 2.25). As for the package with double attributes related to odor and 
ground water, Oregon is significantly different from Ames (t-statistic of 2.01) and Iowa Falls 
(t-statistic of 2.14). It should be emphasized that three out of the four significant differences 
arc related to Oregon for an unknown reason. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from these significance tests. First, there 
are no systematically significant differences across areas or regions by package when looking 
at the change in bids from round three to round four. The second conclusion that can be 
drawn is that the absence of a random sample from the first North Carolina experiment had 
no significant affect on the change in bids from round three to round four for North Carolina. 
There were no significant differences in the changes in the bids between these two. 
Table 5.6 depicts the distribution of the changes in bids from round three to round 
four looking at the different tiers of environmental levels. See appendix C for a breakdown 
of this distribution by location for both the tiers and the ten packages. For the typical 
package, 45.9% of the participants decreased their bid. This is in contrast to the triple 
aitribute product that had approximately eight percent of the participants decreasing their bid. 
This decrease may be explained, in part, by a failure of prior expectations being met. The 
percentage of bids that did not change ranged from 30.4 percent for the high-level attribute 
package to forty-one percent for the low-level single attribute package. 
The information from Table 5.6 shows that the bid distribution shifts to higher bid 
levels as the number of embedded environmental attributes increases. For example, when 
considering only premium payers in Table 5.6, the largest percent of participants pa>'ing a 
premium for the low-level single aitribute product is ten percent at the S.OI to S.49 bid level. 
Note that the distribution shifts slightly for the high level single attribute as compared to the 
Table 5.6: Distribution or Hid (.'Manxes by Knvironmental Tier Level 
Premium i.cvcl (Interval) per Packagc 
Pork Chop Environmental 
Attributes (Level of 
Improvement over Typical) 
Helow 
$0.(N) $0.00 
$0.01-
$0.49 
$0.50-
$0.99 
$1.00-
$1.49 
$1.50-
$1.99 
$2.(K)-
$2.49 
Over 
$2.50 
No Particular Environmental 
Attributes (Typical) 
45.90% 36.17% 6.69% 3.34% 5.47% 0.61% 0.30% 1.52% 
Low Level Single Attribute 31.31% 41.03% 10.03% 8.51% 5.88% 0.91% 1.11% 1.22% 
High Level Single Attribute 28.57% 38.20% 10.03% 9.93% 7.40% 2,94% 1.01% 1.93% 
High Level Double Attributes 17.48% 34.50% 11.55% 11.25% 13.22% 4.56%> 3.04% 4.41% 
High Level Triple Attributes 7.60% 30.40% 9.73% 12,77% 13.07% 6.99% 8.21% 11.25% 
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low-level single attribute. For example, twenty-three percent of the participants are willing 
to pa>' S.50 or more for the high level single attribute product, as compared to se\ enteen 
percent for the low level single attribute product. For comparison, three percent of the 
participants were willing to pay a premium of S2.00 or more for the high-level single 
attribute product. This was eight percent of the participants for the high-level double 
attribute products and nineteen percent for the high-level triple attribute product. Hence, as 
the number of environmental attributes increased the percent of the participants increasing 
their bids also increased. A higher percent of the participants were willing to pay a premium 
for the triple environmental attribute than double attribute product, which was higher than for 
the single attribute product. 
iilingness-to-pay with Unknown Ex .\nte Expectations: Premium Vs. Non-Premium 
Payers 
One method of defining a premium payer is one who increased his/her bid from the 
no information round, round three, to the information round, round four, for the most 
on\ ironmental package—the package with the high-level triple environmental attributes. It 
as discussed earlier that this relates to the consumers' willingness-to-pay for embedded 
en\ ironmental attributes with unknov\'n ex ante expectations. By defining the premium in 
this manner, we avoid the problem that the Vickrey auction in laboratory settings can be 
biased. Cox et al. (1985) and Kagel et al. (1987) have shown that these biases remain 
somewhat constant across bidding rounds. Coursey and Smith have also found that the bias 
in absolute terms tends to be the same (1984). This would imply that if the participant has a 
tendency to over bid, this overbid would be constant across rounds in absolute terms. For 
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example, if a participant has a tendency to over bid for a product by five cents, then that 
panicipant will overbid by five cents in ever\' round. Hence by calculating the willingness-
io-pa\' by taking the difference fi-om the no information round to the information round 
provides an unbiased true revelation of the premium a participant would be willing to pay. 
Using this definition, there were approximately sixty-two percent of the 329 
participants that increased their bid for the most environmental good; that product with all 
three attributes—air, ground water and surface water (Table 5.7). When evaluated by study 
location, the number of participants willing to pay a premium ranged from fifty-five to sixty-
six percent—fifty-five percent at Burlington, Vermont and sixty-six percent at Manhattan. 
Kansas. The bottom line is that more than one-half of the participants indicated a willingness 
lo pay for the pork product with all three environmental attributes. 
Evaluation of the premium payers shows that their average premium was Si.60 for 
the most environmental package—a premium of thirty-seven percent (Table 5.8). The non-
premium payers, for that same package, on average decreased their bids by SO.l 5 (Table 5.9). 
Table 5.7: Premium Payers Versus Non-Premium Payers by Area when Considering 
W'illingness-to-pay with Unknown Ex .4nte Expectations 
Experiment Area Number of 
Premium 
Pavers 
Number of 
Non-Premium 
Pavers 
Percent Premium 
Payers 
•All areas 204 125 62 
.A.mes, lA 30 19 61 
Manhattan, KS 40 20 67 
Raleigh. NC (6/28/97) 19 12 61 
Burlington. VT 15 12 56 
Iowa Falls. lA 35 23 60 
Corvallis, OR 38 22 63 
Raleigh, NC (6/27/98) 27 17 61 
Table 5.8: Participant Bid Levels lor Premium Payers* 
Premium Kid 
Pork Chop Knvironmental Attributes 
(Level of Improvement over Typical) No Information 
Environmental 
Attribute Added 
Absolute 
Change 
l*ercentaRe 
Change 
No Particular Environmental Attributes 
(Typical) 
4.44 3.81 -0.63 (-6.08) -14.11% 
Odor 30-40% 4.53 4.15 -0.38 (-3.99) -HA1% 
Odor 80-90% 4.33 4.29 -0.04 (-0.48) -0.91% 
Ground water 15-25% 4.14 4.17 0.03 (0.30) 0.63% 
Ground water 40-50% 4.34 4.40 0.06 (0.62) 1.28% 
Surface Water 15-25% 4.41 4.31 -0.10 (-1.15) -2.20% 
Surface Water 40-50% 4.36 4.54 a IS (2.06) 4.11% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50% 4.57 5.13 0.56 (6.20) 12.20% 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50% 4.47 5.21 0.74 (7.96) 16.47% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40- 4.37 5.98 1.60(14.79) 36.70% 
50%/Surfacc Water 40-50% 
A premium payer is a participant who paid a premium for the most cnvironntental product-
** Note that the numbers in bold and italir represent a significant difference in the bid level 
respectively. The numbers in parenthesis represent Ihe t-statistics. 
-the triple attribute package. 
fronj zero at the 0.(X)l and 0.05 level, 
Table 5.9: Participant Hid Kcvels for Non-Premium Payers 
Avcraiie Bid I.cvcl per i'ackagc ($) Premium Bid 
Pork Chop Environmental Attributes Environmental Absolute Percentage 
(Level of Improvement over Typical) No Information Attribute Added Change** Change 
No Particular Environmental Attributes 
(Typical) 
3.62 3.28 -tU4 (-3.33) -9.36% 
Odor 30-40% 3.82 3.42 -0.40 (-4.39) -10.57% 
Odor 80-90% 3.60 3.32 -0.28 (-3.29) -7.78% 
Ground water 15-25% 3.54 3.34 -0.19 i-2.25) -5.45% 
Ground water 40-50% 3.51 3.20 -0.32 (-3.54) -8.99% 
Surface Water 15-25% 3.73 3.46 •{)21 (-2.73) -7.30% 
Surface Water 40-509{> 3.56 3.37 -0.19 (-2.25) -5.31% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50% 3.71 3.63 -0.08 (-1.05) -2.22% 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50% 3.68 3.56 -0.12 (-1.38) -3.20% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50%/Surfacc 
Water 40-50% 
3.88 3.73 -0.15 (-3.07) -3.82% 
' A non-preiiiiuin payer is a participant who did not pay a premium for the most environmental product—the triple attribute 
package. 
** Note that the numbers in bold and italic represent a significant difference from zero at the (),(X)I and O.O.S level, respectively. 
The numbers in parenthesis represent the t-statistics. 
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For a breakdown of bid changes for the premium payers and non-premium payers by location 
from round three to round four, see appendix C. It should be noted that by definition, the 
premium for the non-premium payers would always be at or below zero for the triple 
attribute product. Otherwise, they would not be included in this group. This would imply 
that the average premium for the most environmental package will be no greater than zero for 
the non-premium payers. However, this does not imply that all the other goods are capped at 
a maximum of zero. It is conceivable that participants might decrease their bid for the most 
environmental package and increase the value of a package with less environmental 
attributes. This decrease could be an indication that one of the attributes in the bundle is 
undesirable, or that there was a misunderstanding of the experimental process. 
Both the premium payers and the non-premium payers decreased their bid for the 
typical package when the environmental information was released. The premium payers 
decreased their bid more both in absolute and percentage terms. This group followed the 
same consistent bidding pattern as the whole group, while the non-premium payers did not. 
.•\s shown in Table 5.8, the single environmental attribute package ranged from an eight 
percent decline for the package with the low-level odor attributes to a four percent increase 
for the package with the high-level surface water attributes following release of infomiation 
Bids for the double attribute packages increased from twelve to sixteen percent while the bid 
for the triple attribute package increased by thirty-seven percent. 
When anah'zing the change in bids from round three to round four for the premium 
payers, the packages of pork chops with multiple attributes all increased significantly at the 
0.001 significance level once the information was released. In contrast, the package with a 
low-level reduction of odor and the typical package significantly decreased in value at the 
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0.001 significance level. At the tlve-percent significance level, the package with a single 
high-level attribute related to surface water also increased significantly. As for the rest of the 
packages, their bids did not significantly change. For the non-premium payers, the only 
packages that did not decrease significantly at the five-percent level were the double attribute 
packages. 
Of the 125 participants who are considered to be non-premium payers, twenty-five of 
these bidders decreased their bids for the most environmental package while the rest kept 
their bid the same. Since decreasing the bids for the most environmental package was an 
une.xpected result it warrants further analysis. Table 5.10 provides information on the non-
premium payers who did not change their bids from round three to round four for the most 
environmental package, while Table 5.11 examines the bids for the non-premium payers that 
decreased their value for this same package. 
E.xamining Tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11. it is evident that the average bids for the non-
premium payers who decreased their bids are strictly greater for each product in the no 
information round than what the bids were for either the premium payers or those that did not 
change their bids. This could imply that these participants had a high demand for the 
packages of pork chops. It might also imply that these participants are still adjusting lo the 
markci. Also, the fourth round average bids for the non-premium payers who decreased ihcir 
bids arc strictly greater for each product than the average bids for the non-premium payors 
who did not change their bids. This is not the case when comparing the premium payers to 
this group of negative bidders. Hence it would seem that this group of negative bidders for 
the most environmental chop had a high demand for the packages but less demand for 
environmental attributes. 
Table 5.10: Participant Bid Levels for Non-Premium Payers (Zero Bid Change for the Most Knvironmental Package) 
Premium Bid 
Pork Chop Knvironmcntal Attributes 
(Level of Improvement over Typical) No Information 
Knvironmental 
Attribute Added 
Ab.solute 
Change 
Percentage 
Change 
No Particular Environincntal Atlrihutes 
(Typical) 
3.30 3.01 -0.30 -9.04% 
Odor 30-40% 3.56 3.26 -0.30 -8.35% 
Odor 80-90'7(. 3.33 3.10 -0.22 -6.74% 
Groundwater 13-25% 3.26 3.17 -0.09 -2.77% 
Ground water 40-50% 3.20 2.97 -0.23 -7.16% 
Surface Water 15-25% 3.39 3.23 -0.15 -4.52% 
Surfacc Water 40-50% 3.33 3.19 -0.13 -4.05% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50% 3.47 3.39 -0.08 -2.44% 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50% 3.39 3.33 -0.06 -1.78% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50'7(-/Surface 3.51 3.51 0.00 0.00% 
Water 40-50% 
Table 5.11: Participant Bid Levels for Non-Premium Payers (Negative Hid Change for the Most ICnvironmental Package) 
Premium Bid 
Pork Chop Environmental Attributes 
(Level of Improvement over Typical) No Information 
Knvironmental 
Attribute Added 
Absolute 
Change 
l*erccntage 
Change 
No Particular Environmcnlal Attributes 
(Typical) 
4.89 4.39 -0.50 -10.25% 
Odor 30-40% 4.89 4.05 -0.83 -17.06% 
Odor 80-90% 4.67 4.17 -0.50 -10.75% 
Ground water 15-25% 4.63 4.03 -0.60 -12.97% 
Ground water 40-50% 4.78 4.11 -0.66 -13.89% 
Surface Water 15-25% 5.09 4.34 -0.75 -14.72% 
Surface Water 40-50% 4.49 4.09 -0.41 -9.04% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50% 4.69 4.62 -0.07 -1.58% 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50% 4.83 4.48 -0.35 -7.20% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-50%/Surface 5.36 4.62 -0.74 -13.84% 
Water 40-50% 
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There could be at least two reasons for these negative bidders. Either they did not 
understand the intuition of the auction method used, or they were adversely affected by the 
environmental information provided. This would imply that these participants had a higher 
prior expectation of the embedded envirorunental attributes than what was actually true. If 
the answer were the latter, then this would lead to a major implication for auction 
experiments. The implication would be that auctions that solicit willingness-to-pay directly 
without knowing the participants' prior expectations and not allow fornegative bids are 
needlessly censoring an important group. This censoring of the data could cause false 
conclusions to be drawn. 
illingness-to-pay with a Known Basis 
In the previous two sections of this chapter, willingness-to-pay with unknown ex ante 
expectations was investigated. An advantage of looking at the premium in this way is that it 
first assures that there are no physical differences in the packages being studied. The onK-
dilTcrcnce comes from the release of environmental information. The major disadvantage to 
this particular definition is that the expectations of the consumers regarding environmental 
atiributes arc unknown in the naive bidding round where there is no environmental 
informalion given. It was seen above that the product that was denoted the t\pical product 
wont down in \ alue when the information regarding the embedded environmental atirihuies 
was released in the fourth round. This would imply that the consumer's expectations of the 
packages could not be viewed as the t\pical package. Using the other definition of 
willingness-to-pay discussed in chapter three, knowing the consumer's expectations is not an 
issue. This is because the basis package is known with this other definition because the 
comparisons of the packages are within the same information set. Hence the advantage of 
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this definition is that the expectations are known. A minor disadvantage of this method is 
that it must account for the slightly different perceived physical attributes, i.e.. it must 
estimate the value of the visual quality differences and adjust for it. 
This section will investigate this other definition of willingness-to-pay when the basis 
for product comparison is known. If all the packages were perceived as visually identical in 
the third round, then the willingness-to-pay measure can be calculated by subtracting the bid 
for the typical package in round four from the bid of the package with embedded 
en\'ironmental attributes from round four. But it was seen above that all packages \\ ere not 
percei\ ed as having exactly identical physical attributes. Otherwise, the bids for the 
packages in round three would all be equal. Examining Table 5.2 shows that this was 
ob\ iously not the case. This implies that the willingness-to-pay with known basis needs to 
be adjusted for the perceived physical differences. To make this adjustment, the difference 
betw een the typical package in round three and the corresponding package with embedded 
cm ironmenial attributes in round three must be accounted for. This would imply that this 
\\ illingness-to-pay measure could be defined mathematically as: 
WTP, = (p,4 - Pi4) - (p,;. - P13) for i e EP. 
WTP.. represents the willingness-to-pay measure with a known basis adjusted for perceived 
\ isual differences for the i-th package of pork chops with embedded environmental 
aitributes. The bid for the typical product in round t is represented by pn. while pu represents 
the i-th package of pork chops with embedded environmental attributes in round t. EP is the 
set of packages of pork chops that have embedded environmental attributes. 
Table 5.12 provides information on the willingness-to-pay measure with known basis. 
Except for the package with the high-level ground water impact, the willingness-to-pay for 
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embedded environmental attributes is increasing with both level and number of embedded 
en\ ironmental attributes. This would be expected if en\ ironmentai attributes are desired 
attributes. The package that commanded the smallest premium. SO. 13, was the package with 
the low -level of reduction in odor attribute. As expected, the package that commanded the 
highest premium, SI.46, was the triple attribute high-level environmental package. Unlike 
the previous definition, this definition indicates a positive willingness-to-pay for ever\' 
bundle of embedded environmental attributes. V^^len testing to see if these willingness-to-
pay values are strictly greater than zero, only the package with a low-level reduction of odor 
is not significantly different than zero at the five-percent significance level."' The rest of the 
packages are significantly greater than zero. When examining whether the premiums 
differed across attribute levels, it was found that at the five-percent level of significance, all 
of the premiums for the single attribute packages, excluding the package related to low-le\'el 
odor reduction, were not statistically different. Utilizing this same test, shows that the 
packages with double attributes are also not significantly different from each other. The 
premium for the triple attribute package was significantly different from all other packages. 
Examining Table 5.12 closer shows another interesting finding. It appears that the 
attributes are additive. .A.ddiiivity implies that if the premiums for the single high-level 
attributes are added together, then they would equal the premium for the product with those 
combinations of attributes. For example, if the premiums for the three single high-level 
attribute packages are added together, the combined premium value is SI.38. The actual 
premium given for the triple attribute product was SI.46—only an S0.08 difference. This 
also holds for the odor/groundwater combination but not necessarily for the odor/surface 
.Vote that this is a one sided t-test and has a critical value approximately equal to 1.65 for n > 30. 
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Table 5.12: Willingness-to-Pay with Known Basis (All Participants) 
Average Bids(S) 
Pork Chop Environmental 
Attributes (Level of 
Improvement over Typical) Willingness-to-Pay with Known Basis 
No Particular Environmental Basis 
Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 
Odor SO-90% 
Ground water 15-25% 
Ground water 40-50% 
Surface Water 15-25% 
Surface Water 40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 
40-50"''o 
Odor S0-90°/o/Surface Water 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 
40-50° o/Surface Water 40-50% 
Note: The number in parenthesis is the t-statistic for the test of whether the average bid is difTerent from zero 
Those numbers in bold were significantly different from zero. Also, the letter indicates that by doing a pairwisc 
comparison between the premiums for the products, there was no statistical difference between the means being 
compared at the five-percent level of significance. 
water combination. Testing to see if these two means are significantly different from each 
other ro\cals that the null hypothesis of equality can not be rejected at the five-pcrccni level 
of significatice. This t\pe of result holds true for the double attribute packages. .A.ssummi^ 
that marketing costs are same for single, double, and triple environmental attribute packages, 
this approach may suggest that there may not be premium gains from selling packages of 
pork chops with combined attributes. Offering single attribute products may be just as 
beneficial. 
0.13 (1.55) 
0.39 (5.21)^ 
0.46 (6.10)^ 
0.43 (5.07)" 
0.35 (4.42)" 
0.56 (6.40)" 
0.83 (8.58)'' 
0.93 (9.22)" 
1.46(12.56)' 
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Table 5.13 provides the willingness-to-pay with a known basis for embedded 
environmental attributes by location. In general, premiums were similar across locations. 
.•\11 but one of the premiums were positive. The only exception was Oregon for the package 
u ith a low-level environmental attribute related to odor reduction. Upon further 
in\ esiigaiion, Oregon consistently has the lowest premiums for each package if the package 
\\ ith low-level surface water attribute is excluded. This might be explained by the fact that 
Oregon had consistently lower average bids overall. V\1ien testing to see if the premiums for 
the packages differed across location, there were only a few differences. Most occurred in 
Oregon where seventeen differences were shown. The other seven significant differences 
occurred between Ames, Iowa and Manhattan Kansas. .'Amongst all the other location 
comparisons, there were no statistically significant differences. When examining the package 
\\ ith triple attributes, the second experiment in Raleigh, North Carolina had the highest 
premium of SI.87, while the lowest occurred in Oregon at a premium of SI. 19. 
\\'illingness-to-pay with Known Basis: Premium Vs. Non-Premium Payers 
In the last section, willingness-to-pay with a known basis was examined. It was 
found that this average premium over all participants was positive at the aggregate level for 
each package. This would imply that embedded environmental attributes are desirable 
atlribuies that consumers would pay for. In this section, the premium payers and the non-
premium payers will be investigated under the known basis approach to measuring 
willingness-to-pay. In this case, a premium payer will be defined as a participant who has a 
positive willingness-to-pay for the package with the triple attributes, i.e., a participant who 
tendered a higher bid for the most environmental package over the typical package in the 
fourth round. 
Table 5.13: Willingiiess-to-l'ay for lOmiiedded I'lnviroiimeiital A((rit)ii(es with a Known Basis by IVodiicl and Location 
Location 
Pork Chop Environmental 
Attributes (Level of 
Improvement over Typical) 
Ames, 
lA 
Manhattan, 
KS 
Raleigh, 
NC (97) 
Burlington, 
vr 
Iowa Falls, 
lA 
Corvallis, 
OR 
Raleigh, 
NC (98) 
No Particular Environmental 
Attributes (Typical) 
Basis Basis Basis Basis Basis Basis Basis 
Odor 30-40% 0.18" 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.21 -0.28"'* 0.52" 
Odor 80-90% 0.57' 0.3 r** 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.09'''-" 0.75' 
Ground water 15-25% 0.61^ 0.47''' 0.56 0.66" 0.36 0.07""' 0.75' 
Ground water 40-50% 0.69' 0.39' 0.24 0.77 0.35 0.24 0.50 
Surface Water 15-25% 0.54 0.09 0.30 0.50 0.42 0.24 0.52 
Surface Water 40-50% ().95''' 0.54" 0.44 0.70'' 0.54 0.77'' 
Odor 80-90%/Giound Water 
40-50% 
1.I8'"' 0.77'" 0.76 0.93 1.10 023^'"V 0.98' 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 
40-50% 
1.04^' 0.93^ 0.74 1.15 1.03 0.48" 1.29' 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 1.62^ 1.32^ 1.27 1.63 1.44 1.19 1.87 
40-50%/Surfacc Water 40-
50% 
CorrcspomliiiiJ letters indicate that at the live percent level ol significance the null hypothesis of the two changes being equal across location for each 
product coulil not be rejecteil. 
Table 5.14 presents the distribution of premium payers versus non-premium payers 
across the different locations. Wlien comparing the two definitions used to define premium 
pa\ ers. there was an eighty-four percent overlap between the two definitions. Hence, of the 
329 participants in the study, eighty-four percent were classified as making the same decision 
under both definitions—a premium payer was classified as a premium payer and a non-
premium payer was classified as a non-premium payer. Using the present definition, on the 
aggregate level sixty-nine percent of the participants paid a premium. This percentage is 
se\ en percent higher than with the previous definition of willingness-to-pay. The percentage 
of premium payers ranged fi^om fifty-seven percent to eighty-one percent in the different 
siud\' areas. The location with the highest percentage of premium payers was Burlington. 
V ermont at eighty-one percent. This is in stark contrast to the previous definition where 
\ermont had the lowest percent of premium payers at fifty-six percent. The location with the 
lowest percentage of premium payers under this definition was Iowa Falls, Iowa at fifty-
scv cn percent. Except for Iowa Falls, the percentage of premium payers increased for all 
other locations under this new definition. 
Table 5.14: Premium Payers Versus Non-Premium Payers by .\rea when Considering 
W illingness-to-pay with a Known Basis 
Experiment .Area Number of Number of Percent Premium 
Premium Payers Non-Premium Payers 
Payers 
.-Ml areas 228 101 69 
Ames. LA 34 15 69 
Manhattan. KS 44 16 73 
Raleigh. NC (6/28/97) 24 7 77 
Burlingion, VT 22 5 81 
Iowa Falls, lA 33 25 57 
Cor\ a!lis. OR 40 20 67 
Raleigh. NC (6/27/98) 31 13 70 
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Table 5.15 presents the average premium paid for each package for only those ho 
paid a premium for the most environmental package. The highest premium of S2.23 went to 
the package with the triple attributes while the package with a low-level of odor reduction 
only received a premium of S0.35 over the typical package. As expected, the average 
premium paid for each package is positive and significantly different from zero at the 0.001 
significance le\"el. As with aggregate data, when the package with a low-level attribute 
related to odor is excluded, the premiums for the packages with a single high and low-level 
attribute are not significantly different from each other at the five-percent level of 
Tabic 5.15: Willingness-to-Pay with Known Basis (Premium Payers) 
.\verage Bids($) 
Pork Chop Environmental 
.Attributes (Level of 
Improvement over Typical) Willingness-to-Pay with Known Basis 
No Particular Environmental Basis 
-Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40°b 
Odor 80-90% 
Ground water 15-25% 
Ground water 40-50% 
Surface Water 15-25% 
0.35 (3.50) 
0.69 (T.?!)--
0.74 (8.19)' 
0.79 (7.91)'' 
0.65 (7.09)' 
0.90 (8.35)-' 
1.31 (11.10)'' 
.Surface Water 40-50% 
Odor S0-90°/o/Ground Water 40-
50% 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-
50'"o 
1.44(11.90)" 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 40-
50%,'Surface Water 40-50% 
2.23 (16.73)' 
Note; The number in parenthesis is the t-statistic for the test of whether the average bid is different from zero. 
.•\Iso. the letter indicates that by doing a pairwise comparison between the premiums for the products, there was 
no statistical difference between the means being compared at the five-percent level of significance. 
1 1 4  
significance. Also, when comparing the two double attribute packages, their premiums are 
not significantly different from each other at the five-percent level of significance. All other 
comparisons are significantly different from each other. When examining premiums by 
package, it is easy to see that the premiums follow a consistent pattern of increasing by both 
le\el and number of attributes. This pattern includes the package with the high-level 
attribute related to ground water. This result would imply that the inconsistency in the 
pattern seen in the aggregate data, i.e.. the low-level attribute package receiving a higher 
premium than the high-level attribute package, stems from the non-premium payers. 
The aspect of additivity, while not as pronounced with the premium payers as it was 
with the aggregate data, is still evident. WTien adding the premiums of each single high-le\ el 
attribute package together would indicate that the premium for the triple package should be 
S2.3S. The actual premium paid for the triple attribute product was S2.23. a difference of 
onl\ SO. 15. Testing to see if the two means are equal gives a t-statistic of -0.51. This would 
imply that they are not significantly different from each other at the five-percent level of 
significance and that additivity holds for the premium payers. 
Table 5.16 presents the information for the non-premium payers under the current 
definition of willingness-to-pay. These 101 non-premium payers made up thirty-one pcrccni 
of ilic participants in the study. It should be kept in mind that by definition of being a noii-
prcmium payer, the triple attribute package must have a premium no greater than zero. Thi.s 
does not necessarily imply that all the other packages must have a negative premium. When 
e.xamining this group, it is easy to see that the participants decreased the value for all 
packages over the typical. The greatest decrease of SO.39 came from the package with a 
high-level attribute related to ground water. This decrease explains the source of the 
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inconsistency seen in the aggregate data where the package with low-level ground water 
attribute received a higher premium than the package with the high-level attribute. 
E.xamining whether these decreases were significantly different from zero at the five-percent 
le\ el of significance, two packages have premiums not statistically different from zero. 
These packages were the low-level ground water attribute package and the package related to 
ha\ ing a both surface water and odor reduction attributes. Inspecting the data in the table for 
a reason why participants decreased their bids reveals no consistent pattern related to 
environmental attributes. The smallest decrease in premium of SO. 18 was related to the 
Table 5.16: Willingness-to-Pay >vith Known Basis (Non-Premium Payers) 
Average Bids($) 
Pork Chop Environmental 
•Attributes (Level of 
Improvement over Typical) Wiliingness-to-Pay with Known Basis 
No Particular Environmental Basis 
.Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 
Odor 80-90% 
Ground water 15-25% 
Ground water 40-50% 
Surface Water 15-25% 
-0.38 (-3.09)' 
-0.29(2.73)-* 
-0.18 (-1.62)" 
-0.39 (-3.03)" 
-0.32 (-2.35)" 
-0.22 (-2.00)" 
-0.24 (-2.12)" 
Surface Water 40-50% 
Odor S0-90%/Ground Water 
40-50°/b 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 
40-50% 
-0.22 (-1.82)" 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 
40-50%.'Surface Water 40-50% 
-0.30 (-3.29)" 
Note; The number m parenthesis is the t-statistic for the test of whether the average bid is ditTerent from zero. 
.Also, the letter indicates that by doing a pairwise comparison between the premiums for the products, there was 
no statistical difference between the means being compared at the five-percent level of significance. 
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package vs ith a low-level ground water attribute. A test between a pairvvise comparison of 
ihc premiums reveals that there is no significant difference between any of the premiums at 
the five-percent level of significance. 
Of the 101 participants that are classified as non-premium payers based on the current 
definition of willingness-to-pay. twenty-seven decreased their value for the most 
en\ ironmental package. This number is equivalent to the twenty-five participants that 
decreased their bid under the previous definition of willingness-to-pay. Table 5.17 separates 
the non-premium payers into two groups—those participants that had the same value for 
i\pical and most environmental package and those participants that had a higher bid for the 
i\pical package over the most environmental package. As seen in the table, these two groups 
are very distinct. The participants that had a premium of zero for the most environmental 
goods also had a premium bid of zero for the rest of the packages. Some of these premiums 
u ere positive, while the rest were negative. Testing to see whether these premiums are 
staiisiically equal to zero, the null hypothesis of equality to zero cannot be rejected at the 
five-percent level of significance. This would imply that the envirormiental information had 
no effect on these participants. 
When examining the negative bidders' premiums for each product, a different picuirc 
appears. .A.11 of the average premiums are significantly different from zero at the five-perccni 
level of significance. In fact all of the premiums are strictly negative. This would impl\ that 
this group is negatively affected by embedded environmental attributes within the packages. 
Comparing both groups together shows that the zero bidders were not affected by the 
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Table 5.17: Zero Bidders Versus Negative Bidders when Considering Willingness-to-
pay with Known Basis 
Average Bids(S) 
Pork Chop Environmental 
.\ttributes (Level of 
Improvement over Typical) 
\\'illingness-to-Pay with 
Known Basis 
(Zero Bidders) 
(N=74) 
Willingness-to-Pay with 
Known Basis 
(Negative Bidders) 
^ (N=27) 
No Particular Environmental 
.Attributes (Typical) 
Basis Basis 
Odor 30-40°b -0.12(-1.31) -1.09 (-3.09) 
Odor SO-90% -0.06 (-0.64) -0.92 (-3.49) 
Ground water 15-25% 0.09 (0.96) -0.91 (-3.03) 
Ground water 40-50% -0.14 (-1.12) -1.05 (-3.59) 
Surface Water 15-25% -0.02 (-0.12) -1.15 (-3.54) 
Surface Water 40-50% 0.02 (0.20) -0.88 (-2.S0) 
Odor 80-90%''Ground Water 40-
50"o 
-0.06 (-0.58) -0.73 (-2.49) 
Odor S0-90%/Surface Water 40-
50" 0 
-0.01 (-0.09) -0.79 (-2.58) 
Odor S0-90%/Ground Water 40-
50" (1 Surface Water 40-50% 
0.00 (0.00) -1.1 1 (-3.S7) 
Note. The number m parenthesis is the t-siatistic for the test of whether the average bid is different from zero. 
en\ ironmenial information, while the negative bidders are extremely affected in a negaii\ e 
manner due to the environmental information. Finally, neither group shows a consistent 
pattern why they bid the level of premium they did based on environmental attributes. 
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chapter six: results from pre and post auction 
surveys 
Chapter three presented a mode! of consumer behavior in a second-price sealed-bid 
auction with multiple rounds. Within chapter three, an interpretation of the bids from a 
second-price auction was given. Also in chapter three, two willingness-to-pay measures are 
defined. In chapter five, results are examined to determine whether consumers would pay a 
premium for pork products with embedded environmental attributes. The first definition of a 
premium payer considered a participant who increased their bid for the package with the 
most environmental attributes from round three to round four. In this case, it was found that 
approximately sixty-two percent of the participants could be considered premium payers. 
.Another way of defining a premium payer is to consider a participant who bid a higher value 
for the environmental package over the t\pical package in the same information round, 
specifically round four. In this case, sixty-nine percent of the participants could be 
considered premium payers. In this chapter, the pre and post experiment surv eys completed 
b\ the participants will be anaU'zed. The pre experiment surv ey will initially be anah^zed at 
the aggregate level. Then results are provided by premium payers and non-premium payers 
lo e\ aluate for differences between the two groups. Both of the definitions for a premium 
payer will be analyzed. The post survey, which relates to consumer's knowledge of 
production practices, is only analyzed at the aggregate level. 
There were two surv eys conducted during each experiment, one before the auctions and 
one after the auctions. The pre auction survey asked questions that related to socioeconomic 
factors, e.g., age, gender, and household income. It also asked questions related to issues of 
concern, e.g.. the environment, food prices, and family farming. Furthermore, questions 
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were asked relating to the attributes that the participant consumed, e.g.. eating qualit\'. visual 
appeal, and price. See appendix B for the specific questions related to the pre auction sur\ c\. 
The post auction sun. ey asked questions that pertained to knowledge about pork production. 
Questions were asked about the acceptability of different methods for reducing odor in 
production, reducing manure seepage into ground water, and reducing manure run-off or 
spills into surface water. Also asked on this sur\'ey were questions related to concerns about 
farm issues and livestock production methods. See appendi.x B for the post auction 
questions. 
Pre Auction Survey 
Table 6.1 provides general information of the socioeconomic characteristics for the 
participants in the study. This information is provided by study location in .'\ppendix D. Of 
the participants in the study, about six in ten were female (59.88%). This reflects 
responsibility for food purchases, as when the household was initially contacted by 
telephone, the primary food purchaser was encouraged to come to the experiment if the\ 
u ore available. The average age of participants was foay-eight years with an average of 2.69 
individuals per household. Average household income for the study participants was 
approximately S43.400. with an employment level of sixty-six percent.' Most participants 
consumed meat. pouItr\'. and fish. Pork was consumed on a\'erage 5.S3 times per momh. 
while poultrv' was consumed nearly double that at 10.04 times per month. Beef consumption 
' Ii should be noted that the question related to employment asked whether the participant was employed. 
.•\noiher question asked what was the occupation of the participant. .Most of the participants that were 
homemakers labeled themselves as not employed which should be taken into consideration. When accounting 
for homemakers as being employed, this increases the emplovment level of the participants to seventy-seven 
percent. 
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Table 6.1: General Socioeconomic Information: All Participants 
Item Ail Participants 
(N = 329) 
Females "/o 59.88 
Age \'ears 47.74 
Number Livmg m Household 2.69 
Hducaiion Level Years'* 13.98 
Hmployed /o 65.65 
Household Income S'' S43.400 
Consume Beef % 96.65 
Consume Pork % 95.72 
Consume Poultrv' % 97.86 
Consume Fish % 89.30 
Times Consume Beef per Month 9.90 
Times Consume Pork per Month 5.83 
Times Consume Poultry per Month 10.04 
Times Consume Fish per Month 3.91 
Number of Production Facilities VVithm One Mile 0,14 
Number of Production Facilities Withm Two Mile 0,4 i 
Commercial Livestock and/or Crop Producers % 1.23 
Read Food Labels'" 2.3s 
Noticc Environmental Attributes on Labels % 52,01 
Consume More Beef Due to Advertising % 15.4s 
C onsume More Pork Due to Ad%-ertising % 3n ,v2 
Wjni I-.nvironmental Labeling for Most Products W4 ~5 
N'k'ouid Pay a Premium for Meat Products with Environmental 64.Ml 
.A.ttnbutcs "u" 
Want Education for Pork Producers S9_54 
•" This was imputed from categorical responses using mean years with in the category as the observ ation. 
This was imputed from categorical responses using mean mcome within the category as the observation. 
' 1 =ne\ er; 2=sometimes; 3=ahvays 
Note: these questions were asked on the post auction survey. 
was closer to poultry' at an average of 9.9 times per month, whereas fish consumption was 
bclo\\ pork at an average of 3.91 times per month. 
When asked the question "how many pork production facilities are w ithin a one mile 
radius of your dwelling," the average participant response was 0.14 facilities. This number 
nearly tripled when this radius is taken to two miles (0.41 production facilities), h should be 
noted that a large proportion of the participants did not have any hog facilities within a two 
mile radius of their dwelling. Only a small percent of the participants considered themselves 
as commercial livestock and/or crop producers. Of the participants. 1.23 percent of them 
commercially produced livestock or crops. 
Participants indicated that they read labels on the products they buy. The average 
\ alue was 2.38 where a 2 denoted "sometimes read labels" and a 3 denoted "always read 
labels." .A.11 the participants in this study indicated they read labels at least sometimes. 
.About one-half indicated that they had noticed environmental attributes on labels and ninety-
n\ e percent indicated they would like to have environmental information provided on 
product labels. .Almost all of the participants indicated that they would buy a meat product 
that had environmental attributes specified on the label. It should be clarified that this 
question did not ask whether they would pay a premium, rather it asked if they would 
consume meat that had environmental attributes. This implies that there is not an aversion to 
meat products with environmental attributes. Hence environmental attributes are perceivcd 
as a good; so much so. that almost ninety-percent want pork producers to have en\ ironmental 
education on production practices. When participants were asked whether they would pay a 
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premium for meat products with environmental attributes. 64.8 percent indicated they 
would." This is remarkably close to the number that actually did pay a premium. 
It is interesting to note that about one-third of the participants indicated that they had 
purchased more pork as a result of advertisements they had seen in the media. Approximately 
fifteen percent of the participants felt they had consumed more beef as a result of 
ad\ ertisements. This might imply that the pork advertising campaign. Pork. The Other IMiite 
Meal, may be more effective than the beef campaign. Beef It is \Miai 's for Dinner. This 
effect may also be due to the larger number of times beef was consumed per month as 
compared to pork. 
Premium vs. Non-Premium Payer 
Table 6.2 presents a comparison of socioeconomic factors of the premium payers and 
the non-premium payers when a premium payer is defined as a participant who increased her 
bid from round three to round four for the most environmental package. Table 6.3 represents 
a comparison of these same factors where a premium payer in this case is defined as a 
participant who provided a higher bid for the most environmental good compared to the 
t>pical package in the environmental information round, round four. Examining both tables 
carefully shows that the characteristics of premium payers across definitions are very similar. 
In fact, ai the five-percent level of significance, they are not significantly different from cach 
other. " This result also holds for the non-premium payers. Since there is no significant 
" It should be noted that this question was asked on the post auction survey. This was done for two reasons. 
First. It was in the post auction survey to reduce bias in the auction e.xperiment. If this question had been asked 
bei'orc the e.xpenment it may have created an expectation that environmental attributes were the focus of the 
study. Second, it allows for testing whether panicipants knew their own preferences. 
' For the continuous variables, the t-test from chapter five was used. In the case of the proportional data, a test 
from Freund was used (1992, p. 481). In this case, it is assumed that these proportions are being drawn from a 
binomial distribution. 
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Table 6.2: Comparison of General Information: Premium Payers, Non-
Payers for Definition One of Wiilingness-to-Pay' 
•Premium 
Item Premium Payers 
(N = 204) 
.Non-Premium 
Payers(N = 125) 
Females "o 63.24 54.40 
Aue ^'ears 46.83 49.23 
Number Living in Household 2.76 2.57 
Education Level Years'' 14.36 13.2S 
Employed % 71.08 56.80 
Household Income S44.400 S41.700 
Consume Beef % 97.06 95.97 
Consume Pork % 97.06 93.50 
Consume Poultrv' % 99.02 95.93 
Consume Fish % 90.69 86.99 
Times Consume Beef per Month 10.06 9.64 
Times Consume Pork per Month 5.62 6.18 
Times Consume Poultr\' per Month 9.98 10.13 
Times Consume Fish per Month 3.66 4.33 
Number of Production Facilities Within One Mile O.Il 0.19 
Number of Production Facilities Within Two Mile 0.41 0.41 
Commercial Livestock and/'or Crop Producers % 0.99 1.61 
Read Food Labels'^ 2.39 2.37 
Notice Environmental Attributes on Labels % 54.68 4".50 
Consume More Beef Due to Advertising % 13.33 19.13 
Consume .More Pork Due to Advertising % 28.36 35 04 
W'ani Environmental Labeling for Most Products 96.06 92.5() 
UOuld Pay a Premium for Meat Products with 
En\'ironmental .Attributes %' 
71.64 53.33 
U'ani Education for Pork Producers %' 92.61 84.43 
•• A premium payer under this definition is a participant who increased her bid for the most environmental 
package from round three to round four. 
^ This was imputed from categorical responses using mean years with in the category as the obser\ ation. 
' This was imputed from categorical responses using mean income within the category as the obser\ ation. 
" 1 =never; 2=sometimes; 3=always 
' Note: these questions were asked on the post auction survey. 
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Table 6.3: Comparison of General Information: Premium Payers, Non-Premium Payers 
for Definition Two of VVillingness-to-Pay' 
Item Premium Payers Non-Premium 
(N = 228) Payers (N = 101) 
Females % 65.35 47.52 
Age Years 45.90 51.95 
Number Living m Household 2.77 2.51 
Education Level Years'' 14.20 13.44 
Employed % 70.18 55.45 
Household Income S44.700 S40.400 
Consume Beef % 96.93 96.00 
Consume Pork % 96.48 94.00 
Consume Poultry % 98.68 96.00 
Consume Fish % 89.87 88.00 
Times Consume Beef per Month 9.88 9.94 
Times Consume Pork per Month 5.55 6.45 
Times Consume Poultry per Month 10.35 9.32 
Times Consume Fish per Month 3.72 4.35 
Number of Production Facilities Within One Mile 0.09 0.19 
Number of Production Facilities Within Two Mile 0.31 0.24 
Commercial Livestock and/or Crop Producers % 0.99 0.64 
Read Food Labels'^ 2.37 2.40 
Notice Environmental Attributes on Labels % 52.86 50.00 
Consume More Beef Due to Advertising % 14.61 19.13 
Consume More Pork Due to Advertising % 28.00 I ".58 
N^'ant En\ ironmentaI Labeling for Most Products %' 95.59 92.7S 
Would Pay a Premium for Meat Products with 71.68 48.42 
Environmental Attributes %' 
Want Education for Pork Producers %' 92.07 83.67 
" A premium payer under this second definition is a participant who had a higher bid for the most environmental 
package compared to the typical package within round four. 
'' This as imputed from categorical responses using mean years with in the category as the observ ation. 
" This was imputed from categorical responses using mean income within the categor\' as the obser\ ation. 
1 =ne\'er; 2=sometimes; 3=always 
" Note: these questions were asked on the post auction survey. 
differences between socioeconomic characteristics between the two definitions, only the 
comparisons in Table 6.2, the first definition mentioned, shall be discussed. 
For most comparisons in Table 6.2 there were no significant differences between the 
premium payers and the non-premium payers. Many of the tendencies were in the expected 
direction such as a larger percent of the premium payers noticed and wanted environmental 
labels. However, these differences were not significant at the five-percent level of 
significance. Three factors were significantly different at the five-percent significance level 
between the two groups. These dealt with employment, the desire for pork producers to have 
education in environmental awareness and production practices, and paying a premium for 
meal products with environmental attributes. The premium payers had a significantly higher 
percentage of employment. Premium payers also had a significantly higher percentage of 
participants who wanted pork producers to have environmental education. 
.A.S expected the non-premium payers had a significantly lower proportion saying they 
\^ould pay a premium for meat products with environmental attributes than the premium 
pav ers would. For those who actually paid a premium nearly seventy-two percent said the\' 
would pay a premium, while fifty-three percent of the non-premium payers said they would 
pay a premium. These results also hold for the second definition of willingness-to-pay. li 
was expected that the premium payers should be closer to 100 percent giving a premium, 
while the non-premium payers should have been closer to zero. Using a binomial 
distribution test as in Freund (1992), the premium payers are significantly less than 100 
percent at the .001 significance level, while the non-premium payers are significantly above 
zero at this same level of significance. 
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This result is very- interesting because it came after the experiment where the 
participants had already bid according to their preferences. There may be at least two 
reasons for this result. The first reason could be that the information in the experiment, 
specifically from rounds four and five, changed the participants' preferences. Since the 
reponed premiums for this study are due to the environmental information from round four, 
the information provided in round five may have changed the participants" preferences, e.g.. 
the environmental information from round four became more or less important due to the 
information from round five. This might explain why the premium payers are not at one 
hundred percent, but it is highly unlikely that this would explain the non-premium payers. 
This was because the bids in round five did not change significantly as would be expected if 
the information from round five had been preference altering. .Another explanation for this 
disparii\ is that there is a group of free-riders who are indicating that they would pay a 
premium when in actuality they would not. This result would be strictly related to the non-
premium payers. 
Since the rest of the comparisons are not statistically different, a general discussion of 
trends will be provided. Comparing the premium payers to the non-premium payers, females 
were more likely to pay a premium. Non-premium payers tended to be older on average b\ 
2.5 years, while the education level was approximately the same with the premium payers 
only having on average a half a year more education. Household incomes were slightly 
higher for the premium payers by Premium payers consumed more beef per month 
than poultry, pork, or fish. The number of production facilities within a one-mile radius of 
the participants dwelling tended to be higher for the non-premium payers, while extending 
this radius to two miles made the two groups equal. Due to the direct benefit received from 
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pork products produced with embedded environmental attributes, it was expected that a 
Iiighcr concentration hog production facilities would be directly associated with being a 
premium payer. It seems that this may not be true for people who live very close to these 
facilities. This may give some credence to the study done by Taff et al (1996). A plausible 
argument given by Taff et al. is that many people self-select themselves to the en\ ironment 
around \\ hich they live. 
When it came to reading food labels premium payers and non-premium payers were 
nearly identical in the average response. The premium payers had a higher proportion 
noticing environmental attributes provided on the labels of the products they consume. 
Environmental information was important to both sets of participants. Over ninety-two 
percent of both groups indicated they wanted environmental labeling. The premium payers 
were at a slightly higher percentage. This may imply that industry- programs focusing on 
providing environmental information and education are important and are looked upon 
fax Grab I y by consumers. 
Information on participant response to issues of concern is shown in Table 6.4. 
These results are provided by study location in Appendi.x D. Like the previous results, there 
is \ cr\ little difference between which definition is used for a premium payer. In the sur\ c> 
a 1 denoted "very concerned" and a 5 denoted "not concerned." In general, participants ucrc 
"\ er\ concerned" to "somewhat concerned" about the en\-ironmcnl. water quality, air qualitv, 
food prices and pollution. The level of concern was lower for family farming, production 
methods, animal welfare, confinement livestock systems, and changing farm structure. 
Under both definitions of a premium, premium payers were more concerned about air 
quality, food prices, family farming, and pollution than non-premium payers were. For the 
Table 6.4: Issues of ('<»na'rri: All Parlicipaiiis, IVeiiiliini Payers, Non-Freniimii Payers 
Item All Participants 
(N = 329) 
Premium Payers 
Detlnitioii 1" 
(N = 204) 
Premium Payers 
Delliiition 2'* 
(N = 228) 
Non-Premium 
I'ayers 
Derinition 1" 
(N= 125) 
Non-Premium 
Payers 
Definition 2'* 
(N= 101) 
Issues of Concern*^ 
Water Quality 1.3S 1,36 1..38 1.43 1.40 
Pollution 1.48 1.45 1.45 1.52 1 55 
Air Quality 1,55 1.50 1.53 1,62 1.59 
Environment 1.64 1.60 1.64 1.71 1.64 
Food Prices 1.03 1.88 1.85 2,00 2.10 
Animal Welfare 2.37 2.39 2.39 2.33 2.32 
Production Methods 2.44 2.44 2.47 2.45 2.38 
Confinement 2.44 2.42 2,44 2.47 2.43 
Family Farm 2.59 2,54 2.57 2,67 2.63 
Structure Of 
Agriculture 
2.94 2.87 2.96 3.05 2.87 
A premium payer under this definilion is a participant who increased her bid lor the mt)st environmental package Ironi round three to round lour, whereas, 
a non-premium payer did not increase her bid, 
A premium payer under this secoiul (letiiiition is a piirticipant who had a higher bid foi (he mosl environmental package coin[)aied to the typical package 
within round four; wheieas. llic non-premium payei had a higher bid on the typical package. 
'''The question was: On a scale Iroin I thiough 5 with 1 being very concerned' and 5 being 'not concerned,' how concerned are you about the lollowing 
issues: 
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issues of production methods, animal confinement, and the changing structure of agriculture, 
ilicre were no definitive preferences when examining the premium payers under both 
defmitions of a premium. 
Information in Table 6.5 focuses on participant's attitudes tow ard attributes of food 
products they consume. These results are provided by study location in .Appendix D. For 
this information a 1 indicated "very important" while a 5 indicated "not important." .A.11 were 
Table 6.5: Issues of Importance: Ail Participants, Premium Payers, Non-Premium 
Payers 
Item .All Premium .Non-
Participants Payers Premium 
Pavers 
Issues of Importance N = 329 N = 204 -\ = 125 
Pertaining to Defrntion l""*" 
Freshness 1.18 1.19 1.16 
Eating Quality 1.20 1.21 1.17 
\'isual .Appeal 1.6S 1.71 1.63 
Price 1.75 1.73 1.78 
L'nifomiity of Product 2.14 2.15 2.13 
Production .Methods 2.20 2.25 2.12 
Issues oflmoortance N = 228 N = 101 
Pertainine to Defintion 2" 
Freshness 1.19 1.16 
Ealing Quality 1.21 1.18 
X'isual .Appeal 1.70 1.62 
Price 1.69 1.88 
L'ni fomiity of Product 2.18 2.06 
Production Methods 2.26 2.05 
The question was; On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being "very important" and 5 being "not important." 
indicate how imponant the following attributes are for the products you consume; 
A premium payer under this definition is a participant who increased her bid for the most environmental 
package from round three to round four, whereas, a non-premium payer did not increase her bid. 
" .X premium payer under this second definition is a panicipant who had a higher bid for the most 
environmental package compared to the typical package within round four; whereas, the non-premium-
payer had a higher bid on the typical package. 
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\ ery concerned to somewhat concerned about food eating quality, visual appeal, freshness, 
and price. Production methods used in producing the food, and uniformity of product had 
lower levels of importance. There were no significant differences between the premium and 
non-premium payers under both definitions. 
Post .Auction Suney 
The information in Table 6.6 provides panicipant responses to acceptability of 
methods producers use to reduce odors. Filtration of air from livestock buildings was an 
acceptable method for odor reduction; approximately sixty-seven percent indicated it was 
"\ ery acceptable" to "somewhat acceptable." .Microbial and enz\Tne additives to manure as a 
method for odor reduction had a slightly lower level of acceptability; slightly more than fift\ 
pcrcent indicated it was "very acceptable" to "somewhat acceptable." .Another thirty-six to 
thirty-seven percent indicated they had a neutral or no opinion stance. Chemical additives to 
manure were less acceptable. Approximately one in five indicated that this was a "\ ery 
acccpiablc" to "somewhat acceptable" method of odor control. Four in ten indicated it w as 
"somcw hat unacceptable" to "not acceptable." Only ten percent of the participants indicated 
thai use of chemicals in a hog's diet as a means of odor control was "very acceptable" to 
"somewhat acceptable." In contrast, use of natural additives to a hog's diet was hiuhi> 
acceptable. Over seventy-five percent of the participants reported that this method was \ cr\ 
to "somewhat acceptable." This would imply that consumers find it more desirable to ha\tj 
natural solutions to odor problems. 
When considering manure storage and injection methods for controlling odor, 
participants' attitudes differed. The range of those indicating "somewhat acceptable" to "not 
acceptable" ranged from twenty-six percent for manure storage above ground, forty-one 
labic 6.6: Distribution tor Participiint Responses on the Acceptability of Methods for Odor Reduction (N = 329) 
Percentage Of Participants 
Very Somewhat Sonicwhut Nut Acccptabic No Opinion 
Method Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable 
Filtralion of air from building 46.95 21.04 16.46 2.74 4.57 7.32 
Additives to manure; 
Chemical 6.23 12.79 21.64 17.38 23.93 18.03 
Microbial 24.92 27.51 17.48 4.53 6.15 19.42 
Enzyme 27.80 25.56 18.53 4.15 5.43 18.53 
Additives to hog's diet: 
Chemical 2.37 7.46 14.92 14.92 48.14 11.86 
Natural 49.38 26.85 9.88 2.47 4.63 6.79 
hijcction of manure into soil 6.12 11.93 29.05 13.76 22.02 17.13 
to a depth of 4-8 inchcs 
Miinurc spread on top of soil 8.26 23.55 27.22 14.37 11.93 14.68 
with immediate 
incorporation 
Manure storage above 14.11 21.78 25.77 11.96 14.11 12.27 
ground with cover 
Manure storage below 8.62 13.85 25.54 17.23 24.00 10.77 
ground with cover 
Manure storage under hog 2.76 8.59 22.70 18.10 32.82 15.03 
building 
Composting with bedding 16.16 27.13 22.87 8.84 9.15 15.85 
material 
percent for manure storage below ground, and fifty-one percent for manure storage under the 
hog building. Participants were more acceptable of manure storage systems that \\ ere abo\ e 
ground and away from the pigs. The highest level of acceptance was for composting with 
bedding material. Forty-three percent indicated that this was "ver\' acceptable" to 
"somewhat acceptable." 
It is important that about one-fourth of the participants were neutral with respect to 
the method of manure storage and incorporation method. .Another ten to twenty percent had 
no opinion in these areas. Given this, there is an educational focus needed because a large 
number of participants provided a neutral to no opinion response. 
Information in Table 6.7 provides participant acceptability of manure handling 
methods as they perceive it relates to ground water impacts. Again, there were a large 
number with a neutral (22-23%) or no opinion (12-16%). >\Tien groundwater was 
considered, injection had the lowest level of acceptability; twenty-seven percent indicating 
"not acceptable." It was "very acceptable" to "somewhat acceptable" for only one in five 
panicipants. Half indicated that manure storage above ground in steel/cement structures was 
acceptable. Below ground storage was acceptable for thirty-seven percent of the participants. 
Table 6.8 provides information on participant acceptability of methods used for 
manure storage and application related to surface water impacts. Results are quite similar to 
Tabic 6.7 on ground water. Again, manure storage above ground was more acceptable. It 
was interesting that injection was less acceptable than surface application. It should be noted 
that when the injection method is used properly, it is a better method of getting your manure 
on fields than spreading the manure on the top soil from the point of view of odor reduction, 
and ground and surface water protection. 
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Table 6.7: Distribution for the Acceptability of Methods Used To Achieve A Reduction 
Of Manure Seepage Into Ground Water (N = 329) 
Percentage of Participants 
Method 
\'ery 
Acceptable 
Somewhat 
Acceptable Neutral 
Somewhat 
Unacceptable 
Not 
.\cceptable 
No 
Opinion 
Injection of 
manure into the 
soil to a depth 
of 4 to S inches 
4.91 14.72 21.78 15.34 27.61 15.64 
Manure storage 
abo\ e ground 
in steel/cement 
structure 
18.71 31.60 23.31 5.52 8.90 11.96 
Manure storage 
below ground 
in steel cement 
Structure 
15.38 23.38 22.46 12.00 14.46 12.31 
Table 6.8: Distribution of the Acceptability' of Methods Used To Achieve A Reduction 
In Run-off Or Spill Of Manure Into Surface Water (N = 329) 
Percentage of Participants 
Method 
Very 
.Acceptable 
Somewhat 
Acceptable Neutral 
Somewhat 
Unacceptable 
Not 
.Acceptable 
No 
Opinion 
Injcction of 
manure into the 
soil to a depth 
of 4 to 8 inches 
5.21 15.34 23.62 14.11 26.99 14.72 
Manure spread 
on top of soil 
u ith immediate 
incorporation 
Manure storage 
above ground 
in steel cement 
structure 
6.13 
19.02 
24.54 
32.52 
23.62 
20.86 
16.26 
5.83 
18.10 
8.90 
11.35 
12.88 
Manure storage 
below ground 
14.11 23.62 22.09 11.04 15.64 13.50 
in sieel cement 
structure 
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Participant concerns about farm issues and type of production facilities are presented 
in  Tab les  6 .9  and  6 .10 .  In fo rma t ion  in  Tab le  6 .9  shows  tha t  mos t  o f  the  pa r t i c ipan t s  (S2°o)  
are "very concerned" to "somewhat concerned" about the impact of livestock production on 
the enx ironment. Eight in ten are concerned about the worker environment, while seven in 
ten are concerned about the animal environment. About half the participants indicate a 
concern about the structure of the farm industry. For this, thirty-percent had no opinion or 
were neutral. 
.A.boui half the participants indicated they were "somewhat favorable" to "not 
favorable" toward total confinement production; thirteen percent indicated they were ver>' to 
somewhat favorable (Table 5.10). Pasture production was indicated as "ver>' fa\ orabie" to 
"somewhat favorable" by fifty-six percent of the participants. .Approximately three in ten 
participants rated partial confinement as "very favorable" to "somewhat favorable." It is 
interesting to note that sixty-five percent of the participants had no opinion on a hoop pork 
Table 6.9: Distribution of Participant Concerns About Farm Issues 
Percentage of Participants 
Is.suc of 
Concern 
Very 
Concerned 
Somenhat 
Concerned Neutral 
Somewhat 
Unconcerned 
.Not 
Concerned 
No 
Opinion 
Hnvironmental 
impact from 
livestock 
production 
46.15 36.00 11.38 2.15 1.54 
Worker 
environment 
42.33 36.50 13.80 2.76 1.23 y  > , 
.\nima! 
environment 
32.62 34.15 20.00 6.15 3.69 3.08 
Farm Structure 23.55 30.07 23.19 6.52 4.35 12.32 
production method. This indicates they were not familiar with this production method. This 
result was not too surprising due to the relative newness of this technology. In general, 
aititudinal responses on level of acceptability and favorability did not differ between 
premium and non-premium payers. Hence they will not be discussed. 
Table 6.10: Distribution of Participant Concerns About Livestock Production Methods (N 
=329) 
Percentage of Participants 
Issue of 
Concern 
Very 
Favorable 
Somewhat 
Favorable Neutral 
Somewhat 
Unfavorable 
Not 
Favorable 
No 
Opinion 
Hoop 2.18 4.67 16.20 2.80 8.41 65.42 
Partial 
Confinement 
5.61 23.05 29.28 13.71 9.35 19.00 
Pasture 36.39 22.02 17.43 4.59 4.28 14.98 
Total 
Confinement 
4.05 9.35 15.58 10.59 42.68 17.76 
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chapter seven: econometric analysis 
In chapter three, a model was developed to explain consumer behavior in a multiple 
round second-price sealed-bid auction with different information sets. In one of the rounds 
there was no information pertaining to embedded environmental attributes in the products 
being auction. This round was known as a naive bidding round. In a later round, information 
u as released pertaining to the embedded environmental attributes of each product being 
auctioned. This round was considered an information round. To handle these different 
information rounds, an assessment function, which relates quality attributes to utility, was 
de\ eloped and incorporated into the consumer maximization problem. This function maps 
both visual quality and environmental quality of the product into utility. 
\\'ithin chapter three, it was discussed that there were two ways of deri\'ing 
w illingness-to-pay for embedded environmental attributes in a product. The first definition 
of w illingness-to-pay investigated the difference in prices from the naive round to the 
infomialion round for the same product. For the remainder of this chapter, this definition of 
w illingness-to-pay will be known as definition one of willingness-to-pay. It was discussed 
thai the main advantage of this definition is that the products across rounds have the same 
\ isua! aitributes. Hence, only the embedded environmental attributes are being valued in this 
measure of willingness-to-pay. The major disadvantage to this definition is that the ex ante 
expectations in the naive bidding round for the embedded environmental attributes within 
each product is unknown. 
The second definition of willingness-to-pay investigated the price differences 
betu een a basis product with no particular environmental attributes with a product that had 
embedded environmental attributes. These products were taken from the information round. 
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Hence, unlike the previous definition the basis of the consumer's expectation is known for the 
en\ ironmenial product. For the remainder of this chapter, this definition of willingness-to-
pa\ u ill be known as definition two of willingness-to-pay. The disadvantage of this measure 
is that it does not directly account for visual quality differences within each product. This 
means that this definition must account for the visual quality difference in the products. To 
do this, it was suggested that the difference in prices of the basis product and the 
en\ ironmenial product in the naive bidding round be used as an adjustment factor for the 
visual quality differences. 
In chapter five, participants' bids for differing environmental attributes were analyzed 
lo sec whether consumers would be willing to pay a premium for pork products with 
embedded envirorunental attributes. Both of the definitions developed in chapter three were 
in\ estigated. .A. premium payer was defined as a participant who had a positive willingness-
lo-pay for the most environmental product, i.e., the product with a high-level reduction in 
odor, surface water impact, and ground water impact. Under the first definition, it was found 
thai approximately sixty-two percent of the participants in the experimental study did ha\ e a 
posiii\ e willingness-to-pay for a product that reduced the impact from production to air. 
ground water, and surface water. For the second definition of willingness-to-pay, sixi\ -niiic 
pcrccnt of the participants were willing to pay a premium for the most environmental 
product. 
Chapter six investigated the socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics of premium 
pa\ ers and non-premium payers for both definitions. It was found that there were only three 
significantly different characteristics between the two groups—emplo\Tnent, willingness to 
pay a premium (yes/no type of answer), and wanting environmental education for pork 
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producers. All of these significant differences followed a priori intuition. The rest of the 
characieristics between the two groups were not significantly different—age. gender, income, 
monihly consumption of different meat products, etc. 
This chapter utilizes econometric techniques to investigate the relationship between 
willingness-to-pay for embedded environmental attributes, specifically for the triple attribute 
product, and socioeconomic characteristics. There are three objectives in this chapter. The 
first objective is to try to predict who are the premium payers from those who are not 
premium payers for each definition of willingness-to-pay using socioeconomic 
characieristics that are typically used in the willingness-to-pay literature. It should be noted 
that the non-premium payers are separated into two groups. The first group was the set of 
participants who were not affected by the environmental information, while the second group 
was the set of participants who were adversely affected by the information. The second 
objective is to predict the magnitude of the willingness-to-pay for the premium payers using 
ihe same \ ariables that were used to predict who were the premium payers and who were 
not. The third objective is to compare the two willingness-to-pay definitions to see if one 
definition can be better predicted than the other can. 
There have been many econometric methods used to analyze the relationship between 
w illingness-to-pay and socioeconomic characteristics. .Menkhaus et al. (1992) and \lchon ct 
al. (1996a) used ordinary least squares (OLS), while Roosen et al. (1998) and Fo.\ (1994) 
used more advance models that incorporated a two-stage analysis. Specifically, Roosen et al. 
(1998) used a double hurdle model developed by Cragg (1971) to investigate the relationship 
' Since ihere is such a small number of non-premium payers who were negatively affected by the information, 
no attempt will be made to predict the magnitude of the willingness-to-pay for this group. A larger sample size 
would be needed for this task. 
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betw een willingness-to-pay for apples with reductions in pesticide use and product and 
socioeconomic characteristics. Fox (1994) relied on a Heckman (1976, 1979) two-stage 
procedure to evaluate willingness-to-pay for milk with no trace of bovine somatotropin and 
socioeconomic relationships. 
There are two related reasons Roosen et al. (1998) and Fox (1994) use these more 
ad\ ancc modeling techniques over OLS. The first is associated with the method they used to 
collect their data. In both of their studies, they used a second-price sealed-bid multi-round 
auction for collecting willingness-to-pay for food safety attributes. In their experiment, they 
initially endowed each participant with a product. Using the auction, they then asked the 
panicipants to bid on a product with food safety attributes. This bid reflected the participants 
\\ illingness-to-pay to upgrade from their initial endowment to a product that had higher food 
safety attributes. Since Fox and Roosen et al. assumed that the product being bid on was no 
worse than the initial endowTnent, they placed a lower limit on the bids of zero. The 
infomiaiion they collected was the willingness-to-pay for the attribute. Hence, causing a 
censoring or limiting point at zero for those whom did not want to upgrade. The drawback to 
usmg OLS for censored data of this sort stems from the qualitative difference between the 
limit bids and the positive bids (Fox 1994). In this case, OLS tends to provide biased rcsuhs 
bccause it ignores the self-seiection by the participants. 
This leads into the second reason to use more advances two-stage techniques. Fo\ 
notes that "even in the absence of selection bias, the two stage method facilitates an 
intuitively appealing decomposition of the bidding decision (1994, p. 133)." By setting the 
lower limit for bids at zero, Roosen et al. (1998) and Fox (1994) caused the participants to 
self-select themselves into groups—those who want to pay a premium and those who do not. 
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This would imply that the modeling techniques they use needed to incorporate some aspect 
of self-selection. Standard OLS analysis cannot accommodate for this in a one-stage 
procedure. In terms of the model provided in chapter three, the first stage of this two-stage 
technique could be considered the assessment function. 
The method used for collecting the willingness-to-pay information, as described in 
chapter four, would allow for OLS estimation because it elicits continuous values. Since the 
first definition of willingness-to-pay was calculated from the change in bids from the no 
information round, round three, and the information round, round four, it is not restricted to a 
lower or upper bound. This also holds true for the second definition of willingness-to-pay. 
Hence it would first appear that OLS estimation would be appropriate and ad\ anced 
modeling techniques may not be necessary. This would imply that the following equation 
could be estimated: 
(7.1) \VTP = p"x^e. 
WTP is a vector of willingness-to-pay for the environmental attribuie(s) being studied, x is a 
matrix of e.xplanatory variables with coefficient vector p. and z is the disturbance vector. 
There is an issue in chapter five that makes OLS inappropriate for analysis of the 
present data. This issue stems ft^om the one hundred participants in this study from the tlrst 
definition of willingness-to-pay. approximately thirty-percent of the bids, which had a 
\\ iliingness-to-pay of zero. For the second definition there were seventy-four participants, 
approximately twenty-two percent, who had a zero willingness-to-pay. While the method of 
data collection allowed for a continuous distribution of the bids, the nature of the information 
given caused a similar discrete cluster point that is seen in censored or truncated data, such as 
Fox (1994) and Roosen et al. (1998). Typically, censored data has an upper and-^or lower 
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bound on the distribution. The data from chapter four is. in essence, censored within the 
distnbution at zero. Hence using the OLS method to model this data will cause a bias in the 
estimates because the point zero will be weighted to heavily. 
As mentioned above Fox (1994) and Roosen et al. (1998) handled the issue of 
censoring by using a two-stage method for estimating the relationship between the dependant 
and independent variables. Since the models they use are very similar, only the method by 
Fox will be described. Fox (1994) employs a Heckman (1976. 1979) two-stage procedure to 
handle the censoring problem in his data. Heckman's approach considers the bias that arises 
to be a case of a specification error or a missing data problem. To handle this bias, he 
proposes to estimate the missing variable in the first stage, and then include the estimates of 
the regressors in the second-stage. In a sense, his method provides a measure of the degree 
of self-selection (Fox 1994). Fox explains that one of the advantages of this method is that it 
allows different variables to influence each decision, as well as it allows a single variable to 
ha\ e different effects for different groups. 
Fox considers the following equations to estimate; 
(7.2) V;,-UI. i€r, 
(7.3 ) ^ 2I ~ U21 i€I. 
u hcrc r is the subset of participants with non-zero bids. He notes that equation 7.2 can be 
\ iewed as an inverse demand equation and equation 7.3 is a choice function where Y2, is a 
qualitative variable that takes on the value one when the participants pays a premium and 
zero otherwise. 
If Ui, and U;, are independent from each other and U-., has a conditional expectation 
of zero, then OLS can be used to estimate equation 7.2. But these error terms are usually not 
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independent when self-selection is occurring. Fox reports that equation 7.2 is t\pically 
biased. To account for the bias, he estimates the following equation: 
(-4) , 
-
u here g\z  and 022 represent the covariance between Ui. and U:, and the variance of L':,. 
respectively, /.i is defined to be the inverse Mill's Ratio." It should be noted that Fox 
assumed that the joint distribution of Un and U21 is bivariate normal. 
To estimate this model. Fox (1994) employs Heckman's two-stage procedure. He 
first estimates equation 7.3 as a probit equation on the full sample to obtain the probability 
that the bid will be positive. From this, he is able to estimate the inverse Mill's Ratio for 
each observ ation. Finally, he estimates equation 7.4 by OLS for the subset of participants 
wlio bid a positive amount. This final equation he estimates gives a consistent estimate of Pi. 
UTiile useful for standard censored data with a lower bound, the two-stage methods 
thai both Roosen et al. (1998) and Fox (1994) used are not totally appropriate for modeling 
the w illingness-to-pay data from chapter five. The double hurdle method and the two-siagc 
Heckman method are inappropriate for the data from chapter five because the censoring in 
this study rests within the distribution rather than being a lower or upper bound. .-MSG their 
method allows for only two choices. In contrast, the data from chapter five for both 
definitions of willingness-to-pay has three choices. 
Lee (1983) offers a way of modeling this type of data using a two-stage procedure 
similar to the Heckman (1976, 1979) and double hurdle models. He suggests using a two-
stage procedure that incorporates using an initial polychotomous choice function, e.g.. 
" See Fox (1994) for the calculation of the inverse Mill's Ratio. 
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multinomial probit. in the first stage to estimate the discrete dependent variables. In the 
second stage, standard OLS procedures can be used to estimate the continuous dependent 
\ ariablcs with the discrete variables factored out. One of the advantages of using the Lee 
model is that it can account for more than two choices in the selection process, whereas, the 
Double Hurdle model and the two-stage Heckman procedure used cannot. It should be noted 
that Heckman's model is just a special case of Lee's procedure. 
Lee's Polychotomous Choice Selectivit> Models 
The model Lee proposes for handling dependent variables with mixed discrete and 
continuous variables can be set up as follows (1983). Suppose there is a polychotomous 
choice model with M categories and M regression equations. These equations can be writicn 
as: 
(7.5) y, = x,C,-asUs 
(•".6) y\ = 2,7, ^ r|s (s = 1 .VI). 
\\ here X. and z, are both exogenous explanatory variables. In equation 7.5. is the standard 
de\ iaiion for a non-standardized distribution. Note that this is equal to one when u. is 
normally distributed. Equation 7.6 can be viewed as the choice equation, whereas, equation 
~.5 IS the observ ed dependent variable when category s is chosen. Lee assumes the error 
lemis. u, and Tj,. in equations 7.5 and 7.6 each have mean zero given the explanaior\ 
variables x. and z. for all s. All the distributions of the error terms in equation 7.5 are 
assumed to have completely specified absolutely continuous marginal distributions. .A^lso. 
the joint distributions of the error terms in equation 7.6 have been specified. 
Lee's model assumes that the dependent variables ys are obser\ ed if and only if 
category s is chosen (1983). The choice of category s follows the rule 
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(7.7) \ ' > max ; ' wherej ^ s. 
/ = ! .  M  '  '  
Letting the polychotomous variable I take on the values 1 to M. variable I takes the value ofs 
ii'category s is chosen. Hence 7.7 would imply that 
(7.S) I = s iff ZsYs >es 
where 
(7.9) t :  = ma.\ y , — ^ ,  w h e r e j  ^  s .  
For each pair (Us. GS ). Lee defines the marginal distribution of u^ as Gs(u) and the marginal 
distribution of as Fs(e). He states that by using the translation method, a bivariate 
distribution of (u^. z^) can be specified. Note that ps can be defined as the correlation between 
u. and c.. By letting gs( ) be the density function of Gs( ). and defining the dummy variable D, 
such that 
( ~.10) Ds = 1 iff I = s. 
tor s = 1 M, the log likelihood function can be specified. This log likelihood function for 
a polychotomous choicc model with random sample of size N can be written as 
\\ here J;, is equal to the inverse of the cumulative distribution evaluated at F,(-) and J:, is 
equa l  t o  the  inve r se  o f  the  cumula t ive  d i s t r ibu t ion  eva lua ted  a t  G i (  ) .  By  a s suming  tha t  y ,  y .  
i.e., the set of e.\planator\' variables across choices are the same, for all s and the marginal 
distribution of u^ are normally distributed N(0,l), a two stage method can be used to estimate 
the equations 
(~. 1 1) In Z. = 
(7.12) y, = XsBs - asps4)(Jis(Zsy))/Fs(Zsy) r[. (s- 1 M). 
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where 4)( ) is the standard normal distribution function and the expectation of r|, given that 
choice s is selected equals zero. The conditional variance of given that choice s is chosen 
is 
( 7  1 3 )  choaen) = a; -{a^p^)-[j,^(,zv) + (P(J^^(zj))IF^{z^y)] 
It should be noted that the estimation of this variance would need correction for 
heieroscedasticity because the errors are correlated across sample obserx ations. 
There are two main reasons why the use of Lee's model is the appropriate way to 
model the data from chapter five and six. First, due to the nature of the attribute that is being 
valued, there is a definite anchoring point within the distributions of bids. .A.s mentioned 
abo\ e. this anchoring point causes a discrete point within a continuous distribution. The 
model by Lee is general enough to handle this issue by estimating the discrete variables first. 
Once these discrete variables have been estimated, they can be factored out leaving a 
continuous distribution with the appropriate probability structure, i.e.. no discrete points with 
a large probability mass. 
The second reason Lee's model is appropriate is it is intuitively appealing to think of 
the assessment function explained in chapter three as a separate stage to developing a 
u illingncss-to-pay measure. Thus in the first stage the participant assesses what effect the 
released information has on the participant. !n the second stage, the participant chooses the 
magnitude of the effect. This is especially pronounced in the first definition of willingness-
to-pay. Since this willingness-to-pay was calculated from the difference between a naive 
bidding round and a round with information, there arises a subjective classification of how 
the information affects the participant. This can be viewed as the assessment function from 
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the bchaviorai model presented in chapter three. Hence, the derivation of willingness-to-pay 
from the participant's standpoint can be viewed as a two-stage procedure similar to the 
double hurdle model where there is self-selection. The participants first decide what effect 
the information had on them, then they choose the intensity of the effect. This decision 
causes a self-selection process that also can be handled by Lee's generalized model. 
It should be noted that Lee's model is general enough to allow different explanator\-
\ ariables for determining the magnitude of each categor\'. Hence the explanator\' variables 
used to e.xplain the magnitude of the willingness-to-pay for the premium payers can be 
different from the e.xplanatory variables for the negative premium payers. 
There is a great advantage to modeling the data using Lee's model from a marketing 
point of view. By using this two-stage modeling method of Lee, not only is the magnitude of 
the premium being predicted, but also the classification of the magnitudes. From a marketing 
point of view, even though you may not be able to predict the magnitude of the premium 
u cll. \ou might be able to predict the direction of the magnitude shift with greater accuracy. 
I.e.. predicting premium payers versus non-premium payers. This would allow marketers lo 
focus ihcir marketing efforts on the group that matters to them. 
Two-Stage Estimation with an Ordered Probit Selection Rule 
Information shocks pertaining to product attributes can have a natural self-sclcciion 
aspcci to them. When maximizing consumers are given new information on a product. ihc\ 
must dccide on how that new information impacts their purchase decision. They decide 
whether the information has a positive, neutral, or negative effect. In this sense, the 
consumers can be viewed as self-selecting themselves into a group. Once they have decided 
which group they belong, they can reallocate their resources to maximize their utilities. 
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Since this self-selection process has a natural ordering to it. an appropriate selection rule 
would be an ordered probit rule that has three choices—a negative premium, no premium, 
and a positive premium. 
Let z equal the ex post categorical realization of whether the consumer was 
negatively affected, denoted by a zero, not affected, denoted by a one, or positively affected, 
denoted by a two. The ordered probit part of the model can be written as: 
(~. 14) z* = a"W - u 
where, z = 0 if z* < 0, i.e., the participants negatively affected by the information; 
1 if 0 < z* < (i-i. i.e., the participants not affected by the information; 
2 if z* > jj-i, i.e., the participants positively affected by the information. 
Equation 7.14 can be considered a latent utility function where z* is the unobserv ed utiiit\ . 
This would imply that z is the observed choice that is made by the consumer. It is assumed 
that the error term u is distributed as standard normal. is an unknown threshold parameter 
thai is estimated along with the explanator>' values. The matrix VV is a set of explanatory 
\ariables and the vector a is the set of corresponding coefficients. While Lee's model can 
account for the explanatory variables being different for each category, it is also assumed that 
the explanatory' variables for the ordered probit model are the same for each category. The 
u illingness-to-pay equation can be written as; 
(-.15) WTP, = P/Xs + es. 
where s represents one of the three categories chosen—premium payers, negative premium 
payers, or those unaffected. WTPs is the willingness-to-pay vector of the subset of 
participants that fall into category's. Ss is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero, 
has a standard deviation of Osr and has a correlation of ps with u from the ordered probit 
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model. is the matrix of explanator\' variables including L.WIBDA. which is the estimated 
bias that occurs due to the self-selection process, p^.is the corresponding coefficient vector 
for the matrix of explanatory variables. 
To estimate this model, Greene describes this two-stage procedure as having four 
steps in the process (1993). The first step is to estimate the ordered probit equation using 
maximum likelihood estimation on all the obser\'ations. This allows for factoring out the 
discrete \ ariable. The second step is to select the subset of obser\ ations to use in the OLS 
regression, in this case, the negative premium payers or the positive premium payers. The 
third step is to estimate this equation by OLS including the correction term that takes into 
account the choice that was selected. The final step is to correct the asymptotic covariance 
matnx for the estimates of this subset of observations. The econometric software LI.MDEP 
u as used to estimate this model. Appendix E gives the LIMDEP commands to estimate this 
model. This model and its program are discussed in more depth in the LIMDEP manual. 
Empirical Results 
It shall be assumed that the explanatory variables are the same for equation 7.14 and 
".15 for each definition. The model estimated has two willingness-to-pay equations with a 
irichotomous choice function to be estimated. Equation 7.14 is estimated first for both 
denniiions of willingness-to-pay. From each equation, the bias from the self-selcclion 
proccss is estimated for each participant and then used as a regressor in the corresponding 
OLS estimation. Then equation 7.15 is estimated for s equal to two. i.e.. the positive 
premium payers. Due to the small number of negative premium payers, this group will not 
be estimated. It should be noted that the group whose willingness-to-pay was zero does not 
need to be estimated by the OLS procedure. By estimating the ordered probit model, in 
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cssencc. this group has already been estimated. Since the zeros have been estimated, the\ 
become factored out of the estimation of equation 7.14. 
The explanator>' variables for both equations for each definition of willingness-to-pay 
is a subset of the socioeconomic characteristics and derived variables from the attitudinal 
questions analyzed in chapter six. The choice of the subset of explanatory' variables has two 
sources. The first source of the variables comes from the behavioral model developed in 
chapter three. This model suggests that income and socioeconomic factors should be used as 
explanatorv' variables. While the model suggests that socioeconomic factors should be used 
as explanatory' variables, it does not give direction on what variables should be used from 
chapter six. 
The second source of explanatory variables is from the literature on willingness-to-
pay for attributes. Specifically, the papers by Roosen et al. (1998), Menkhaus et al. (1992), 
and Mellon et al. (1996a) are the major sources of the socioeconomic factors that will enter 
equations 7.14 and 7.15. Menkhaus et al. and Melton et al. were discussed in chapter two. 
w hile Roosen et ai. was briefly discussed above. There are four socioeconomic 
characteristics that are common in all three papers. These are participant's age, household 
income, participant's education, and participant's gender. Each paper also incorporates a 
\ ariablc that relates to the experiment and'Or location depending on whether the cxpenmciii 
w as conducted in more than one location. For this model, location of the experiment is also 
used as a variable. Both Melton et al. and Roosen et al. incorporate a variable that accounts 
for consumption of the product being tested, while Menkhaus et al. and Melton et al. use the 
number of people living in the household as an explanatory value. Hence, both pork 
consumption and number of people living in the household are used in this model for both 
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definitions. These variables are outlined in Table 7.1. These variables include both 
continuous variables, such as pork consumption per month, and discrete variables, such as 
number of people in the household. The data also consists of categorical data including 
location, income, and education. 
Table 7.1: >"ariable Description for Each Estimated Equation 
\ ariable Description 
NOrNHOUS Number of people living in the household 
PORXM Number of times per month pork is consumed by participant 
GENDER 1 if female, 0 othen\'ise 
.•\GE Age of the participant 
LOCI I if the experiment was conducted in Ames. L\; 0 otherwise 
LOC2 1 if the experiment was conducted in Manhattan, KS; 0 otherwise 
L0C3 1 if the experiment was conducted in Raleigh, NC in 1997; 0 otherwise 
LOC4 1 if the experiment was conducted in Burlington, VT; 0 otherwise 
L0C5 1 if the experiment was conducted in Iowa Falls. I A; 0 otherwise 
L0C6 1 if the experiment was conducted in Corvallis, OR; 0 otherwise 
LOC7 1 if the experiment was conducted in Raleigh, NC in 1998; 0 otherwise 
INCl I if household income is less than S10,000; 0 othen.vise 
1NC2 I ifhousehold income is between SIO.OOO and S20,000; 0 otherwise 
INC3 1 ifhousehold income is between 520,000 and 530,000; 0 other\% ise 
1NC4 1 ifhousehold income is between 530,000 and 540.000; 0 otherwise 
1NC5 1 ifhousehold income is between 540.000 and 550.000; 0 otherwise 
INCo 1 ifhousehold income is between 550,000 and 560.000; 0 otherwise 
INC" 1 ifhousehold income is between 560,000 and 570,000; 0 otherwise 
INCS 1 ifhousehold income is between 570,000 and 580,000 ; 0 otherwise 
1NC9 1 ifhousehold income is between 580,000 and 590,000; 0 otherwise 
INC 10 1 ifhousehold income is over 590,000; 0 otherwise 
EDL'l 1 if highest level of education achieved was eight grade 
EDL'2 1 if highest level of education achieved was eleventh grade 
EDL'3 1 if highest level of education achieved was high school or G.E.D. 
EDL'4 1 if highest level of education achieved was some technical, trade, or 
business school 
EDL'5 1 if highest level of education achieved was some college, no degree 
EDL'6 I if highest level of education achieved was a Bachelors degree 
EDU7 1 if highest level of education achieved was some graduate work, no degree 
EDU8 1 if highest level of education achieved was Masters degree 
EDU9 1 if highest level of education achieved was a Doctorate degree 
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The first equations to be estimated are the ordered probit equation for each definiiion. 
The e.\pIanaior>' variables used in these ordered probit equations are a constant term and all 
of the explanatory' variables in Table 7.1 excluding EDUl, EDU2. INCl. INCZ. and LOCT." 
The exclusion of these variables is necessary to avoid the dummy variable trap/ In this case, 
the first two responses in education and income and the location of the second experiment 
done in Raleigh. North Carolina are being used as the bases of comparison for their 
rcspecti\ e categories. Since the behavioral model does not explain what effects the 
socioeconomic factors should have on willingness-to-pay, Roosen et al. (1998), Menkhaus et 
al. (1992). and Melton et al. (1996a) are used to hypothesize the sign of the explanatory-
coefficients. 
There are three multi-response categories used in this model. The first two are 
education and income. It is hypothesized that a higher education level will increase the 
probability of the participant being a premium payer. It is also expected that the coefficients 
increase in magnitude as the education level goes up. These hypotheses come from the fact 
ihat the three papers mentioned above all received a positive effect on willingness-to-pay 
from education. Like education, income will also be hypothesized as positive and having 
higher coefficients for higher income levels. There are two major reasons for these 
Inpoiheses. First, environmental attributes tend to be regarded as a luxury type good, in ihis 
case, a person will not buy a luxury good until they can afford it. .\nother reason for these 
hypotheses is income lends to have a positive effect for normal goods. 
Due lo the extremely small number of participants falling mto EDUl and INCl. EDL'2 and INC2 were also 
excluded to assure that there was not a problem of collinearity between the constant term and the income and 
education category'. 
" The dummy variable trap is a situation where there is perfect collinearity between the constant term and the 
category being analyzed. To avoid this problem, one of the responses within a category is dropped. 
The other multi-response categorical variable in this model is related to where the 
experiment was conducted. Since there is nothing in the literature which gives an a priori 
expectation to the effect a location can ha%'e on willingness-to-pay, a benefit hypothesis w ill 
be investigated. Within this benefit hypothesis, it is expected that locations closer to high 
concentrations of hog production will tend to have a higher benefit received from consuming 
pork u ith embedded environmental attributes. It was stated above that the second 
experiment in Raleigh, North Carolina is being used as the basis for location. This being the 
case, it is expected that the location variable associated with Iowa Falls, Iowa will have a 
positi\ e effect on the probability of willingness-to-pay. This is because this location would 
receive more benefits from environmental production of hogs than the Raleigh location. For 
Manhattan. Kansas. Burlington, Vermont, and Corvallis, Oregon, it is expected that these 
\ ariables would have a negative coefficient because they are farther away from the high 
concentrations of hog production compared to Raleigh. Hence, these three areas would 
receive less benefit than Raleigh would. It is unclear what sign Ames, Iowa and the first 
Raleigh, North Carolina experiment would have based on the second Raleigh experiment. 
There are three explanatory variables that are predicted to have negative coefficients. 
These are the monthly pork consumption of the participant, PORKM. the number of people 
liMng in the participant's household, NOINHOUS. and the participant's age. .AGE. Pork 
consumption and number in household are hypothesized to have a negative coefficient 
because when either of these increase, it becomes more costly for the household to purchase 
products with envirormiental attributes. The negative coefficient predicted for participant's 
age comes from a benefits argument. A person who is younger will receive more of the 
benefits from pork that is produced with environmental attributes over someone who is older 
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because the younger person is expected to live longer. Hence, she will be able to consume 
the benefits for a longer period of time than someone who is older will. 
The final variable that is standard in the literature is the participant's gender. 
GENDER. There has been some work done in the experimental literature on how gender and 
altruistic behavior relate to each other. Andreoni and Vesterland point out that there has been 
conflicting results on whether men are more altruistic than women are (2001). In their paper 
the\ in\ estigate this issue by looking at how costs affects a genders altruistic nature. In their 
results they find that women tend to be more altruistic when the cost of altruism is high. 
while men tend to be more altruistic when the cost to altruism is low. This result would 
imply for this model that women should be willing to give more than men would because the 
participants in this study get to choose the cost. While this is a magnitude effect, it does not 
explain \\ hich gender would be more likely to give, i.e., have a higher probability of giving. 
-Another result of .Andreoni and Vesterland is that woman tend to want things equal while 
men lend to be either perfectly selfish or perfectly selfless. This would imply that there 
slKHiid be more women willing-to-pay a premium than men do. Hence, it shall be 
hspothesized in this paper that women will have a higher probability of paying a premium. 
This would imply a positive coefficient on gender. 
Table 7.2 provides the result of the ordered probit model for the first definition of 
u illmgness-to-pay. For this definition, there were only three estimated parameters thai u crc 
significant at the five or ten percent level of significance. The constant term and the 
estimated threshold parameter were significant at the five-percent level. At the ten-percent 
level of significance was gender. For this definition, gender had the expected sign of 
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Table 7.2: Ordered Probit Estimates for the Ex Post Categorical Realization of 
Whether the Participant Was Negatively Affected, Not Affected, or Positively 
Affected Using the First Definition of Willingness-to-Pay' 
\ ariable Coefficient" Standard Error Mean of V ariable 
Constant 1.2780' 0.6138 
NOIN'HOUS 0.0076 0.0485 2.6S69 
PORKM -0.0113 0.0150 5.8290 
GENDER 0.2443" 0.1502 0.5988 
AGE -0.0052 0.0049 47.7362 
LOCI 0.0609 0.2763 0.1489 
LOC2 0.2136 0.2716 0.1824 
LOC3 -0.0079 0.2911 0.0942 
LOC4 -0.2573 0.3030 0.0S2I 
LOC5 0.0691 0.2764 0.1763 
LOC6 0.1422 0.2660 0.1824 
INC3 -0.2859 0.2620 0.1376 
INC4 0.1669 0.2544 0.1 S65 
INC5 0.0851 0.2614 0.1407 
IXC6 0.3906 0.3334 0.1040 
INC" 0.0780 0.3180 0.0703 
INC8 -0.2289 0.3309 0.0599 
INC9 -0.0184 0.4273 0.0398 
INC 10 -0.1795 0.3265 0.0734 
EDL"3 0.2925 0.4754 0.1220 
EDU4 0.0831 0.4792 0.0S54 
EDL'5 0.3063 0.4439 0.2530 
EDL'6 0.3873 0.4668 0.2409 
EDL- 0.1871 0.5056 0.0732 
EDLS 0.2939 0.4694 0.1220 
EDU9 0.3326 0.5416 0.05~9 
Threshold parameter for index 
u: 1.1847 0.1168 
N = 329 
I a)  A  premium payer under this definition is a participant who increased her bid for the most environriK-iuai 
pajkaue from round three to round four. 
( h i  A P . asterisk * imphes that the coefTicient is significant at the five-percent level of significance and a d.iuhic 
asterisk " implies significance at the ten-percent level. 
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posiii\ e. This implies that being a woman increased the likelihood of being a premium 
payer. .A.11 of the other estimated variables were not significant. 
Examining Table 7.2 shows that the variables for education have consistent signs with the 
a priori expectations, i.e., positive sign. It should be kept in mind that all of these education 
le\ els are being compared to the group of participants with less than a high school degree. 
This implies that a person who had at least a high school diploma has a higher likelihood of 
being a premium payer. WTiile the sign was consistent with expectations, the magnitude of 
the effect was not. It was h>pothesized that the magnitude of the effect would increase as 
education level increased. This is not the case. A participant with a Bachelors degree had 
the highest magnitude effect for being a premium payer. A participant with a Doctorate 
degree has the second highest likelihood of being a premium payer, while a person with some 
college has the third highest magnitude effect. The group of participants that had the lowest 
magnitude effect was the group that has some technical, trade, or business schooling. 
Excluding income and location, two other variables have consistent signs, while one 
does not. The other variables that were not significant but had consistent signs were age and 
number of limes pork is consumed in a month. Both of these variables had a negali\ e effect 
on ihe likelihood of being a premium payer. Hence a participant who was older had a lesser 
iikeiihood of being a premium payer. Also, the likelihood that a panicipant was a premium 
payer decreases as he/she consumes more pork in a month. The variable that had an 
inconsistent sign and was insignificant was number in household. It was hypothesized that 
this \ ariable would have a negative effect. But for definition one of willingness-to-pay. this 
\ ariable look on a positive and very small value. 
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WTien looking at income for definition one, some of the variables took on consistent 
signs of being positive, while others were inconsistent. The basis of comparison for the 
income levels were the participants whose income was less than or equal to S20,000. The 
variables for the income levels from S30.000 to S70,000 ail have the expected positive 
coefficient. WTiile this group of variables has the consistent signs, they do not have the 
h\pothesized increasing magnitudes. This implies that if the participant fell in one of these 
income categories, he/she would have a higher likelihood of being a premium payer 
compared to someone who makes 520,000 or less. The income variables for the income 
levels over S70.000 have the inconsistent sign of being negative. Hence, having a high 
income implies that the participant was less likely to be a premium payer compared to 
someone who makes 520,000 or less. The group of participants who fell in the income range 
of S20.000 to S30.000 also were less likely to be premium payers compared to those 
participant who made less than 520,000. 
As with income, all of the location variables have insignificant signs. Some of the 
\ ariables have consistent signs, while others do not. The two location variables thai ha\ e 
consistent signs are those that designate the participants from Iowa Falls, Iowa, and 
Burlington. Vermont. Iowa Falls has the expected positive sign, while Burlington has the 
expected negative sign. It was expected that both Manhattan, Kansas and Cor\allis. Oreuon 
would have a negative coefficient. Both of these variables had the unexpected positive sign. 
This would imply that the benefits hypothesis used to sign these coefficients may not be 
enough to explain the effect of environmental pork on willingness-to-pay. For the two 
variables whose sign was a priori indeterminate, Ames, Iowa has a positive coefficient, while 
the first experiment in Raleigh, North Carolina has a negative coefficient. This implies that 
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participants in Ames are more likely to be premium payers compared to participants t'rom 
Raleigh. It should be noted that while the first Raleigh experiment has a positive coefficient, 
it is extremely close to zero. 
Table 7.3 provides the result of the ordered probit model for the second definition of 
wiliingn ess-to-pay. Under this second definition of willingness-to-pay, four estimated 
parameters are significant at the five-percent level. As with definition one. the constant term 
and the threshold parameter are significant at the five-percent level. For definition two. 
gender is also significant at the five-percent level and has the expected sign of being positive. 
The fourth parameter that is significant at the five-percent level is age. This parameter also 
has the expected sign of being negative. The rest of the estimated parameters in Table 7.3 
arc noi significant at the five or even ten-percent level of significance. 
Siniilar to definition one, all the education variables for the second definition of willingness-
lo-pay have the expected sign of positive. Also, the magnitudes for these parameters do not 
roilow the h\polhesis of increasing as education increases. The magnitudes of the education 
\ ariables have no consistent pattern. For this second definition, the group with the highest 
likelihood of being premium payers is the group who has some technical, trade, or business 
schooling. This is completely opposite of the first definition. The group with the lov^ est 
iikclihood of being premium payers is the group with some graduate education. 
Excluding the income and location variables, the two variables that have consistent signs to a 
priori belief but not significant are number in household and monthly pork consumption. 
Both of these variables have the expected negative sign. While monthly pork consumption is 
consistently negative under both definitions of willingness-to-pay, the number of people in 
the participant's household is not. 
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Table 7.3: Ordered Probit Estimates for the Ex Post Categorical Realization or 
Whether the Participant Was Negatively Affected, Not Affected, or Positively 
Affected Using the Second Definition of Willingness-to-Pay' 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Mean of N'ariable 
Constant 1.7623' 0.5868 
NOINHOUS -0.0352 0.0515 2.6869 
PORKM -0.0157 0.0173 5.S290 
GENDER 0.5076* 0.1647 0.5988 
.AGE -0.0113* 0.0054 47.7362 
LOCI -0.0716 0.3173 0.1489 
L0C2 0.0048 0.3073 0.1824 
L0C3 0.0095 0.3720 0.0942 
LOC4 0.1900 0.3692 0.0821 
LOC5 -0.1980 0.3208 0.1763 
LOC6 -0.1423 0.1106 0.1824 
rxc3 -0.2833 0.2896 0.1376 
rNC4 -0.1158 0.2652 0.1865 
rNC5 -0.1252 0.2884 0.1407 
INC6 0.0413 0.3410 0.1040 
INC" 0.1458 0.3706 0.0703 
INCS -0.2878 0.3812 0.0599 
INC9 -0.0052 0.5193 0.039S 
INC 10 0.3620 0.4014 0.0734 
EDL'3 0.2264 0.4216 0.1220 
EDL'4 0.4820 0.4557 0.0854 
EDL'5 0.4656 0.3750 0.2530 
EDL'6 0.1698 0.3S13 0.2409 
EDL'7 0.0119 0.4440 0.U732 
EDLS 0.1189 0.4176 0.1220 
EDL'9 0.4374 0.5496 0.0579 
Threshold parameter for index 
M; 0.9575 0.1106 
N = 329 
( J I  A  p r e m i u m  p a y e r  u n d e r  t h i s  s e c o n d  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  a  p a r t i c i p a n t  w h o  h a d  a  h i g h e r  b i d  f o r  t h e  m o s i  
environmental package compared to the r\pical package within round tour. 
I b 1 An asterisk * imphcs that the coefilcient is significant at the five-percent lev el of significance. 
The income variables under definition two perform even more dismally than for the 
first definition of willingness-to-pay. Under this second definition only three income levels 
carry the consistent sign. These are the variables representing the income levels from 
S50,000 to 570,000 and the variable representing income level over 590,000. The rest of the 
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income variables have the unexpected negative sign. This result coupled with the results 
from definition one suggest that the likelihood of being a premium payer is not necessarily 
defmed by income. 
There is only one location variable that is consistent with a priori beliefs, while the 
rest of the location variables are inconsistent with the prior beliefs. The location that has the 
consistent e.xpected sign is Corvallis, Oregon. This variable has a negative sign. Manhattan, 
Kansas. Burlington. Vermont, and Iowa Fall. Iowa all have the opposite signs as e.xpected. 
Comparing .A.mes, Iowa across definitions gives conflicting results. Under this second 
definition of willingness-to-pay, the sign of the coefficient for Ames is negative. This is in 
contrast to being positive from the previous definition. -A.s for the first Raleigh e.xperiment. 
this group also has opposite signs across the different definitions. For this second definition, 
the first Raleigh experiment is positive. Like the previous definition, the coefficient on this 
first Raleigh experiment is very close to zero. 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 provide the frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes for 
participant group placement fi-om the estimated ordered probit equation for each definition of 
u illingness-to-pay. The columns show the predicted outcomes from the model, while the 
rows show the actual outcomes from the data. The major result to notice is that the probit 
equation for each definition failed to predict which participants were negatively affected by 
the environmental information. Each equation also has difficulty predicting who was not 
affected by the environmental information. 
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Table 7.4: Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes from the Estimated Ordered 
Probit for Definition 1 of Willingness-to-Pay' 
Predicted Outcome 
Actual Negatively .\ffected 
Outcome 
Not Affected Positively .Affected Total 
Negatively 
Affected 0 4 21 25 
Not .Affected 0 8 92 100 
Posili\"ely 
.Affected 0 6 198 204 
Total 0 18 311 329 
A prcrmum payer under this second definition is a participant u ho had a higher bid for the most 
environmental package compared to the typical package within round four. 
Table 7.5: Frequencies of .Actual and Predicted Outcomes from the Estimated Ordered 
Probit for Definition 2 of VVillingness-to-Pay' 
Predicted Outcome 
.\ctual Negatively .A.ffecied 
Outcome 
Not Affected Positively Affected Total 
Negative!}.' 
•Affected 0 0 •7-2 / 27 
No: .Affected 0 6 68 :'4 
Posiii\ cly 
A ffee ted 0 2 226 22S 
Total 0 8 321 329 
A premium payer under this second definition is a participant who had a higher bid for the most 
en\ ironmemal package compared to the typical package within round tour. 
The probit equations for both definitions of willingness-to-pay had a high tendency to 
predict premium payers over the other two groups. Of the 329 participants, the equation for 
the first definition picked 311 of them to be premium payers. Of this group selected to be 
premium payers, ninety-two participants were not actually affected by the information and 
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twenty-one participants were negatively affected. For the second definition, the probit 
equation chose 321 participants to be premium payers. Twenty-seven of these participants 
were actually negatively affected by the information, while sixty-eight participants were 
actually not affected by the environmental information. 
Comparing Tables 7.4 and 7.5. it is easy to see that the probit equation for the second 
equation did a slightly better job predicting than the probit equation for the first definition. 
Both probit equations were not able to predict any negative premium payers correctly. 
Furthermore, both probit equations had trouble predicting the participants who were not 
affected by the environmental information. Both equations predicted this group with 
approximately eight-percent accuracy. Given that a prediction fell in the category of the 
participants not affected, the probit equation for the second definition did a better job of 
predicting these participants correctly. This probit definition for the second definition also 
predicted the premium payers with slightly higher accuracy. 
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from Tables 7.4 and 7.5. The first 
conclusion is that neither probit equation for each definition does a very good job predicting 
the three dift'erent categories using the core variables used in the willingness-to-pay 
literature. The second conclusion that can be drawn is that the probit equation for the second 
definition of v\illingness-to-pay does a slightly better job in predicting compared to the first 
definition of willingness-to-pay. 
Table 7.6 presents the results from the conditional OLS model for predicting the 
magnitude of the premium for those who were affected positively by the environmental 
information under the first definition for willingness-to-pay. In the second column, the 
uncorrected standard error for heteroscedasticity is presented, while in the third column, the 
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correcied standard error for heteroscedasiicity is presented. The e.xplanatory variables used 
to predict the magnitude for this group are assumed to be the same as the variables used to 
predict which category each participant falls into, i.e., the % ariables from Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
The predicted signs and magnitudes for this equation will be the same as for the probit 
equations. Hence, it is expected that income and education will have positive signs with 
increasing magnitudes. The number in household, monthly pork consumption, and age are 
all expected to have negative coefficients. Gender is expected to have a positive coefficient. 
The location variables are also expected to have the same signs as the signs from the probit 
equation. Also included with these explanatory variables is LAMBDA, which is an 
adjustment factor for the biased caused by the clustering of zeros. 
The first thing to notice in Table 7.6 is that the number in household, age. gender, and 
monthly pork consumption all have consistent a priori signs. .A.ge has the expected negative 
coefficient and is significant at the five-percent level of significance. At the ten-percent level 
of significance, both gender and monthly pork consumption are significant. Gender has the 
expected positiv e coefficient, while monthly pork consumption has a negative coefficient. 
While the number in household parameter is not significant, it has the expected sign of being 
negative. 
When examining the category of education, there are many education coefficients that 
are significant at either the five or ten-percent level of significance. The only education 
variable that is not significant is the one pertaining to having some technical, trade, or 
business schooling. At the ten-percent level of significance, the variable related to a 
Bachelors degree is significant. For all of the other education levels, all the parameters are 
significant at the five-percent level of significance. Examining the magnitudes on education 
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Table 7.6: Second-Stage OLS Analysis of the Positive Premium Payers for Definition 1 
of Willingness-to-Pay' 
\'ariable Coefficient'' Standard Error 
(Uncorrected) 
Standard Error 
(Corrected) 
Mean of 
N'ariabie 
Constant -5.2S14 6.1650 4.9218 
NOINHOUS -0.0201 0.0924 0.0713 2.7598 
PORKLM -0.0755" 0.0577 0.0458 5.6193 
GENDER 1.6749" 1.1205 0.9156 0.6324 
.•\GE -0.0567' 0.0255 0.0230 46.8369 
LOCI 0.5133 0.5235 0.5429 0.1471 
LOC2 0.9499 1.0290 0.8407 0.1961 
L0C3 -0.6417 0.4547 0.4226 0.093 I 
LOC4 -1.3752 1.3421 1.1100 0.0735 
LOC5 0.6058 0.5299 0.5265 0.1716 
L0C6 0.9225 0.7621 0.6748 0.1863 
rNC3 -2.5784* 1.4503 1.2601 0.1141 
INC4 0.2129 0.8331 0.6922 0.2028 
INC5 -0.3956 0.5728 0.4428 0.1484 
INC6 1.2828 1.6751 1.4142 0.1285 
INC7 -0.3034 0.6158 0.6836 0.0791 
INCS 
-2.2129* 1.1993 0.9553 0.0495 
INC9 -0.7742 0.6465 0.6357 0.0306 
INC 10 -1.7473* 1.0130 0.8748 0.0644 
EDLo 2.6061* 1.6032 1.2314 0.1225 
EDU4 0.7413 0.8735 0.5234 0.0784 
EDL'5 2.5661* 1.6343 1.2564 0.2500 
r:DL"6 2.8897" 1.9599 1.5745 0.2647 
EDL" 3.5634* 1.2595 1.1795 0.06S6 
EDUS 2.8889* 1.6236 1.2557 U.1324 
EDL'9 2.9007* 1.7731 1.4013 0.0539 
L.-\MBD.-\ 10.9237" 8.2374 6.7337 0.5SOS 
N 
R-
Log-Likelihood 
204 
0.2041 
-355.0125 
Lou-Likelihood 
( Restricted) -378.2970 
( a )  A  p r e m i u m  p a y e r  u n d e r  t h i s  s e c o n d  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  a  p a r t i c i p a n t  w h o  h a d  a  h i g h e r  b i d  f o r  t h e  m o s t  
em ironmental package compared to the typical package wuhin round four. 
( b )  A n  a s t e r i s k  "  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  c o e f T i c i e n t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  f i v e - p e r c e n t  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a n d  a  d o u b l e  
asterisk "* implies significance at the ten-percent level. 
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shows that the higher education levels tend to have higher magnitudes over the lower 
education levels. 
Similar to the probit equations above, the variables for income in the OLS model tend 
to not have the expected signs. In Table 7.6, there are only two income levels that have the 
expected positive sign. These are the income level associated with S30.000 to S40.000 and 
the income level associated with 550,000 to S60.000. The rest of the income variables are 
negative. There are three income levels that are significantly negative at the five-percent 
level of significance—the income level associated with S20.000 to $30,000. the income level 
associated with S70.000 to S80,000. the income level associated with the highest income. 
Examining the location variables in Table 7.6 show that all the variables for location 
are not significant at either the five or ten-percent level of significance. Among these 
variables, only two have the hypothesized sign. Burlington. Vermont has the expected 
negative coefficient, while Iowa Falls, Iowa has the expected positive coefficient. Both 
.Manhattan, Kansas and Corvallis, Oregon have the unexpected sign of positive. .A.mes. Iowa 
has a positix e coefficient, while the first Raleigh, North Carolina has a negative coefficient. 
Examining the LAMBDA coefficient shows the level of bias due to the zeros has a 
positive and significant effect at the ten-percent level of significance. Hence, deleting the 
zeros and running OLS on the remaining obser\'ations would cause a serious bias to occur in 
the estimates on the coefficients. Using a likelihood ratio test, the null h>'pothesis that all 
coefficients are zero for this model can be rejected at the five-percent level of significance. 
The critical value for this test at the five-percent level of significance is 38.89, while the 
calculated likelihood ratio from the model is 46.56. Hence, the variables in this model do 
have explanatory power. 
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The results from the conditional OLS model for predicting the magnitude of the 
premium for those who were affected positively by the en\ ironmental information under the 
second definition for willingness-to-pay are presented in Table 7.7. The second column in 
this table presents the uncorrected standard error for heteroscedasticity, while in the third 
column has the corrected standard error. The explanatory variables used to predict the 
magnitude for this group are assumed to be the same as the variables used to predict the 
previous OLS model for the first definition. The predicted signs and magnitudes for this 
equation will be the same as for the probit equations. Hence, it is expected that income and 
education will have positive signs with increasing magnitudes. The number in household, 
monthly pork consumption, and age are all expected to have negative coefficients, while 
gender is expected to have a positive coefficient. The location variables are also expected to 
have the same signs as the signs from the probit equation as well as the previous OLS 
equation for the first definition of willingness-to-pay. Again, the variable LAMBD.A. is 
included lo account for the bias. 
Examining Table 7.7 shows that the core values used in the willingness-to-pay 
iiteraiure does not do a good job explaining the magnitude for the second definition of 
u illingncss-to-pay. In this case there are only two significant variables at the five or icn-
pcrceni level of significance. The first significant variable is the variable denoting the llrsi 
Raieigli experiment, which is significant at the five-percent level. The other significant 
variable is the one denoting the group of participants who have some graduate education. 
This variable was significant at the ten-percent level and had the expected positive sign. .A.s 
for the rest of the variables, they were not significant at the five or ten-percent level. 
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Table 7.7: Second-Stage OLS Analysis of the Positive Premium Payers for Definition 2 
of VVillingness-to-Pay' 
N'ariable Coefficient" Standard Error Standard Error 
(Uncorrected) (Corrected) 
Mean of 
N'ariable 
Constant 3.5842 2.4698 2.5717 
NOIXHOUS -0.1056 0.1413 0.1303 2.7675 
PORKM 0.0046 0.0580 0.0510 5.5583 
GENDER -0.1246 1.3847 1.3343 0.6535 
.•\GE -0.0215 0.0316 0.0306 45.9067 
LOCI -0.0055 0.5859 0.6072 0.1491 
LOC2 -0.5924 0.5206 0.5132 0.1930 
L0C3 -1.0280* 0.5613 0.5076 0.1053 
L0C4 -0.4070 0.7706 0.7493 0.0965 
LOC5 0.5736 0.7959 0.8348 0.1447 
LOC6 -0.4531 0.6414 0.6368 0.1754 
INC3 -0.4482 0.9212 0.9077 0.1196 
INC4 -0.4691 0.5876 0.4888 0.1771 
INC 5 -0.3448 0.6015 0.5265 0.1460 
INC6 0.0212 0.5679 0.6028 0.1 106 
INC7 -0.0338 0.7059 0.7619 0.0796 
INCS -0.5427 1.0189 0.9052 0.0531 
INC9 0.0663 0.7974 0.7422 0.0398 
INCIU -06162 1.0674 1.0834 0.0840 
EDU3 0.5894 1.2278 1.1208 0.1102 
EDU4 0.1522 1.6987 1.6125 0.0881 
EDU5 0.5023 1.6083 1.5929 0.2687 
EDL'6 0.7030 1.0958 0.9964 0.2554 
EDL-- 1.9387" 1.0106 1.0705 0.0705 
EDL'S 1.0669 1.0413 0.8774 0.1 190 
EDL'9 0.4900 1.6291 1.4849 0.1 I 96 
L.-\.MBD.\ -0.3747 5.4082 5.4224 0.4(i~3 
N 
R-
Log-Likelihood 
228 
0.1276 
-467.1391 
Log-Likelihood 
( Restricted) -482.6947 
( a )  A  premium payer under this second definition is a participant who had a higher bid for the most 
en\ ironmental package compared to the typical package within round four. 
( b )  . A n  a s t e r i s k  *  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  f i v e - p e r c e n t  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a n d  a  d o u b l e  
asterisk •* implies significance at the ten-percent level. 
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Under this second definition of willingness-to-pay, all of the location variables and all 
of the education variables have the expected signs even though they are not significant. The 
\ ariable for the number in household and the variable for age both have the expected sign of 
being negative. On the other hand, the variable for monthly pork consumption and the 
variable for gender have the opposite of the expected sign. For this model gender had a 
negative effect on magnitude, while monthly pork consumption had a positive effect. 
There are only two income levels that have the expected sign of being positive. 
These are the variable that denote income level of 550,000 to 560,000 and the variable that 
denotes the income level of 580,000 to 590,000. Both of these variables are close to zero 
relative to the income variables. All other income variables under this second definition have 
the unexpected sign of being negative. 
Using a likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero for this 
model cannot be rejected at the five-percent level of significance. The critical value for this 
test at the five-percent level of significance is 38.89, while the calculated likelihood ratio 
from this second definitions model is 31.12. Thus, this model does not have explanatory 
pou er for predicting the magnitude of the positive premium payers. Looking at the variahlc 
L.A.VIBDA. which accounts for the bias, an opposite conclusion is drawn compared to the 
pre\ ious model for the premium payers under the first definition. The bias for this second 
definition is negative but insignificant at the ten-percent level of significance. Hence by 
dropping the zeros and estimating this model with standard OLS for the premium payers for 
this second definition will not cause significant bias. 
Comparing the two different models leads to several conclusions. For the second 
definition of willingness-to-pay, the socioeconomic factors was able to predict slightly better 
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the directional effect environmental information has on the participant. On the other hand, 
the first definition does a better job explaining the magnitude of the premium for the 
premium payers. The second definition has a much better R', i.e.. e.>:planator>' power, than 
the first for the conditional OLS using the same core variables used in the willingness-to-pay 
literature. The second definition coefficients did not do better statistically than a model with 
all coefficients equal to zero. This implies that the coefficients for the second definition had 
no significant e.xplanatory power over a model with just an intercept term. In both models 
under both stages, the income levels rarely had the expected sign or magnitudes and were 
usually not significant explanatory variables. This result was unexpected because income 
usually shows up as a significant variable in most willingness-to-pay studies. Finally, the 
bias due to the zero bidders is an important factor for the first definition, while it does not 
seem to effect the second model significantly. This result is not too surprising considering 
there were less zeros in the second definition of willingness-to-pay. 
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chapter eight: summary and conclusions 
Summary and Conclusions 
In chapter one a brief o\ er\ ie\v of the pork industr\' and related environmental 
concerns w ere provided. These environmental concerns included odors from production, as 
\\ ell as. surface and ground water impacts. This overview motivated the need to value 
en\ ironmental attributes related to production from a consumer's point of view. This can 
assist the development of adjustments in the industry and development of policy. Kjiowing 
the \ alue consumers place on environmental attributes can also help producers make 
decisions about incorporating new technologies which decrease environmental impacts trom 
production. 
Within chapter one, four primary objectives of this dissertation were outlined. The 
first objective was to present a theoretical model that explained the behavior of a consumer in 
a second-price sealed-bid auction when there are embedded environmental attributes 
coniained in the item being auctioned. From this behavioral model, two willingness-to-pay 
measures for environmental attributes were discussed. The second objective was lo outline 
an experimental setting in which willingness-to-pay measures for embedded environmental 
attributes can be collected from consumers. Examining consumer's willingness-to-pay for 
pork products with embedded environmental attributes, which was derived from the 
experimental setting outlined in the second objective, was the third objective. The final 
objecti\e was to investigate the relationship between socioeconomic factors and respondent's 
\\ illingness-to-pay for embedded environmental attributes. 
.A. major objective of this dissertation was to interpret bids from a second-price 
auction when embedded environmental attributes exist in the product being auctioned. It was 
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shown in chapter three that when embedded environmental attributes do not exist, the 
second-price auction has the property that it is in the best interest of the participants to 
iruihfuUy reveal their preferences, i.e.. their true value for the item being auctioned. This 
true value was defined as the maximum amount of income the bidder is willing to give up to 
obtain a new set of attributes from the product being auction. When embedded 
environmental attributes exist in the product being auctioned and the bidder has some degree 
of free-riding capabilities, it is no longer a dominant strategy for the bidders in a second-price 
auction to bid their true value. Rather, the dominant strategy of the bidder is to bid her true 
value minus any part of her true value that can be obtained from someone else. i.e.. minus the 
\ alue that can be associated from free-riding. 
From the behavioral model developed in chapter three, two definitions for 
wiilingncss-to-pay were derived. The first definition compares the bids across information 
sets for the same product. These information sets range from the naive set of the physical 
iraits \ isually observ ed to those where environmental attributes are provided. In the initial 
information set. only the observed physical attributes of the products are known. This first 
information set was known as a naive information set. This was followed by infomialion 
being released relating to the environmental attributes of each product. This second 
inlbmiaiion set was known as the environmental information set. This measure uas called 
consumer's willingness-to-pay with unknown ex ante e.xpectations. It was also known as 
definition one. The second definition of willingness-to-pay examines the difference between 
bids in the same environmental information set for a product with embedded environmental 
attributes compared to a product that has no particular environmental attributes, i.e.. a typical 
product. This definition was modified to account for any perceived physical quality 
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differences between the two products. This measure was known as the consumer's 
willingness-to-pay for environmental attributes with a known basis. This measure was also 
known as definition two. This second definition for willingness-to-pay was argued to be a 
belter approximation to a person's true valuation for environmental attributes because it takes 
a long-run approach to examining willingness-to-pay. 
The second major objective of this dissertation was to develop a consumer 
experiment to collect information from consumers about their preferences for pork products 
with embedded envirormiental attributes. In chapter four, a second-price sealed-bid multiple-
round (five rounds) auction was presented as a method to obtain willingness-to-pay 
information. This auction was conducted in six locations across the countr>'—.A.mes, Iowa; 
Iowa Falls. Iowa; Raleigh, North Carolina; Manhattan, Kansas; Burlington. Vermont; and 
Cor\ allis. Oregon. In the first three rounds of each experiment, the participants were allowed 
to \ isually inspcct ten different packages of pork chops and offer bids for each. These 
packages contained four pork loin chops, uniformly cut. Each package weighed 
appro.\imatel\- two pounds. In round four, they were provided information that pertained to 
the environmental attributes embedded in the respective packages of pork chops and allowed 
10 bid agam. These attributes dealt with a reduction in odor, a reduction in ground water 
mipact, and a reduction in surface water impact from production. For odor, a lou (high) 
reduction level was defined as a thirty to forty-percent (eighty to ninety-percent) reduction ui 
odor from production as compared to odor from a typical pork production system. In the 
case of surface and ground water, the low-level (high-level) impact reduction was defined as 
a reduction of fifteen to twenty-five percent (forty to fifty percent) when compared to a pork 
chop from a typical production system. Not only were single low-level and high-level 
attribute packages of pork chops presented, but also differing combinations (air. water 
qualiiy, surface water) of the high-level attributes were also presented. The information in 
round four only dealt with the improved envirorunental attributes. Societal health 
implications from the attributes were provided in round fne. 
The third objective of this dissertation was to examine consumer's willingness-to-pa> 
for environmental attributes collected from the experiments discussed in chapter tour. 
Chapter five examines three major aspects of the data collected from the experiments. The 
first part examined the bids for each product for each round. The next part examined the data 
in light of the first definition, definition one, of willingness-to-pay. The final part examines 
the sccond detlnition of willingness-to-pay. 
It is seen in chapter five that in the first three naive bidding rounds of the experiment, 
av erage participant bids increased at a decreasing rate. When analv-zing the changes in bids, 
ii was found that the bids for at least eighty-percent of the packages did not increase 
siunificantly between round two and round three. Five out of the seven locations had one 
hundred percent of the packages not significantly changing value between these two bid 
rounds. Hence, bids were stabilizing. This provided further support to the findings of 
Coppinuer el al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1985) that participants eventually discover their 
preferences when a second-price sealed-bid auction is used with multiple trials. 
.-Vfter information was released in round four, the average bid for each package took 
on a consistent pattern where the most environmental package received the highest bid. the 
packages with less environmental attributes received lower bids, and the typical package v\ ith 
no particular environmental attributes received the lowest average bid. Between round three, 
the naive bidding round, and round four, the environmental information round, half of the ten 
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packages significantly changed in value at the .001 significance level. The t\picai packagc 
and the low-level odor reduction packages significantly decreased in value while both of ihe 
double attribute packages and the triple attribute package increased significantly in value. 
With no significant changes occurring for the products with a single high-level 
cn\ ironmental attribute, it can be inferred that participants' prior expectations were that the 
products ihey were bidding on had some level of environmental attributes. Thus, before any 
cn\ ironmental information was provided on the products, the participants believed that the 
products had some embedded environmental attributes, specifically, single high-level 
environmental attributes. This would imply that environmental information does affect 
consumers' willingness-to-pay for a good. It also suggests that a product that does not have 
environmental characteristics will likely decrease in value when a similar product with 
embedded environmental attributes is released on the market. 
With the release of the societal human health implications of the environmental 
attributes in round five, bid levels did not change significantly from round four. The 
participants" evaluation of the societal health implications from the information released in 
round four was confirmed by the information released in the fifth round, i.e., their 
expectations on health implications formed in round four were in line with what was released 
in round five. The changes in the bids from round three to round four demonstraicd that the 
participants' initial expectations were not being met. 
Chapter three presents a behavioral model that explains how consumers make 
decisions when they are in a multiple-round second-price sealed-bid auction with different 
information sets. In this chapter two ways of defining willingness-to-pay were developed. 
One method is to observe bids between bidding rounds with two different information sets. 
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This allows for the visual attributes to be constant, but from the point of view of the 
rcsearcher there is no ex ante information on the consumer's prior expectation of embedded 
environmental attributes. This method of looking at willingness-to-pay was established as 
definition one of willingness-to-pay. .\nother method of measuring willingness-to-pay 
relates to comparing a t>pical good to one that has an environmental improvement over the 
t\pical good in the same bidding round. This willingness-to-pay measure assures that the 
expectation of the environmental attributes for the consumer is known to the researcher, but 
it does not directly account for any visual quality differences between the two products being 
considered. In chapter three, a method of adjusting for visual quality differences between 
tu o packages was developed. Throughout the dissertation, this approach \\'as known as the 
second definition of willingness-to-pay. 
•A premium payer under the first definition of willingness-to-pay was defined as a 
participant who increased her bid from the last no information round, round three, to the 
inibnnation round, round four, for the most environmental product—that product with a 
high-le\ el reduction in odor, surface water impact, and ground water impact compared to a 
product from a typical system. It was found that of the 329 participants in the study, 
approximately sixty-two percent paid a premium for the package of pork chops with the 
triple high-level embedded environmental attributes. By location, this ranged from nft>-si\ 
percent in Burlington, Vermont to sixty-seven percent in .Vlanhattan. Kansas. The average 
premium paid by the premium payers for this product was SI.60. This premium was 
significantly different from zero. When examining across regions, there was no significant 
difference at the five-percent level in the premiums paid for the most environmental product. 
The value of the typical package decreased by S0.63. Using this definition, there is a group 
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of consumers who will pay a premium for pork products with embedded high-level 
en\ ironmenial attributes. 
When analyzing the non-premium payers for the first definition of willingness-to-pay. 
it u as found that when the environmental information was released, all the packages of pork 
chops decreased in value, some by a significant amount. A non-premium payer is someone 
w ho did not increase her bid between round three and round four for the pork product with 
the triple high-level embedded environmental attributes. Of the 125 participants who were 
considered non-premium payers, twenty-five actually decreased their bids for the most 
en\ ironmenial package. It should be noted that, while the bids decreased for this group of 
tw enty-five between round three and four, the most environmental package was still \ alued 
higher than the tv'pical package. 
WTien the second definition of willingness-to-pay was investigated, a similar result to 
the first definition was found. For this second definition, a premium payer is defined as a 
participant who had a higher bid for the environmental package in round four over the t\pical 
package after adjusting for visual differences. Of the 329 participants, approximately sixty 
nine percent of the participants could be classified as premium payers. On average, the 
premium under this definition for the premium payers was S2.23 for the most environmental 
packagc. This premium was significantly greater than zero. 
When examining the non-premium payers under the second definition of willingness-
lo-pay, there were 101 participants that did not pay a premium for the most environmental 
good. Of this group, twenty-seven participants had a negative willingness-to-pay due to the 
information provided in the experiment in round four. This implies that there was a small 
group who was negatively affected by the release of the environmental information. One 
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explanation for this is that the participants in this group had higher environmental 
expectations of the products before the release of environmental information or they did not 
understand the system of bidding. 
When analyzing the differences in socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes 
between the premium payers and the non-premium payers using standard statistical tests for 
both definitions of willingness-to-pay. it was found that there were ver>' few significant 
differences. The three characteristics that showed up as significantly different between the 
two groups with the expected outcome were if employed, willingness-to-pay a premium for 
meal products with environmental attributes (yes/no type of question), and the desire for 
producers to have environmental education about production practices. Characteristics such 
as age, gender, and household income did not show up as significantly different. .A.ttitudes 
about the environment, product attributes, and production methods also did not show up as 
significantly different between the two groups. 
The fourth major objective of this dissertation was to examine the relationship 
bciween willingness-to-pay and socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes. To investigate 
this relationship, chapter seven utilized a two-stage polychotomous choice model. The 
necessity for using this model comes from the fact that under both definitions of willingness-
lo-pay there were a large number of participants having zero willingness-to-pay. In essence, 
this group causes a discrete cluster point in the middle of continuous distribution. This can 
be viewed as a censoring issue within a distribution. By using standard OLS techniques, 
estimated coefficients for this data would be biased. The explanatory variables used in this 
model were the core variables developed in the willingness-to-pay literature. 
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To estimate this model, the first stage used an ordered probit model to predict 
whether the environmental information provided affected the participants positively, 
negaii\ el\'. or not at all. It was found that with both definitions the model did not perform 
w ell in predicting whom the negative and zero bidders were. Additionally, of the core 
variables developed in the literature, very few were significant under either definition. Under 
definition one. the constant term was significant at the five-percent level, while gender 
(female = 1. male = 0) was significant and positive at the ten-percent level. Using definition 
two. the constant term, gender (female = 1, male = 0), and age are all significant at the five-
percent level of significance. Gender had a positive effect on willingness-to-pay, while age 
had a negative effect. Under both definitions, income usually had a negative sign but it was 
insignificant. 
In the second stage, OLS was used to predict the magnitude of the change that was 
caused by the release of envirormiental information. An equation was estimated separately 
for the premium payers under both definitions of willingness-to-pay. It was found that this 
model was able to predict the magnitude of the willingness-to-pay better for definition one as 
compared to the second definition. The first definition had statistically significant 
explanator\' power, while the second definition of willingness-to-pay did not. Under the llrst 
definition of willingness-to-pay. monthly pork consumption and gender {female = 1. male ^ 
0) were both significant at the ten-percent level of significance. Monthly pork consumption 
had a negative impact on willingness-to-pay, while gender had a positive effect. .Many of the 
categorical education variables were significant and had the expected sign. Education was 
divided into ten categorical levels. It was also found that under definition one the bias 
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caused by the zero bids did have a significant effect on the estimation process. This was not 
ihe case for the second definition. 
From this work it is clear that some proportion of consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for pork products with embedded environmental attributes. Under both definitions 
of \\ illingness-to-pay. over sixty percent of the participants paid a premium for pork products 
with embedded envirorunental attributes. Furthermore, these consumers want producers to 
ha\ c env ironmentai education and produce in an environmentally sound fashion. 
Future Research And Issues 
There are three areas where this research can be expanded. The first area is related to 
the theory of auctions when the product being auctioned has embedded environmental 
attributes. One study that needs to be done is related to consumer behavior in the other three 
major auctions (Dutch auction, first-price auction, English auction) discussed in this 
dissertation when the product being auctioned has embedded environmental attributes. 
Another study that can be done is one that examines the properties of an optimal auction 
when environmental attributes exist fi-om both the sellers and buyers viewpoint. 
The second area pertains with the experiment process. It would be useful to examine 
the effects of introducing a substitute product, like beef or chicken, that would have no 
en\ ironmental attributes into this auction experiment. .A.lso it would be interesting to see 
what would happen if there were only two or three products rather than ten. If consumers arc 
using a particular product as an anchor for the ecolabeling value, then by having many 
products convolutes which product is the anchor. Another extension to this experiment is to 
de\ elop a tool that will measure the level of free-riding. 
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The next logical step to this research is to do an in-store study for pork products with 
en\. ironinentally embedded attributes. Participants indicated they w ould pay a premium for 
pork products with embedded environmental attributes, but it is unknown whether the level 
of premium given in this study would hold over time where consumers make repeated 
purchases. There are many examples of products that are introduced into the market but fail 
after a few months. WTiile this study was able to impose some market discipline, it was not 
able to e\ aluate purchases over time. .\n in-store study would help gauge the level of market 
share a product with embedded environmental attributes could gain. 
The pork production industry is well positioned to address environmental issues and 
de\ clop products with embedded environmental attributes. The industr\- has already 
de\ eloped a program which focuses on environmental audits. Under this program pork 
producers can have their pork production systems undergo an environmental audit. This, in 
effect, provides a certification process built around environmentally safe production methods. 
Studv participants indicated they felt producer education on environmental issues was 
miportani and encouraged. The industry is already doing this. It is important to inform 
consumers about what the industry is doing. Industry' education packages need to focus on 
producers and consumers alike. The industr\' has done an excellent job at focusing these 
i\pcs of programs on producers. These efforts need to be expanded to consumers. 
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appendix a: lntroductory letter 
() June, 1997 
Dear; 
The Economics Department at Iowa State University is conducting a national study regarding 
knowledge and concerns related to pork production. Your household was scientifically 
selected to be included in this study and we would be grateful for your help. 
U'iihin the next two weeks you will be contacted by telephone and the person who is most 
responsible for food purchases in your home will be asked if they would be interested in 
panicipatmg in a consumer experiment at Iowa State. This session will take about 2 hours of 
\our lime and would take place on a Saturday. It would involve no risk to you and you 
u ould be paid S40.00 for participating. The experiment will be located on the Iowa State 
campus in room 162 Heady Hall. A map is included to assist you with finding this building. 
To dale, we have had over 400 people from the Ames and Story County area participate in 
similar sessions and we have received positive comments from almost all of those 
panicipants. Most people said they found the experience to be interesting and infomiaii\ c. 
1 f \ou have any questions regarding the study, please call Sean Hurley at 51 5-294-21 and 
he will be happy to help you. Thank you for your consideration. 
Smcerei\. 
James B. Kliebenstein, Ph.D. 
Professor 
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL DIRECTIONS, BID SHEETS, AND PRE AND 
POST AUCTION SURVEYS 
Consent Form 
>'ou are about to participate in a consumer experiment in willingness-to-pa\ for a food 
product. This experiment will ttike approximately two hours. 
W'c need your signed consent if you are to act as a subject. Your participation in the 
experiment is completely voluntar\' and you may withdraw from the experiment at any time 
without prejudice to you. Results from the experiment vvill be strictly confidential. Any 
name associated with the experiment will be deleted upon completion of the experiment. 
If >ou consent to participate in the e.xperiment. please sign the consent form below. 
1 ha\ e read the consent form statement and agree to act as a subject in the experiment, uith 
the understanding that I can withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice lo 
me. 
Signature 
/ i 
Date 
1S2 
Experimental Instructions 
General Instructions 
\'ou are about to participate in an experiment in market decision making. Please 
follow all instructions carefully. 
The e.xperiment will consist of 2 stages and will last approximately 2 hours. In stage 
1 you will be asked to decide how much you would be willing to pay for different 
candy bars. This stage is designed to familiarize you with the auction procedure w e 
will be using. In stage 2 you will be asked how much you would be willing to pay for 
pork products with different attributes. 
You will submit your bidding price on a recording sheet. You cannot reveal your 
bids to any other participant- Any communication between participants will result in 
an automatic penalty of S3. Please do not complete any form until instructed to do so 
by the monitor. 
You will receive S40 for participating in this experiment. Because you actually pay 
for any product you choose to purchase, your take home income will consist of S4(j 
minus the price paid for any products purchased. 
Please pay attention to the monitors at all times and do not hesitate to ask questions 
about any of the instructions. 
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Pre-Auction Sur\ey 
About "^'ou 
1. ^'our sex; Female Male 
2. As of your last birthday, how old were you? 
3. Ho\\ many individuals live in your household, including yourself? 
If you have children, how old are they? 
4. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed: 
Grade 8 
Grade 9-11 
H. S., G. E. D. 
Some technical, trade, or business school 
Some college, no degree 
B.S., B.A., etc. 
Some graduate work, no degree 
M.S., M.A., etc. 
Ph.D., DA^M.. D.D.S., etc. 
5. Are you currently employed? Yes No 
6. WTiat is your occupation, e.g.. homemaker, police officer, doctor, teacher, etc.? 
Please indicate the approximate household income for 1996: 
Less than S10.000 
510,000-520,000 
520,000 - 530,000 
530,000 - 540,000 
540,000 - 550.000 
550,000 - 560.000 
560,000 - 570,000 
570.000 - 580.000 
580,000 - 590.000 
More than 590.000 
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S. Do you eat beef? Yes No 
Do you eat pork? \'es No 
Do you eat poultr>'? Y'es No 
Do you eat fish? Yes No 
9. How often do you eat beef, pork, poultry, fish? per week per month 
Number of times you eat beef? 
Number of times you eat pork? 
Number of times you eat poultry? 
Number of times you eat fish? 
1 (J. How far do you live from a pork production facility? 
Under one quarter of a mile 
One quarter of a mile to one half of a mile 
One half of a mile to one mile 
One mile to one and a half miles 
One and a half miles to two miles 
Two miles to three miles 
Three miles to four miles 
Four miles to five miles 
Over five miles 
Don't know 
I I. How many pork production facilities are within a one mile radius of your dwelling? 
! 2. How many pork production facilities are within a two mile radius of your dwelling? 
13. Do you produce livestock for commercial use? 'N'es No 
If yes, what livestock do you produce? 
Livestock Number of animals 
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14. Do you produce crops for commercial use? Yes No 
If yes, what crops do you produce? 
Crop Typical number of acres allocated to the crop 
15. Do you read the information on the labels of the products you buy? 
Never 
Sometimes 
Always 
14. Have you ever noticed any information labeling on the products you buy that portray 
env ironmental attributes or qualities? 
Yes 
No 
If yes. please give an example: 
15. Do you think you have purchased more beef or pork as a direct result of the beef and 
pork advertisements you have seen in the media; e.g.. "Pork the other white meal", 
etc.? 
more beef? Yes No 
more pork? Yes No 
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16. On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being 'very concerned' and 5 being "not 
concerned." how concerned are vou about the followina issues: 
Issue 
Very 
Concerned 
Not 
Concerned 
Environment 1 
Water quality 1 
Air Quality 1 
Food prices 1 
Family Farming 1 
Production methods 
in livestock farmina 1 
Animal welfare 
Pollution 
Livestock 
confinement 
SNSlcms 
Changing farming 
structure 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
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17. On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being "very important' and 5 being "not 
important." indicate how important the following attributes are for the products you 
consume: 
Very Not 
Issue Important Important 
Eating quality 1 2 3 4 5 
X'isual appeal 1 2 3 4 5 
Freshness 1 2 J 4 5 
Price 1 2 J 4 5 
Environmental 1 -> J 4 5 
Production methods 
used in producing 
the good 1 -> -* J 4 5 
Uniformity 
of product 1 2 J 4 5 
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Experimental Instructions and Forms 
Stage One Instructions 
Step 1: Notice that there are 10 varieties of candy bars displayed: 
1. .A.Imond Joy 
2. Baby Ruth 
•»> J. KitKat 
4. M&M's 
5. Mars 
6. Milky Way 
7. Skittles 
S. Snickers 
9. Starburst 
10. Twix 
You will be asked to indicate your willingness to pay for each of these candy bars. 
Step 2: Please write your bid for each of the 10 candy bars on the recording sheet 
provided. Place a horizontal mark across the vertical price line at the point that 
corresponds to the vertical price line at the point that corresponds to your bid for 
each respective candy bar. Next to the mark write the dollar amount of your bid. 
Start by placing a bid for: 
1. \'our most preferred candy bar. 
2. Your least preferred candy bar. 
3. Fill in the remaining bids in any order you choose. 
For each of the 10 candy bars the monitor will announce the highest bidder and 
display the second-highest bidding price of the candy bar on the blackboard. In 
this auction, the highest bidder will pay the second highest bidding price. 
This auction will have one bidding round. After the bidding round is completed, 
one of the 10 candy bars will be selected randomly to be the candy bar auctioned. 
For e.xample, if the twix is the candy bar randomly selected to be auctioned and if 
the highest bid for the Twix is S0.35 and the second highest bid is S0.20. then the 
highest bidder will purchase the Twix and must pay SO.20. 
Note; In the event there is a tie for the highest bid, the winner will be determined by a 
coin toss. In this case, the second highest bid would also be the same as your bid. 
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Note: In this auction it is in your best interest to bid the amount you are truly u illing to 
pay for the candy bar. If you bid more than your true u illingness-to-pay. then 
you increase your chances of purchasing the candy bar but you may ha\ e to pa\ a 
price that is greater than your valuation of that candy bar. On the other hand, if 
you bid less than the amount that you are truly willing to pay, you ma\' lose the 
chance to purchase the candy bar at a price that you would be willing to pay. 
Kxiiinple Candy Har Hids 
ALMOND BABYIUITM KITKAT MAM'S 
JOY 
MARS 
2.(K) 2.(K) 2.(KL 2.(K) 2.(K) 
1.3()_ 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
l.(K) I.(Ml l.(KI l.(KI l.(K) 
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.00 0.(K) ( ) ( H )  (MM) 0(K) 
II)// 
MII.KY 
WAY 
2.(K), 
1.50 
i.(K) 
0.50, 
0 00 
SKriTl.liS SNICKHRS STARBDRST TWIX 
2,00_ 
1.50 
l.(X) 
0.50 
().(K) 
2.(ML 
1.50 
l.(K) 
0.50 
0(K) 
2.(K). 
1.50 
l.fH) 
0.50 
0.(X) 
2.(M) 
1.50 
l.(K) 
0.50 
0 00 
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Quiz 
Please fill in the blank for each of the following questions. 
1. The example bidding sheet indicates that the bidder is willing to pay S for a 
Mars bar and is willing to pay S for a Snickers. 
2. Suppose your bid of 50.35 is the highest bid for the Skittles and the Skittles were 
randomly selected to be the candy bar auctioned. Also suppose that the second 
highest bid for the skittles is S0.21. V\1iat price will you pay for the Skittles? S 
Ciiiuly Hjir Hids 
ALMOND BABY HUTU KITKAT MAM'.S 
JOY 
MARS 
2.()0 2.()() 2.(X) 2.(H) 2.(K) 
L50 1.50 I 50 L50 1.50 
LOO LOO L(M) l . (M)  L(N) 
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.(M) 0.(M) ().(M) 0(M) ( ) . ( K )  
ll)f/ 
MILKY 
WAY 
SKriTLl-S SNICKHHS STARIUJRST TWIX 
2.(M) 2.<X) 2.(M) 2.00 2.(M) 
L50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
L(M) L(X) i.(K) L<M) L(H) 
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.00 (MM) 0.00 (MM) (),(M) 
Recording Sheet for ( andy H:u' Round 
Bidder tf Aliiioiul 
Joy 
liaby 
Ruth 
Kiikai Mc-CiM's Mars Milky 
Way 
Skittles Snickers Starhurst Twix 
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Stage Two Instructions 
Step 1: You will be asked to bid on 10 packages of pork loin chops. Each package 
contains four pork loin chops and weighs approximately 2 pounds. These 
packages are labeled as the following; 
1. Pork loin chop package 1. 
Pork loin chop package 2. 
J. Pork loin chop package 3. 
4. Pork loin chop package 4. 
5. Pork loin chop package 5. 
6. Pork loin chop package 6. 
7. Pork loin chop package 7. 
S. Pork loin chop package 8. 
9. Pork loin chop package 9. 
10. Pork loin chop package 10 
\'ou will be asked to indicate your willingness to pay for each of these packages of 
pork loin chops. 
Step 2: Please write your bid for each of the packages on the recording sheet. Place a 
horizontal mark across the vertical price line at the point that corresponds lo your 
bid for each package of pork loin chops. Next to the mark write the dollar amount 
of your bid. 
For each of the 10 packages, the monitor will announce the highest bidder's 
number and display the second-highest bidding price of the package on the 
blackboard. In this auction, the highest bidder will pay the second highest bidding 
price. 
This auction will have five bidding rounds. After the fifth bidding round is 
completed, one of the bidding rounds will be selected by the monitor to be the 
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binding round. Then one of the 10 pork loin chop packages will be selected 
randomly to be the package auctioned. 
Note: In the event there is a tie for the highest bid. the winner will be determined by a 
coin toss. In this case the second-highest bid will be the same as the highest bid. 
Note: In this auction it is in your best interest to bid the amount you are truly willing to 
pay to purchase each package. If you bid more than your true willingness-to-pa\. 
you increase your chances of purchasing the package but you may ha\ e to pay a 
price greater than what you are willing to pay. On the other hand, if you bid less 
than the amount you are truly willing to pay, you may lose the chance to purchase 
the package at a price that you would be willing to pay. 
Recording Sheet for I'ork Kxperhnent: iUddhi^ Round 
Bidder ff Package 1 Package 2 Package Package 4 Package .S Package 6 Package 7 I^ickage S Package 9 Package 10 
Pork l.oin C hop Hids: Koiiiui I 
Pork 
Loin Chop 
Packagc I 
I'ork 
Loin Chop 
Packajjc 2 
Pork 
l.oin Chop 
I'ackagc 3 
I'ork 
l.oin Chop 
Packapc 4 
I'ork 
Loin Chop 
I'ai:kai!c 5 
12.00 
9.00 
6.00 
3.(X) 
0.(K) 
I2 . (H)  
9.0()_ 
6.(K) 
3.(K) 
( ) . ( ) ( )  
I2.(K) 
9.(H) 
6 00 
.MH) 
( ) ( K )  
I2.(K)_ 
9.(H) 
6.(K) 
.VIM) 
( ) ( ) ( )  
i2.<K) 
9.(K) 
6.00 
.3.(K) 
11)« 
Pork I'ork Pork Pork Pork 
Loin Chop Loin Chop l.oin Chop Loin Chop Loin Chop 
Package 6 Packagc 7 Packagc 8 Packaged Packagc 10 
12.00 
9. (M)  
6.(M) 
( ) ( ) ( )  
I2.(K) 
9.(K) 
6.(X) 
3.(K) 
().(M) 
!2.(K) 
9.(K) 
6.(H) 
.V(H) 
().()() 
I2(K) 
9,(K) 
6.(M) 
.V(K) 
(KM) 
I2,(M)_ 
9,(M)_ 
6.0()_ 
.V(M). 
(I.(M) 
vO 
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Attributes of the Pork Loin Chop Packages (9:00 Session) 
Package I has no particular environmental attributes. It is the tv'pical pork loin chops which 
can be bought at any local store. 
Package 2 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces odor by 30 to 40% below the t>pical (package 1). 
Package 3 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces odor by 80 to 90% below the typical (package 1). 
Package 4 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces seepage of nutrients, etc., from swine manure into the groundwater by 15 to 25% 
below the typical (package 1). 
Package 5 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces seepage of nutrients, etc., from swine manure into the groundwater by 40 to 50% 
below the typical (package 1). 
Package 6 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces run-off of phosphorus, etc., from manure into surface water by 15 to 25% below 
the typical (package 1). 
Package 7 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces run-off of phosphorus, etc., from manure into surface water by 40 to 50% below 
the typical (package 1). 
Package 8 has a combination of two environmental attributes in a pig production system; one 
using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, and the other using technology that 
reduces seepage into the groundwater by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 1). 
Package 9 has a combination of two environmental attributes in a pig production system; one 
using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, and the other using technology thai 
reduces run-off into surface water by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 1). 
Package 10 has a combination of three environmental attributes in a pig production sy stem; 
one using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, the second using technology that 
reduces seepage into the groundwater by 40 to 50%, and the third using technology that 
reduces run-off into surface water by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 1). 
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Attributes of the Pork Loin Chop Packages (11:30 Session) 
Package 1 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technoiogy that 
reduces odor by 30 to 40% below the typical (package 5). 
Package 2 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces odor by 80 to 90% below the typical (package 5). 
Package 3 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces seepage of nutrients, etc.^  from swine manure into the groundwater by 15 to 25"/o 
below the typical (package 5). 
Package 4 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces seepage of nutrients, etc., from swine manure into the groundwater by 40 to 50% 
below the typical (package 5). 
Package 5 has no particular envirorunental attributes. It is the tj-pical pork loin chops which 
can be bought at any local store. 
Package 6 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces run-off of phosphorus, etc., from manure into surface water by 15 to 25% below 
ihc ix'pical (package 5). 
Package 7 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology thai 
reduces run-off of phosphorus, etc., from manure into surface water by 40 to 50% below 
ihc t\pical (package 5). 
Package 8 has a combination of two environmental attributes in a pig production system; one 
using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, and the other using technology that 
reduces seepage into the groundwater by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 5). 
Package 9 has a combination of two environmental attributes in a pig production system; one 
using lechnology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, and the other using technology thai 
reduces run-off into surface water by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 5). 
Package 10 has a combination of three environmental attributes in a pig production system; 
one using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, the second using technology thai 
reduces seepage into the groundwater by 40 to 50%, and the third using technology thai 
reduces run-off into surface water by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 5). 
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Attributes of the Pork Loin Chop Packages (2:00 Session) 
Package 1 has the en\'ironmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces odor by 30 to 40% below the typical (package 10). 
Package 2 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technolog\- that 
reduces odor by 80 to 90% below the typical (package 10). 
Package 3 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces seepage of nutrients, etc., from swine manure into the groundwater by 15 to 25% 
below the typical (package 10). 
Package 4 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces seepage of nutrients, etc., from swine manure into the groundwater by 40 to 50% 
below the tvpical (package 10). 
Package 5 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces run-off of phosphorus, etc., from manure into surface water by 15 to 25% below 
the typical (package 10). 
Package 6 has the environmental attribute of a pig production system using technology that 
reduces run-off of phosphorus, etc.. from manure into surface water by 40 to 50% below 
the t\pical (package 10). 
Package 7 has a combination of two environmental attributes in a pig production system; one 
using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, and the other using technology that 
reduces seepage into the groundwater by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 10). 
Package 8 has a combination of two environmental attributes in a pig production system; one 
using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, and the other using technology that 
reduces run-off into surface water by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 10). 
Package 9 has a combination of three environmental attributes in a pig production system; 
one using technology that reduces odor by 80 to 90%, the second using technology that 
reduces seepage into the groundwater by 40 to 50%, and the third using technology that 
reduces run-off into surface water by 40 to 50% below the typical (package 10). 
Package 10 has no particular environmental attributes. It is the typical pork loin chops 
which can be bought at any local store. 
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The Production Systems 
Typical Production System 
The tvpical pork loin chops in this experiment come from a pig production system 
using an earthen manure storage system with manure applied on the top (surface) of 
tlie land. Odor in this system is allowed to flow freely. 
.Attributes of the typical pork production system with respect to odor, seepage and run­
off is as follows: 
Odor 
A t\pical swine production system emits odor for a time period which is equivalent to 
about 11-18 days per year (3-5% of the time). This odor is produced primarily by 
sulfur compounds due to animal waste decomposition. For a 90% reduction, the 
swine production emits odor for a period of time which is equivalent to about 1-2 
days per year, while for a 40% reduction, the swine production emits odor for a 
period of time which is equivalent to about 7-11 days per year. 
Odor emissions from pork production facilities can have many effects to the 
surrounding area and its residents. They can cause unpleasant living conditions and 
loss of property values for surrounding neighbors; some psychological duress, as uell 
as health effects of coughing, wheezing, vomiting, etc.. and a more depressed general 
outlook on life. It creates uncertainty about planning social events by neighbors and 
can be a nuisance to both neighbors and those passing by. 
Pig production systems with reduced odors (i.e., 40% and 90%) involve combinations 
of differing manure storage technologies and manure application methods along with 
air filtration devices attached to the production facilities to reduce odor emissions. 
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Groundwater seepage 
The primary problem that can arise is leeching of nitrogen or nitrates from swine 
manure into the groundwater supply. This groundwater contamination can affect 
anyone using the underground aquifer for water consumption, e.g.. surrounding 
neighbors, communities, etc. 
One of the major health concerns with this seepage into an aquifer is Blue Baby 
disease resulting from lack of oxygen. This disease affects infants under the age of 6 
months and can possibly lead to death. 
Once an aquifer has been polluted, it can take months and even years to clean itself 
Pig production systems with reduced seepage (i.e., 40% and 90%) into the 
groundwater involve combinations of differing manure storage technologies and 
manure application methods. 
Surface \> ater 
The primary problem is from nutrient run-off from manure or manure spills that 
winds up in the surface water, i.e, stream, rivers, lakes, marshes, etc. The principal 
nutrient contaminant from swine manure is phosphorus. 
This contamination can lead to oxygen depletion in the surface water supplies and the 
death of aquatic life such as fish. It can also lead to excessive algae growth in surface 
water supplies further depleting the oxygen supply in the affected water. Depending 
upon water flow of the contaminated area and level of run-off or spill, aquatic life can 
be affected over a short distance or cover many miles. Contamination can impact 
recreational use of surface water, i.e., boating, fishing, swimming, aesthetics, etc.. 
The amount of time for clean up depends upon surface water flow and can \ ary from 
a feu- days to weeks. 
Pig production systems with reduced surface water contamination (i.e.. 40".. and 
90" o) in\oIve combinations of differing manure storage technologies and manure 
application methods. 
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Post Auction Surrey 
IS. On a scale of 1 through 6 with 1 being "very acceptable/ 3 being 'neutral.' 5 being 
'not acceptable,' and 6 being 'no opinion" how acceptable to you are the following 
methods to achieve a reduction in odor? 
Method Ver>-
Acceptable 
Neutral Not No 
Acceptable Opinion 
Filtration of air 
from building 
Additives lo manure: 
Chemical 
Microbial 
Enzyme 
Additives to hogs 
diet: 
Chemical 
Natural 
Manure storage 
abo\ e ground with 
cover 
Manure storage 
below ground with 
co\ er 
Injection of manure 
into the soil to a 
depth of 4 to 8 
inchcs 
Manure spread on 
lop of soil with 
immediate 
incorporation 
Manure storage 
under hog building 
Composting with 
bedding material 
Other: Please 
Specify 
1 
J 
3 
3 
J  
3 
J 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
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19. On a scale of 1 through 5 with 1 being 'very acceptable". 3 being 'neutral', and 5 
being "not acceptable", how acceptable to you are the following methods to achie\ e 
reduction of manure seepage into groundwater? 
•Method \'er\-
Acceptable 
Neutral Not No 
.Acceptable Opinion 
Injection of manure 
into the soil to a 
depth of 4 to 8 
inches 
Manure storage 
above ground in 
steel/cement 
structure 
Manure storage 
below ground in 
steel cement 
structure 
Other: Please 
Specify 
1 
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20. On a scale of 1 through 5 with 1 being "verx' acceptable'. 3 being "neutral', and 5 
being 'not acceptable", how acceptable to you are the tbllowing methods to achieve a 
reduction in run-off or spill of manure into surface water? 
Method Very 
Acceptable 
Neutral Not No 
Acceptable Opinion 
Injection of manure 
into the soil to a 
depth of 4 to S 
inches 
Manure spread on 
top of soil with 
immediate 
incorporation 
Manure storage 
above ground in 
steel cement 
structure 
Manure storage 
below ground in 
steel cement 
structure 
Other; Please 
Specify 
1 
21. On a scale from 1 through 6 with 1 being "very concerned', 5 being 'not concerned, 
and 6 being 'no opinion' how concerned are you about the following issues: 
Issue Ver>^ 
Concerned 
Not .No 
Concerned Opinion 
Environmental 1 
impact from 
livestock production 
Worker Environment 1 
Animal Environment 1 
Farm Structure 1 
2 
-> 
J 4 5 6 
J 4 5 6 
3 4 5 6 
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On a scale from 1 through 6 with I being 'ver\' favorable". 5 bemg "not fas orablc/ 
and 6 being "no opinion." how favorable to you are the following livestock production 
practices? 
Type of Facilit>- Ver>' Not No 
Favorable Favorable Opinion 
Hoop 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Partial Confinement 1 2 J 4 5 6 
Pasture 1 J 4 6 
Total Confinement 1 -) 4 5 6 
23. Would you buy a meal product that has environmental attributes specified on the 
label? 
Ves No 
24. Would you pay a premium for a meat product that has environmental attributes 
specified on the label? 
\'es No 
25. Is it important to you that the pork you consume was produced by a producer who has 
received education in environmental awareness and production practices? 
\'es No 
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS BY LOCATION 
Tabic CI: Bid Premiums (S) per Package by Area for Premium Payers (Ames. lA; 
Manhattan, KS; Raleigh, NC (97); Burlington, VT) 
Location 
Pork Chop Environmental Ames, Manhattan, Raleigh. Burlington. 
Attributes (Level of Improvement lA KS NC (97) \T 
over Typical) 
No Particular Environmental -0.79 -0.47 1 P
 
-0.52 
Attributes (T>'pical) 
Odor 30-40% -0.61 -0.22 -0.33 -0.05 
Odor SO-90% -0.05 0.01 0.09 0.17 
Ground water 15-25% 0.02 0.01 0.36 0.53 
Ground water 40-50% 0.16 0.06 -0.19 0.68 
Surface Water 15-25% 0.01 -0.16 0.11 0.39 
Surface Water 40-50% 0.46 0.20 0.10 0.55 
Odor S0-90%/Ground Water 40-50% 0.97 0.56 0.54 O.SO 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50% 0.73 0.76 0.44 1.12 
Odor S0-90%/Ground Water 1.74 1.38 1.33 1.89 
40-50%. Surface Water 40-50% 
Table C2: Bid Premiums (S) per Package by Area for Premium Payers (Iowa Falls. I A: 
Corvallis. OR; Raleigh, NC (98)) 
Location 
Pork Chop Environmental Iowa Falls, Cor>allis, Raleigh. 
.\ttributes (Level of Improvement lA OR NC (98) 
over Typical) 
No Particular Environmental -0.63 -0.44 -i.22 
Attributes (T\pical) 
Odor 3 (-1-40" 0 -0.39 -0.55 -<).3(> 
Odor 80-90° o -0.18 -0.12 -o.dl 
Ground water 15-25% -0.19 -0.08 
Ground water 40-50% -0.01 0.21 -|).3js 
Surface Water 15-25% -0.37 0.04 -'J.3iS 
Surface Water 40-50% 0.19 -0.02 -0.05 
Odor S0-90%/Ground Water 40-50% 0.78 -0.03 0.51 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 40-50% 0.95 0.45 0.84 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 1.60 1.59 1.84 
40-50°/b/Surface Water 40-50% 
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Table C3: Bid Premiums (S) per Package by Area for Non-Premium Payers (Ames. 
lA; Manhattan, I^; Raleigh, NC (97); Burlington, VT) 
Location 
Pork Chop Environmental Ames, Manhattan, Raleigh. Burlington. 
Attributes (Level of Improvement lA KS NC (97) \T 
over Typical) 
No Particular Environmental -0.27 -0.34 -0.71 -0.89 
Attributes (T\pical) 
Odor 30-40% -0.10 -0.58 -0.37 -1.01 
Odor SO-QO^/o 0.01 -0.37 -0.40 -0.96 
Ground water 15-25% 0.03 0.10 -0.34 -0.71 
Ground water 40-50% -0.01 -0.23 -0.28 -0.66 
Surface Water 15-25% -0.14 -0.67 -0.60 -0.89 
Surface Water 40-50% 0.21 -0.05 -0.24 -0.65 
Odor 80-90% Ground Water 40-50% 0.00 -0.06 -O.IO -0.44 
Odor S0-90%/Surface Water 40-50% 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.35 
Odor S0-90%/Ground Water -O.IO -0.08 -0.05 -0.23 
40-50° b. Surface Water 40-50% 
Table C4: Bid Premiums (S) per Package by Area for Non-Premium Payers 
Location 
Pork Chop Environmental Iowa Falls, Corvallis, Raleigh. 
.Attributes (Level of Improvement lA OR NC (98) 
over Typical) 
No Particular Environmental -0.69 0.25 -0.05 
.Aliributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40°'o -0.53 -0.32 -O.OS 
OdorS()-90°o 
-0.42 -0.07 -0.113 
Ground u aler 1 5-25% -0.45 -0.17 (1.0(1 
Ground \^ atcr 40-50° o -0.75 -0.22 -(i.(i8 
Surface Water I5-25°/o -0.04 0.08 -((.05 
Surface Water 40-50% -0.58 -0.19 O.OS 
Odor S0-90°o Ground Water 40-50% -0.08 0.17 -0.2" 
Odor SO-90% Surface Water 40-50% -0.51 0.03 0.(,i3 
Odor S0-90"-o Ground Water -0.44 -0.02 -(J.0~ 
40-50" u Surface Water 40-50% 
Table C5: Percent of I'articipants Paying Preniiiinis hy Premium Level for Hoth Products and Tiers (Ames, lA) 
Premium Level (Interval) i?er l*ackat;e 
Pork Chop Knvironmental Ik'low $0.01- $0.50- $1.00- $1.50- $2.00- Over 
Attributes (Level of $0.(10 $0.(N) $0.49 $0.99 $L49 $1.99 $2.49 $2.50 
Improvement over Typical) 
By Product: 
No Particular HuviroiimciilJil 46.94% 34.69% 4.08% 6.12% 4.08% 2.04% 2.04% 0.(K)% 
Attributes ( Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 26.53% 53.06% 10.20% 6.12% 4,08% 0.(M)% ().()()% ().(K)% 
Odor 80-90% 26.53% 32.65% 12.24% 14.29% 10,20% 2.04';^^ 0.(K)7r. 2,04% 
Ground water 15-25% 30.61% 38.78% 6.11% 12.24% 6.12% 0.()()'7r 2.04% 4,08% 
Ground water 40-507r) 26.53% 32.65% 12.24% 16.33% 8.16% 2.()4%> 0.(K)% 2,04% 
Surface Water 15-25% 26.53% 44.90% 12.24% 8.16% 4.08% 0.00'^. 4.08% 0,009}. 
Surfacc Water 40-50% 24.49% 30.61% 12.24% 12.24% 8.16% 2.04%. 2.04% 8.16% 
Odor 80-90%/Grouiid Water 14.29% 34.69% 12.24% 12.24% 14.29% 4.08% 0.00% 8.16% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Surfacc Water 20.41% 38,78% 10,20% 8.16% 10.20% 2.04%. 0.(K)% 10.20% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 6.12% 32.65% 10.20% 10.20% 22.45% 2.04%. 4.08% 12.24% 
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50% 
By Tier: 
No Particular Environmental 46.94% 34.69% 4.08% 6.12% 4.08% 1XW% 2.04% 0.00% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Low Level Single Altribule 27.89% 33.33% 9.527p 12,24% 7.48% 2.04% 0.68% 1,36% 
High Level Single Allribule 25.85% 31.97% 12.24% 14.29% 8.84% 2.04% 0.68% 4.08% 
High Level Double Attributes 17.35% 36,73% 11,22% 10,20% 12.24% 3.06% (,».(H)'7f. 9.18% 
High Ixvel Triple Attributes 6,12% 32,65% 10,20% 10,20% 22.45% 2.04% 4.08% 12,24% 
Tiil)lc C6: Percent of Parlicipnnts I'ayin^ Preniiums hy Premium Level for Both Products and Tiers (Manhattan, KS) 
Premium Level (Interval) per Package 
Pork Chop Knvironmcntai Below $0.01- $0.50- $I.(M)- $1.50- $2.00- Over 
Attributes (Level of $().()() $0.49 $0.99 $1.49 $1.99 $2.49 $2.50 
Improvement over Typical) 
By Product: 
No Particular F.nviroiimcntal 45.00% 36.67% 6.67% 3.33% 5.00% 1.67% 0.00% 1.67% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 35.00% 38.33% 8,33% 8.33% 6.67% 3.33% 0.(K)% 0.00% 
Odor 80-90% 28.33% 35.00% 6.67% 16.67% 8.33% 5.00% 0.00% O.OO^f. 
Ground water l.')-25% 25.00% 38.33% 8.33% 15.00% 8.33% 1.67% 0.(H)% 3.33% 
Ground water 40 .^0% 30.00% 35.00% 8.33% 6.67% 10.00% 8.33% 1.67% 0.(M)% 
Surface Water 15-25% 26.67% 40.00% 5.00% 13.33% 10.00% 3.33% 0.(X)% 1.67% 
Surface Water 40-50% 20.00% 36.67% IO.(K)% 13.33% 8.33% 8.33% 0.00% 3.33% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 16.67% 28.33% 6.67% 11.67% 21.67% 5.1K)% 8.33% 1.67'/r. 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Surfacc Water 15.00% 31.67% 6.67% 10.00% 20.00% 3.33% 6.67% 6.67% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Grouiul Water 6.67% 26.67% 10.00% 16,67% 10.00% 8.33% 13.33% 8.33% 
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50% 
By Tier: 
No Particular Environmental 45.00% 36.677o 6.67% 3.33% 5.(K)% 1.67% O.CX)^}, 1.67% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Low Level Single Attribute 28.89% 38,89% 7.22% 12.22% 8.33% 2.78% 0.(K)% 1.67% 
High Level Single Attribulc 26,11% 35.56% 8.33% 12.22% 8.89% 7.22% 0,56% 1.11% 
High Level Double Attributes 15.8.3% 30,{M)% 6,67% 10.83% 20.83% 4.17% 7.50% 4.17% 
High Level Triple Attributes 6.67% 26.67% 10.(H)% 16.67% 10.00% 8.33% 13.33% 8,33% 
Table C7: Percent of Participants Paying Premiums by Premium Level for Hoth Products and Tiers 
(Raleigh, NC f)/2S/«)7) 
Premium Level (Interval) ncr Package 
Pork Chop Knvinmmenlal Kelow $0.01- $0.50- $I.(M)- $L50- $2.00- Over 
Attributes (Level of $(K0() $0.00 $0.49 $0.99 $L49 $1.99 $2.49 $2.50 
Improvement over Typical) 
By Product: 
No Particular Unvironmcntal 54.84% 29.03% 3.23% 6.45% 3.23% 0.(X)% 0.00% 3.23% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 38.71% 38.71% 9.68% 6.45% 0.00% 0.(K)% 6.45% ().()()% 
Odor 80-90% 35.48% 41.94% 9.68% 6.45% 3.23% 3.23% 0.()07f) 0.00% 
Ground water 15-25%; 38.71% 45.16% 3.23% 6.45% 0.00% 3.23% 0.00% 3.23% 
Ground water 40-50% 35.48% 38.71% 12.90% 9.68% 0.00% O.OO'/fi 3.23% 0.00% 
Surface Water 15-25% 38.71% 32.26% 16.13% 6.45% 0.00% 3.23%- 3.23% 0.00% 
Surface Water 40-50% 29.03% 38.71% 9.68% 6.45% 12.90% 0.00% 3.23% 0.(X)% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 22.58% 32.26% 16.13% 9.68% 12.90% 3.23% 0.00% 3.23% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Surfacc Water 19.35% 32.26% 16.13% 16,13% 9.68% 6.45% 0.00% 0.00% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 6.45% 32.26% 12.90% 12.90% 16.13% 6.45% 3.23% 9.68% 
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50% 
By Tier: 
No Particular Environmental 54,84% 29.03% 3.23% 6.45% 3.23% ().(K)% 0.00% 3.23% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Low Level Single Atlribute 38.71% 38.71% 9.68% 6.45% 0.(K)% 2.15% 3.23% 1.08% 
High Level Single Attribute 33.337o 39.78% 10.75% 7.53% 5,38% 1.08% 2.15% 0.00% 
High Level Double Atlributcs 20.97% 32,26% 16.13% 12.90% 11.29% 4.84% 0.00% 1.61% 
High Level Triple Altribiitcs 6.45% 32.26% 12,90% 12.90% 16.13% 6.45% 3.23% 9.68% 
Table C8: Percent of Participants Paying Premiums hy Premium l,evel for Both Products and Tiers (Burlington, V'T) 
Premium l.evel (Interval) per I'ackage 
Pork Chop Knvironmeiital Below $0.01- $0.50- $1.(M>- $1.50- $2.(M)- Over 
Attributes (Level of $0.(N) $().()() $0.49 $0.99 $1.49 $1.99 $2.49 $2.50 
Improvement over Typical) 
By Product: 
No Particular Environmental 55.56% 29.63% 11.11% 0.00% 3.70% 0.()0%> 0.(X)% 0.00% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 48.15% 22.22% 18.52% 3.70% 3,70% 0.(M)% 0.00% 3.70% 
Odor 80-90% 40,74% 22.22% 18.52% 11.11% 3.70% 0,00% 0.00% 3.70% 
Ground water 15-25% 37.04% 14.81% 18.52% 11.11% 11.11% 3.707o 3.70% 0,00% 
Ground water 40-50% 37.04% 29,63% 11.11% 11.11% 3.70% ().(H)% 0.00% 7.41% 
Surface Water 15-25% 44.44% 22,22% 11.11% 11.11% 7.41% 0.(K)% 0.00% 3.70% 
Surface Water 40-50% 40.74% 25.93% 11.11% 7.41% 7.41% 3.70% 0.(K)% 3.70% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 25.93% 25.93% 18.52% 3.70% 11.11% 3.70% 7.41% 3.70% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Surfacc Waicr 22.22% 29.63% 11.11% 7,41% 14.81% 3.70% i JO% 7.41% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 14.81% 29,63% 11.11% 3.70% 7.41% 3,70%. 14.81% 14.81% 
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50% 
By Tier: 
No Particular Environmental 55,56% 29,63% 11.11% 0.00% 3.70% 0 . (X)% 0.(K)% 0.(X)% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Low Level Single Attribute 43.21% 19.75% 16.05% 8.64% 7.41% 1.23% 1.23% 2.47% 
High Level Single Attribute 39.51% 25.93% 13.58% 9.88% 4.94% 1,23%. 0.00% 4.94% 
High Level Double Auribulcs 24.07% 27.78% 14.81% 5.56% 12.96% 3.70% 5.56% 5..56% 
High Level Triple Attributes 14,81% 29,63% 11.11% 3.70% 7.41% 3,70%. 14.81% 14,81% 
Table C9; Percent of Participants Paying Premiums hy Premium Level f<tr Kotli Products and Tiers (Iowa hills, lA) 
Premium I.evel (Interval) per I'ackaue 
Pork Chop Environmental Below $0.01- $0.50- $1.(H)- $1.50- $2.(M)- Over 
Attributes (Level of $().(H) $().(N) $0.49 $0.99 $L49 $1.99 $2.49 $2.50 
Improvement over Typical) 
By Product: 
No Particular Environmental 44.83% 31.03% 10.34% 3.45% 8.62% O.OO'iJi 0.00% 1.72% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 37.93% 37.93% 10.34% 6.90% 6.90% 0.(M)% 0.00% 0.(K)% 
Odor 80-90% 32.76% 37.93% 13.79% 3.45% 8.62% 1.72% 1.72% 0.00% 
Groundwater 15-25% 29.31% 39.66% 15.52% 6.90% 6.90% 0.00% 1.72% 0.(K)% 
Ground water 40-50% 32,76% 34.48% 15.52% 1.72% 8,62% 3.45% 1.72% 1.72% 
Surface Water 15-25% 32.76% 36.21% 13.79% 5.17% 10,34% 0.(K)% 0.00% 1.72% 
Surface Water 40-50% 29.31% 34.48% 8.62% 8.62% 12.07%. 1.72% 3.45% 1.72% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 12.07% 31.03% 17.24% 12.07% I3.797f) 6.90% 5.17% 1.72% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Surface Water 13.79% 29.31% 12.07% 12.07% 15.52%. 6.90% 5.17% 5.17% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 10.34% 29.31% 8.62%) 10.34% 13.79% 10.34% 6.90% 10.34% 
40-50%/Surface Water 40-50% 
By Tier: 
No Particular Environmental 44.83% 31.03% 10.34% 3.45% 8.62% o.oo';{. 0.00% 1.72% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Low Level Single Attribute 33.33% 37.93%- 13.22% 6,32% 8.05% 0.00% 0.57% 0.57% 
High Level Single Attribute 31.61% 35.63% 12.64% 4,60% 9.77% 2.30% 2.30% 1.15% 
High Level Double Attributes 12.93% 30.17% 14,66% 12,07% 14.66% 6.90% 5.17% 3.45% 
High Level Triple Attributes 10.34% 29.31%. 8.62% 10.34% 13.79% 10.34% 6.90% 10.34% 
Table (MO: Percent of Participants Paying Preminms by Premium I.evel for Both Products and I'iers (Corvallis, OR) 
Premium Level (Interval) per Packatie 
Pork Chop Environmental Below $0.01- $0.5()- $1.00- $1.50- $2.(M)- Over 
Attributes (l^evel of $0.(M) $tl.(M) $0.49 $0.99 $1.49 $1.99 $2.49 $2.50 
Improvement over Typical) 
By Product: 
No Particular nnvironmcnlal 31.67% 5().(K)% 8.33% 0.00% 6.67% ().(K)% 0.00% 3.33% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 43.33% 36,()7% 8.33% 6.67% 3.33% 1.67% 0.00% 0.(X)% 
Odor 80-90% 26.67% 45.(K)% 6.67% 13.33% 5.(K)% 1.67% 1.67% 0.(X)''/{. 
Ground water 15-25% 25.00% 50.(K)% 13.33% 8.33% 1.67% 0.(K)% 0,(X)% 1.67% 
Ground water 40-50%) 23.33% 46.67% 5.(X)% 13.33% 8.33% 0.00% 0.(K)% 3.33% 
Surface Water 15-23% 18.33% 41.67% 16.67% 11.67% 10.00% 0.00% 1.67% 0.00% 
Surface Water 40-50^<i 26.67% 41.67% 15.00% 10.00% 1.67% 3.33% 1.67% 0.00% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 25.00% 36.67% 11.67% 8.33% 13.33% 1.67% 1.67% 1.67% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Surfacc Water 13.33% 38.33%- 13.33% 20.00% 8.33% 1.67% 1.67% 3.33% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 3.33% 33.33% 11.67% 15.00% 8.33% 10.00% 5.(K)% 13.33% 
40-50%/Surfacc Water 40-50% 
By Tier: 
No Particular Environniental 31.67% 50.(H)% 8.33% 0.00% 6.67% ().(K)% 0.00% 3.33% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Low Level Single Attribute 28.89% 42.78% 12.78% 8.89% 5.(K)% 0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 
High Level Single Attribute 25.56% 44.44% 8.89% 12.22%. 5.00% 1.67% 1.11% 1.11% 
High Ixvel Double Attributes 19.17% 37.50% 12.50% 14.17% 10.83% 1.67% 1.67% 2.50% 
High Level Triple Attributes 3,33% 33.33% 11.67% 15.(X)% 8.33% 10.(K)% 5.(K)% 13.33% 
Table CI I: Percent of Participants Payinji Prenjiunis by Premium Level for Hoth Products and Tiers 
(Raleinh, NC mim) 
Premium Level (Interval) per Packagc 
Pork Chop Environmental Below $0.01- $0.50- $L00- $L50- $2.(M»- Over 
Attributes (Level of $0.0(1 $0.(M) $0.49 $0.99 $L49 $L99 $2.49 $2.50 
Improvement over lypical) 
By Product: 
No Particular Environmental 54.55% 34.09% 2.27% 4.55% 4.55% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Odor 30-40% 29.55% 54,55% 0.00% 9.09% 2.27% 0.00% 2.27% 2.27% 
Odor 80-90% 20.45% 59.09% 0.(K)% 9.09% 6.82% 0.00% 0.00% 4.55% 
Ground water l5-259f) 22.73% 54,55% ().(K)% 11.36% 9.09% 0.00% 0.(K)% 2.27% 
Ground water 40-50% 34.09% 40,91% 6.82% 6.82% 4.55% 6.82% 0,(K)% 0.00% 
Surface Water 15-25% 27.27% 56.82% 9.09% 0.00% 4,55% 0.00% 2.27% 0.00% 
Surface Water 40-50% 20.45% 50.00% 9.09% 6.82% 9.09% 2.27% 0.00% 2.27% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 20.45% 47.73% 9.09% 9.09% 4,55% 4.55% 0.00% 4.55% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Surfacc Water 13.64% 43.18% 6.82% 11.36% 9,09% 11.36% 0,00% 4.55% 
40-50% 
Odor 80-90%/Ground Water 9.09% 29.55% 4.55% 15.91% 13.64% 4.55% 11.36% 11.36% 
40-5()%/Surfacc Water 40-50% 
By Tier; 
No Particular Environmental 54.55% 34.09% 2.27% 4.55% 4.55% 0.00% 0,00% ().{K)% 
Attributes (Typical) 
Low Level Single Attribute 26.52% 55.30% 3.03% 6.82% 5.30% 0.00% 1.52% 1.52% 
High Ixvel Single Attribute 25.00% 50.00% 5.30% 7.58% 6.82% 3.03% 0,00% 2.27% 
High Level Double Attributes 17.05% 45.45% 7.95% 10,23% 6.82% 7.95% 0.(K)% 4.55% 
High Level Triple Attributes 9,09% 29,55% 4.55% 15.91% 13.64% 4.55% 11,36% 11.36% 
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APPENDIX D: POST AUCTION SUR\ EV RESULTS BY LOCATION 
Information on Participant Response to General Information by Location 
Table Dl: Comparison of General Information on Participants from the Pre Survey 
Auction (All Participants: Ames, lA; Manhattan, KS; Raleigh, NC (97): 
Burlington, VT) 
Location 
Ames. Manhattan. Raleigh. Burlington. 
lA KS NC (97) \T 
Females % 63.27 53.33 61.29 62.96 
Age ^'ears 45.49 42.33 38.03 47.78 
Number Living in Household 2.69 2.70 2 94 3.19 
Education Level Years 15.88 14.74 15.48 14.60 
Employed % 63.27 71.67 77.42 62.96 
Household Income S 44.200 35.500 46,300 39.100 
Consume Beef % 97.96 98.33 100.00 92.59 
Consume Pork % 97.96 90.00 96.77 96.15 
Consume Poultry' % 100.00 98.33 100.00 96.15 
Consume Fish % 91.84 85.00 93.55 92.31 
Times Consume Beef per Month 10.43 12.60 9.45 6.70 
Times Consume Pork per Month 5.87 5.27 5.05 6.15 
Times Consume Poultry per Month 10.14 10.14 13.13 9.30 
Times Consume Fish per Month 4.06 2.98 4.98 4.30 
Number of Production Facilities 0.22 0.10 0.06 <J.(r 
Within One Mile 
Number of Production Facilities 0.59 0.22 0.13 ( J . O S  
Within Two Miles 
Commercial Producers % 0.00 1.67 0.00 ( ) , ( ) { )  
Read Food Labels^ 2.41 2.39 2.35 2.26 
Notice Environmental Attributes on 46.94 47.46 45.16 55.5(' 
Labels " 0 
Consume More Beef Due to 10.20 15.52 31.03 ! 1.54 
Advertising "o 
Consume More Pork Due to 16.33 32.20 33.33 30.":^ 
Advertising % 
Want Environmental Labeling for 100.00 93.22 87.10 92.59 
Most Products % 
Would Pay a Premium for Meat 55.10 66.10 61.29 70.37 
Products with Environmental 
Attributes % 
Want Education for Pork Producers % 81.63 89.83 90.32 96.30 
^ l=never; 2=sometimes; 3=always 
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Table D2: Comparison of General Information on Participants from the Pre Survey 
Auction (All Participants: Iowa Fall. lA; Corvallis, OR: Raleigh. NC (98» 
Location 
Iowa Fails, Corvallis, Raleigh. 
lA OR NC (98) 
Females % 62.07 66.67 50.00 
Age ^'ears 58.30 52.47 44.61 
Number Living in Household 2.52 2.53 2.61 
Education Level Years 14.72 15.50 16.50 
Employed % 50.00 55.00 88.64 
Household Income S 36,800 45.500 59,900 
Consume Beef % 100.00 91.67 95.45 
Consume Pork % 100.00 91.67 100.00 
Consume Poultry % 96.49 95.00 100.00 
Consume Fish % 85.96 88.33 93.18 
Times Consume Beef per Month 12.70 7.17 8.09 
Times Consume Pork per Month 7.60 5.11 5.55 
Times Consume Poultry per Month 7.51 9.31 12.39 
Times Consume Fish per Month 3.86 3.16 5.09 
Number of Production Facilities 0.45 0.00 0.00 
Wiihin One Mile 
Number of Production Facilities 1.54 0.02 0.00 
Within Two Miles 
Commercial Producers % 3.64 0.00 2.27 
Read Food Labels^ 2.36 2.43 2.41 
Notice Environmental Attributes on 52.83 60.00 54.55 
Labels % 
Consume More Beef Due to 21.15 14.29 "".50 
Advertising % 
Consume More Pork Due to 39.22 37.29 2 5 . o i )  
Ad\ ertising % 
Want Environmental Labeling for 89.09 100.00 i;- -3 
Most Products % 
Would Pay a Premium for Meat 54.55 75.00 72."3 
Products with Environmental 
Attributes % 
Want Education for Pork Producers % 89.29 91.53 90.91 
^ I =ne\ er; 2=sometimes: 3=al\vays 
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Table D3: Comparison of General Information on Participants from the Pre Survey 
Auction (Premium Payers: Ames. lA: Manhattan, KS: Raleigh. NC (97): 
Burlington, VT) 
Location 
Ames, Manhattan, Raleigh. Burlington. 
lA KS NC (97) \T 
Females % 76.67 55.00 57.89 53.33 
Age Years 45.03 42.65 41.37 43.60 
Number Living in Household 2.73 2.75 2.95 3.00 
Education Level Years 15.4 14.7 15.78 15.46 
Employed % 66.67 72.50 89.47 80.00 
Household Income S 42,200 35,000 50,800 41.000 
Consume Beef % 96.67 100.00 100.00 93.33 
Consume Pork % 100.00 95.00 94.74 100.00 
Consume Poultrv" % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Consume Fish % 93.33 82.50 100.00 93.33 
Times Consume Beef per Month 10.33 12.38 10.67 7.07 
Times Consume Pork per Month 5.97 5.73 5.28 6.33 
Times Consume Poultry per Month 10.20 10.80 13.28 10.00 
Times Consume Fish per Month 3.87 2.91 4.78 3.87 
Number of Production Facilities 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Within One Mile 
Number of Production Facilities 0.73 0.10 0.05 O.IO 
Within Two Miles 
Commercial Producers % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,(J(J 
Read Food Labels^ 2.40 2.35 2.42 2.33 
Notice Environmental Attributes on 43.33 50.00 47.37 06.()7 
Labels % 
Consume More Beef Due to 10.00 15.00 29.41 0.1 It) 
.•\d\-ertising % 
Consume Vlore Pork Due to 20.00 25.00 31.5S 
•Advertising "o 
Want Environmental Labeling for 100.00 95.00 84.21 3.3 3 
.Most Products % 
Would Pay a Premium for Meat 70.00 70.00 68.42 /  J. 3 3 
Products with Environmental 
Attributes % 
Want Education for Pork Producers % 86.67 90.00 94."4 10(J.()(j 
1 =never; 2=sometimes; 3=al\vays 
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Table D4: Comparison of General Information on Participants from the Pre Survey 
Auction (Premium Payers: Iowa Fall, lA; Corvaliis. OR; Raleigh. NC (98)) 
Location 
Iowa Falls, CorA'allis, Raleigh, 
lA OR NC (98) 
Females % 74.29 65.79 51.85 
Age \'ears 54.83 51.84 43.44 
Number Living in Household 2.77 2.63 2.70 
Education Level Years 12.54 15.9 16.88 
Employed % 60.00 60.53 85.19 
Household Income S 37.900 49,300 60.000 
Consume Beef % 100.00 92.11 96.30 
Consume Pork % 100.00 92.11 100.00 
Consume Poultry % 97.14 97.37 100.00 
Consume Fish % 94.29 86.84 92.59 
Times Consume Beef per Month 12.94 7.18 7.89 
Times Consume Pork per Month 6.57 4.62 5.07 
Times Consume Poultry per Month 7.83 8.30 11.48 
Times Consume Fish per Month 3.66 3.09 4.44 
N umber of Production Facilities 0.47 0.00 0.00 
Within One Mile 
Number of Production Facilities 1.61 0.03 0.00 
Within Two Miles 
Commercial Producers % 6.06 0.00 0.00 
Read Food Labels" 2.34 2.45 
ri 
Noiicc Environmental Attributes on 5S.S2 60.53 59.26 
Labels % 
Consume More Beef Due to 15.63 16.67 4.()() 
Advertising % 
Consume More Pork Due to 31.25 34.21 -) -V -> -1 
Ad\ ertising "o 
\\"ani En\ ironmental Labeling for 97.14 100.00 
Mosi Products % 
\\ ould Pay a Premium for Meat 65.71 77.14 
Products with Environmental 
Attributes % 
Want Education for Pork Producers % 94.29 94.59 92.59 
" 1 =never; 2=sometimes; 3=aKvays 
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Table D5: Comparison of General Information on Participants from the Pre Survey 
Auction (Non-Premium Payers: Ames, lA: Manhattan. KS; Raleigh, NC 
(97); Burlington, VT) 
Location 
Ames, Manhattan, Raleigh, Burlington. 
lA KS NC (97) N T 
Females % 42.11 50.00 66.67 75.00 
Age ^'ears 46.21 41.70 32.75 53.00 
Number Living in Household 2.63 2.60 2.92 3.42 
Education Level Years 16.64 14.8 15 13.75 
Employed % 57.89 70.00 58.33 41.67 
Household Income S 42,100 36.500 38.600 36.700 
Consume Beef % 100.00 95.00 100.00 91.67 
Consume Pork % 94.74 80.00 100.00 90.91 
Consume Poultry % 100.00 95.00 100.00 90.91 
Consume Fish % 89.47 90.00 83.33 90.91 
Times Consume Beef per Month 10.58 13.05 7.63 6.25 
Times Consume Pork per Month 5.71 4.31 4.71 5.92 
Times Consume Poultry per Month 10.04 8.74 12.92 8.42 
Times Consume Fish per Month 4.36 3.14 5.32 4.S3 
Number of Production Facilities 0.21 0.30 0.17 0.33 
Within One Mile 
Number of Production Facilities 0.37 0.45 0.25 0.00 
Within Two Miles 
Commercial Producers % 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.0(1 
Read Food Labels" 2.42 2.47 2.25 2.1" 
Notice Environmental Attributes on 52.63 42.1 1 41.67 41.6" 
Labels % 
Consume More Beef Due to 10.53 16.67 J j.j_-
Advertising % 
Consume More Pork Due to 10.53 47.37 36.36 IS.l.s 
Ad\ crtising % 
Want Environmental Labeling for 100.00 89.47 91.67 91.6" 
Most Products % 
Would Pay a Premium for Meat 31.58 57.89 50.00 6().67 
Products with Environmental 
Attributes % 
Want Education for Pork Producers % 73.68 89.47 83.33 91.67 
" 1 =never; 2=sometimes; 3=al\vays 
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I'able 06: Comparison of General Information on Participants from the Pre Survey 
Auction (Non-Premium Pavers: Iowa Fall. lA: Corvallis. OR: Raleigh. NC 
(98)) 
Location 
Iowa Falls, Cor\'alIis, Raleigh, 
lA OR NC (98) 
Females % 43.4S 68.18 47.U6 
Age \'cars 64.10 53.55 46.47 
Number Living in Household 2.13 2.36 2.47 
Education Level Years 13.09 14.82 15.88 
Employed % 34.78 45.45 94.12 
Household Income S 35.000 39.100 59.700 
Consume Beef % 100.00 90.91 94.12 
Consume Pork % 100.00 90.91 100.00 
Consume Poultry % 95.45 90.91 100.00 
Consume Fish % 72.73 90.91 94.12 
Times Consume Beef per Month 12.32 7.14 8.41 
Times Consume Pork per Month 9.23 6.00 6.29 
Times Consume Poultry per Month 7.00 11.14 13.82 
Times Consume Fish per Month 4.19 3.27 6.12 
Number of Production Facilities 0.42 0.00 0.00 
Within One Mile 
Number of Production Facilities 1.42 0.00 0.00 
Within Two Miles 
Commercial Producers % 0.00 0.00 5.SS 
Read Food Labels^ 2.39 2.41 2.35 
Notice Environmental Attributes on 42.11 59.09 4".()() 
Labels % 
Consume More Beef Due to 30.00 10.00 13.33 
Ad\ crtising % 
Consume More Pork Due to 52.63 42.86 2^>.41 
Advertising % 
Want Environmental Labeling for 75.00 100.00 1 (Jit.i II1 
Most Products % 
Would Pay a Premium for Meal 35.00 71.43 64."] 
Products with Environmental 
Attributes % 
Want Education for Pork Producers % 80.95 86.36 88.24 
" l=never; 2=sometimes; 3=always 
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Participant Response to Issues of Concern by Location 
Table D7: Issues of Concern and Importance to Participants by Location (Ail 
Participants: Ames, lA; Manhattan, KS; Raleigh, NC (97); Burlington. NT) 
Ames, lA Manhattan, Raleigh, Burlington. 
Item KS NC (97) V'T 
General Issues of 
Concern"" 
En\ironment 1.69 1.84 1.58 1.48 
Water Quality 1.42 1.50 1.35 1.37 
Air Quality L60 1.72 1.52 1.37 
Food Prices 1.90 1.78 1.81 1.74 
Family Farms 2.54 2.53 2.81 2.63 
Livestock Production 2.60 2.53 2.55 2.37 
Methods 
Animal Welfare 2.54 2.34 2.45 1.96 
Pollution 1.58 1.60 1.55 1.19 
Li\ estock Confinement 2.27 2.76 2.90 
Changing Farm Structure 2.85 3.05 3.23 2.59 
Product Attribute: 
Issues of Importance^'" 
Ealing Quality 1.15 1.32 1.19 1.15 
X'isuai Appeal 1.81 1.74 1.68 i.67 
Freshness 1.19 1.19 1.26 1.19 
Price L79 1.63 1.84 1.74 
Production Methods 2.27 2.33 2.77 1.96 
L'niformitv of Product 2.38 2.21 2.19 2.04 
The question was: On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being "very concerned' and 5 being 
"not concerned.' how concerned are you about the following issues; 
The question was; On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being 'very important' and 5 being 
"not important." indicate how important the following attributes are for the products 
you consume; 
Table D8: Issues of Concern and Importance to Participants by Location (All 
Participants: Iowa Fall, lA; Corvallis, OR; Raleigh. NC (98)) 
Iowa Falls. Cor>-allis, Raleigh, 
Item lA OR NC (98) 
General Issues of 
Concern"' 
Environment 1.57 1.62 1.59 
Water Quality 1.26 1.35 1.43 
Air Quality 1.53 1.50 1.49 
Food Prices 2.02 2.02 2.12 
Family Farms 2.21 2.67 2.86 
Livestock Production 2.22 2.35 2.52 
Methods 
Animal Welfare 2.52 2.20 2.43 
Pollution 1.42 1.48 1.41 
Li\ estock Confinement 1.75 2.57 2.70 
Changing Farm Structure 2.57 3.10 3.11 
Product .Attribute: Issues 
of Importance"" 
Ealing Quality 1.25 1.16 1.14 
X'lsual .Appeal 1.63 1.58 1.66 
Freshness 1.18 1.19 1.U9 
Price 1.68 1.81 1.77 
Production Methods 2.09 1.97 2.14 
L'niformitv of Product 1.86 2.24 2.07 
The question was: On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being "very concerned" and 5 being 
"not concerned," how concerned are you about the following issues: 
"" The question was: On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being 'very important' and 5 being 
"not important," indicate how important the following attributes are for the products 
you consume; 
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Table D9: Issues of Concern and Importance to Participants by Location (Premium 
Payers: Ames, lA: Manhattan, KS; Raleigh. NC (97); Burlington. NT) 
Ames, lA Manhattan, Raleigh, Burlington. 
Item KS NC (97) NT 
General Issues of 
Concern'"' 
Environment 1.S3 1.7S 1.42 1.27 
Water Quality 1.45 1.4S 1.26 1.33 
Air Quality 1.66 1.65 1.32 1.27 
Food Prices 1.83 1.75 1.84 1.80 
Family Farms 2.55 2.53 2.74 2.20 
Livestock Production 2.66 2.40 2.47 2.33 
Methods 
Animal Welfare 2.38 2.33 2.68 2.13 
Pollution 1.66 1.55 1.47 1.13 
Li\ esiock Confinement 2.34 2.68 3.16 2.20 
Changing Farm Structure 2.69 2.93 3.26 2.13 
Product Attribute: 
Issues of Importance"*' 
Ealing Quality 1.17 1.31 1.21 1.07 
X'isual Appeal 1.86 1.79 1.79 1.60 
Freshness 1.14 1.21 1.26 1.20 
Price 1.62 1.64 1.89 l .SO 
Production Methods 2.14 2.38 2.89 2.07 
L'niformitv of Product 2.17 2.15 2.16 2.07 
The question was; On a scale from 1 Ihrough 5 with I being 'very concerned" and 5 being 
'not concerned.' how concerned are you about the following issues; 
' The question was; On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being "very important" and 5 being 
'not important,' indicate how important the following attributes are for the products 
vou consume: 
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Table DIO: Issues of Concern and Importance to Participants by Location (Premium 
Payers: Iowa Fall, lA; Corvallis, OR; Raleigh, NC (98)) 
Iowa Falls, Cor>'allis, Raleigh. 
Item lA OR NC (98) 
General Issues of 
Concern'"' 
Environment 1.50 1.61 1.52 
Water Quality LIT 1.39 1.37 
Air Quality 1.46 1.50 1.46 
Food Prices L91 2.00 2.00 
Family Farms 2.24 2.74 2.67 
Livestock Production 2.26 2.45 2.48 
Methods 
Animal Welfare 2.62 2.24 2.37 
Pollution 1.37 1.45 1.37 
Livestock Confinement 1.65 2.55 2.52 
Changing Farm Structure 2.41 3.26 3.11 
Product Attribute: Issues 
of Importance'*" 
Ealing Quality 1.31 1.22 1.07 
\'isual Appeal 1.68 1.55 1.67 
Freshness 1.20 1.26 1.07 
Price 1.74 1.76 1.74 
Production Methods 2.26 1.89 2.30 
L'nifomiitv of Product 1.97 ? ">9 2.19 
The question was: On a scale from 1 through 5 with I being "very concerned" and 5 being 
"no: concerned,' how concerned are you about the following issues: 
Tlie question was: On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being "very important" and 5 bemg 
"not important.' indicate how important the following attributes are for the products 
vou consume: 
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Table DI I: Issues of Concern and Importance to Participants by Location (Non-
Premium Payers: Ames, lA: Manhattan, KS; Raleigh, NC (97); Burlington. 
\ T )  
Ames, lA Manhattan, Raleigh, Burlington. 
Item KS NC (97) \T 
General Issues of 
Concern'"' 
Environment 1.47 2.00 1.83 1.75 
Water Quality 1.37 1.56 1.50 1.42 
Air Quality 1.53 1.89 1.83 1.50 
Food Prices 2.00 1.83 1.75 1.67 
Family Farms 2.53 2.56 2.92 3.17 
Livestock Production 2.53 2.83 2.67 2.42 
Methods 
.\nimal Welfare 2.79 2.39 2.08 1.75 
Pollution 1.47 1.71 1.67 1.25 
Livestock Confinement 2.16 2.94 2.50 2.25 
Changing Farm Structure 3.11 'S ^  J. J J 3.17 3.17 
Product Attribute: 
Issues of Importance^*" 
Eating Quality 1.11 1.33 1.17 1.25 
X'isual Appeal 1.74 1.61 1.50 1.75 
Freshness 1.26 1.17 1.25 1.1" 
Price 2.05 1.61 1.75 1.67 
Production Methods 2.47 2.22 2.58 1.83 
L'niformitv of Product 2.68 2.25 2.0U 
•" The question was: On a scale from I through 5 with 1 being 'very concerned' and 5 being 
"not concerned/ how concerned are you about the following issues: 
" TIk' question was: On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being "very important' and 5 being 
"not important.' indicate how important the following attributes are for the products 
you consume: 
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Table D12: Issues of Concern and Importance to Participants by Location (Non-
Premium Payers: Iowa Fall. lA; Cor\allis. OR; Raleigh. NC (98)) 
Item 
Iowa Falls, 
lA 
Cor\'allis. 
OR 
Raleigh. 
NC (98) 
General Issues of 
Concern*"' 
En\ironment 1.68 1.64 1.71 
Water Quality 1.41 1.27 1.53 
.-Mr Quality 1.64 1.50 1.53 
Food Prices 2.18 2.05 2.29 
Family Farms 2.15 2.55 3.18 
Livestock Production 2.14 2.18 2.59 
.VIethods 
.•\nimal Welfare 2.36 2.14 2.53 
Pollution 1.50 1.55 1.47 
Livestock. Confinement 1.90 2.59 3.00 
Changing Farm Structure 2.82 2.82 3.12 
Product .attribute; Issues 
of Importance*''' 
Ealing Quality 1.14 1.05 1.24 
Visual Appeal 1.55 1.62 1.65 
Freshness 1.14 1.05 1.12 
Pnce 1.59 1.90 1.82 
Production .Methods LSI 2.10 1.88 
L'niformitv of Product 1.68 2.14 1.88 
The question was; On a scale from 1 through 5 with I being "ver^' concerned' and 5 being 
"not concerned,' how concerned are you about the following issues: 
The question was; On a scale from 1 through 5 with 1 being •ver\- imponant" and 5 being 
"not imponant.' indicate how important the following attributes are for the products 
you consume; 
22S 
APPENDIX E: LIMDEP COMMANDS FOR RUNNING 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Program for Estimating the Magnitudes of the Premium for the Premium Payers 
RESET 
READ;tlle="C; Program Files\ES\LimdepMeodata_6_17.xls";fonnat=xls;namesS 
SKIPS 
NAMES ; W = ONE. NOINHOUS, NOINHSQ. EMPLY. rNC3060. INC60UP. 
PORKM. PORKMSQ. ATTRIB, PREMl.GENHINCS 
CREATE ; Z = ORDPRO S 
NAMES : X = ONE, AGE, GR^AJDCOL. GRADGRAD.INC3060. rNC60L'P. 
ATTRIB. MRPRK, ENVLVL PRKEDUIS 
CREATE ; V = R4939 S 
CALC ; J = 2 S 
ORDERED PROBIT ; Lhs - Z ; Rhs = W ; Par S 
CALC ; Nolist; JP = Max(Z) + 1 ; JPl = JP - 1 
; KP = Col(VV) ; KPl = KP+1 ; M = JP-2 ; L=KJ'~M S 
MATRIX ; list ; ALPH.\=Part(B.l.KP) 
; U'I= [-10000/0] 
; U2- Part(B.ICPl,l) 
; U3= [10000] 
; MUA=[U1AJ2/LT3] 
; Z11 = Part(VARB,l.KP.l,KP) 
; Z21 = Init(2,ECP.O) 
; Z22 = [0,0/0,0] 
;Z3I =Pan(V.\RB,KPl,L,l,KP) 
; Z32 = Init(M,2,0) 
; Z33 = Pan(VARB,KPl,L,KPl,L) 
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; Z41 = lnit(l,KP.O) 
; Z42 = [0,0] 
; Z43 = Init(l.M.O) 
; Z44 = [0] 
;V=[Z11/ Z21.Z22/ Z3KZ32,Z33/ Z41.Z42.Z43.Z44]S 
INCLUDE ; New ; Z = J S 
CALC ; J1 = J - 1 
; J2 - J ^ 2 S 
CREATE ; AJl = MUA(Jl) - WALPHA 
; AJ = NnJA(J2) - WALPHA 
: DJl =N01(AJ1) 
; DJ =N01(AJ) 
; FJl =Phi(AJl) 
; FJ =Phi(AJ) 
; LAMBDA = (DJ 1 -DJ)/(FJ-FJ 1) 
: DELTA = (AJ1*DJ1 - AJ"^DJ)/(FJ-FJ I) - L.AMBDA " 2 S 
N.AMES ; XL = XXAMBDA S 
REGRESS ; Lhs = Y 
; Rhs = X, LAMBDA S 
CALC ; P =Col(XL) 
; C =B(P) 
; S2 = SUMSQDEV/NREG - C^2 • Xbr(DELTA) 
: RHOSQD= ^^2/52 S 
CREATE ; PJl = (J>1) » DJ1/(FJ-FJ1) » (LAMBDA-AJl) 
; PJ =0S 
MATRLX XPl = XL'* PJl 
; XP = XL'* PJ 
;ZERO= lnii(P,l,0) 
;R = lnit(3,JPl,0) 
; R(1J1)=1 
; R(2J2)=I 
; XPP = [XPl,XP,ZERO] 
; XGl =XL'[DELTA]W 
; XG2 = XPP * R 
;XG =[XG1,XG2] S 
CREATE ; H = 1 - RHOSQD • DELTA S 
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MATRIX ; list: VC = XL'[H]XL - RHOSQD * XG * V * XG' 
; VC = S2 * <XL'XL> * VC * <XL'XL> 
; Slat ( B,V.\RB) 
; Stat ( B,VC) S 
Program for Estimating tbe Magnitudes of the Premium for the Non-Premium Payers 
RESET 
READ;fiIe="C:'Program Files'vES\Limdep Jeodata_6_l 7.xIs";format=xIs;namesS 
SKIPS 
NAMES ; VV = ONE, NOINHOUS, NOINHSQ. EMPLY. INC3060. INCGOL'P, 
PORKM PORtCMSQ. ATTRIB, PREM^GENHINCS 
CREATE ; Z = ORDPRO S 
NAMES ; X = ONE, AGE, NOINHOUS. NOINHSQ. EMPLYMNC3060 
.INC60LP. \WTLAB. PREMl, PRKEDUl. GEN^INCS 
CREATE ; V = R4939 S 
CALC : j = 0 S 
ORDERED PROBIT ; Lhs - Z ; Rhs = \V ; Par S 
CALC ; Nolist ; JP = Ma.\(Z) - I ;JP1=JP-I 
; K:P = Col(W) ; KPl = FCP^l ; M = JP-2 ; L=K:P-M S 
MATRIX ; list ; ALPHA=Pail(B.l .KP) 
: Ul= [-10000/0] 
; U2= Part(B,KPI,l) 
; U3= [10000] 
; MUA=[U1/U2,a;3] 
;  Z l l  =  P a r t ( V A R B , l , K P , l . K P )  
; Z21 = Init(2,KP,0) 
; Z22 = [0,0/0,0] 
; Z31 = Pan(VARB,KPl,L,l,KP) 
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; Z32 = Init(M.2.0,) 
; Z33 = Pan(V ARB.KP LL.KP l.L) 
; Z41 = Init(l.KP.O) 
; Z42 = [0,0] 
; Z43 = Init(l,M,0) 
; Z44 = [0] 
;V=[Z11/ Z21,Z22/ Z31.Z32.Z33/ Z41.Z42.Z43,Z44]S 
INCLUDE ; New ; Z = J S 
CALC ; J1 = J 1 
; J2 =J - 2S 
CREATE ; AJl = MUA(Jl) - WALPHA 
; AJ = MUA(J2) - WALPHA 
; DJl =N01(AJ1) 
; DJ =N01(AJ) 
; FJl =Phi(.AJl) 
; FJ =Phi(AJ) 
; L.AMBD.A. = (DJ 1 -DJ)/(FJ-FJ 1) 
; DELTA = (AJ1*DJ1 - AJ*DJ)/(FJ-FJ1) - L.AMBDA '• 2 S 
X.AMES ; XL = X,L.AaMBDA S 
REGRESS ; Lhs = Y 
; Rhs = X. LAMBD.A. S 
CALC ; P =Col(XL) 
; C =B(P) 
; S2 = SUMSQDEV/NREG - C^2 * Xbr(DELTA) 
; RHOSQD= c^2/s2 S 
CREATE ; PJl =(J>1) * DJ1/(FJ-FJ1) » (LAMBDA-AJl) 
; PJ =0S 
MATRLX ;iist; XPl = XL'* PJl 
; XP = XL'* PJ 
: ZERO= IniUP,1.0) 
;R = lnit(3,JPl,0) 
; R(1.J1)=1 
; R(2.J2)=1 
; XPP = [XPl.XP,ZERO] 
; XGl =XL'[DELTA]W 
; XG2 = XPP * R 
;XG =[XG1,XG2] S 
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CREATE ; H = 1 - RHOSQD DELTA S 
MATRLX ; list; VC = XL'[H]XL - RHOSQD * XG * V XG' 
; VC = S2 • <XL'XL> * VC * <XL'XL> 
; Stat ( B^VARB) 
; Stat ( B , VC ) S 
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